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Abstract  
This research highlights the existence and examines the culture and practices of three secretive 
groups within the Thatcherite state which operated between 1984 and 1989. Primarily involved with 
the state’s responses to the miners’ strike, the groups were also involved in government initiatives 
concerning four other areas of the public sector. The new data is used to answer significant 
questions surrounding the Thatcherite state during the period. The research investigates existing 
ideological mores within the state and gauges the development of new cultural norms peculiar to 
the Thatcher era. New evidence, only recently made available to the public, is used to examine 
Thatcher’s personal relationship with members of the permanent state and measure the Prime 
Minister’s level of involvement in directing policy. The research uses the new data to add to existing 
debates in two key areas. Firstly, Stuart Hall’s theory of authoritarian populism is tested by 
examining the activities of the three secretive agencies in relation to Thatcherism’s ideological 
discrepancy concerning that ideology’s authoritarian and anti-statist strands. Secondly, the research 
attempts to unite two competing historiographical arguments. On the one hand, that the British 
state has always been authoritarian and conservative. On the other, that Thatcher and Thatcherism 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research 
In 1985 shortly after the end of the miners’ strike, the historian John Saville highlighted the 
existence of the ‘Ridley Report.’1 Written by a Tory think-tank in 1977, the Report recommended 
that once the Conservative Party was back in power, Britain’s nationalised industries and the trade 
unions which protected them should be attacked, and the unions ‘destroy[ed].’2 Once that was 
done, the industries could be fully privatised.3 The report highlighted the National Union of 
Mineworkers as a future target and proposed that the miners’ union should be goaded into a strike.4  
The report argued that the targeted sectors should be attacked ‘by stealth,’ therefore avoiding a full-
on confrontation and allowing the government to feign political neutrality in any coming industrial 
dispute.5 In his 1985 article, Saville argued that the Thatcher government went about implementing 
the Ridley Report from 1983 onwards. Saville could not test his claim against any primary 
documentation produced by state agencies involved in the running of the strike – that data was 
secret and withheld from public view. However, that situation changed between 2014 and 2018 as a 
plethora of departmental files were made public at the National Archives. For the first time, this 
research was able to gauge state responses to the miners’ strike using that new evidence. The focus 
of the thesis is not on the strike itself, but rather the Thatcherite state. Clive Bloom and Seamus 
Milne both wrote seminal works concerning the Thatcherite state during the strike. Both argued that 
the Thatcherite state was different to what went before. According to those authors, certain 
elements of the British state behaved differently, due to the authoritarian manner of both Thatcher 
personally and ideological Thatcherism.6 However, Ralph Miliband argued that the British state, like 
any state in a western democracy, was necessarily conservative, biased toward conservative parties 
and hostile toward organised labour, and that this had always been the case.7 One of the things that 
the research investigates is that discrepancy between those two positions. A second discrepancy 
exists in an ideological context - concerning Stuart Hall’s description of Thatcherism as ‘authoritarian 
populism.’8 Hall contrasted the Thatcherites’ public pronouncements of neoliberalism and anti-
 
1 John Saville. ‘An Open Conspiracy: Conservative Politics and the Miners’ Strike 1984-5,’ Socialist Register 22 
(August 1985), pp.295-329. 
2 Report of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group 1978 (the Ridley Report), Margaret Thatcher Foundation 
Online, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110795, p15. (Accessed 24th April 2018).  
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid, Confidential Annex p24. 
5 Ibid, p15.  
6 Seamus Milne. The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners (London: Verso 2014), and Clive Bloom. 
Thatcher’s Secret War: Subversion, Coercion, Secrecy and Government 1974-90 (Stroud: The History Press 
2015). 
7 Ralph Miliband. The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (Aylesbury: 
Quartet Books 1974), p76. 
8 Stuart Hall. Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left: The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso 1990). 
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statism with those apparent strands of authoritarianism within the state during Thatcher’s tenure.9 
This research interprets the new evidence in order to add to that debate.  
Much of the new evidence takes the form of three case studies, each one revealing the 
existence and activities of a secretive part of the state during the Thatcher tenure. The first case 
study focuses on the Downing Street Policy Unit (DSPU). The DSPU was an elite body of policymakers 
based inside 10 Downing Street which provided policy advice directly to the Prime Minister. Case 
Study 1 shows how Thatcher populated the DSPU with private-sector loyalists from companies which 
had longstanding ties with the Conservatives including NM Rothschild and the oil giants, Shell and 
BP. Each company seconded an executive into the DSPU for the duration of the strike. Following the 
Ridley Report for guidance, those DSPU loyalists were instrumental in every aspect of the dispute 
including the accumulation of coal stocks as early as 1983, policing, the law courts, the financial 
battle and the media. Why did Thatcher recruit private-sector executives directly into the state 
apparatus, and what specific activities did they undertake during the miners’ strike in the specified 
fields? The DSPU members and their activities are investigated fully through a deep analysis of the 
new data in order to make an original contribution to ongoing debates about the nature of both the 
Thatcher government and Thatcherism.  
Case Study 2 reveals the existence of a highly secretive multi-agency collaboration of civil 
servants, MI5 officers and senior policemen during the miners’ strike. Known as the Leicester Unit, 
the new evidence will be examined to provide details of what the groups’ remit was, what effect 
Thatcher and the DSPU had on permanent state employees such as them, and what that says about 
both the Thatcher government and Thatcherism.  After the miners’ strike had been defeated by dire 
need, the new evidence reveals the existence of a third secret group – explored in Case Study 3. 
Subversion in Public Life (SPL) was another multi-agency collaboration, featuring many of the same 
people and agencies involved in the Leicester Unit including senior civil servants, MI5 officers and 
senior policemen. However, the SPL existed between 1985 and 1990, after the strike had ended, and 
was preoccupied with several other areas including the rank-and-file civil service, the education 
sector, Labour-stronghold local councils and NHS trade unions. The evidence relating to both the 
Leicester Unit and the SPL will be analysed in order to provide fresh insight into the secret workings 
of the Thatcher state. The identification of processes and influences instrumental to those involved 
will be considered, as well as key contextual developments. Together, the DSPU, the Leicester Unit 
and the SPL offer three new areas of the Thatcherite state which have never undergone any scrutiny. 
Indeed, the very existence of the latter two was not known before this research. These secretive 
 
9 Ibid.  
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groups, the people involved in them and the activities undertaken by those people will all be 
searched in an effort to unify the historiographical discrepancy and add further to Hall’s theory 
concerning authoritarian populism.  
This research utilises recently-released archival evidence – much of it never before seen by 
the public - to make a new contribution in several fiercely-contested fields of historiographical 
debate. The research offers original perspectives amid the often polemical and conflicting narratives 
which surround the government’s responses to the miners’ strike. Moreover, the evidence adds to 
the debate concerning the apparent authoritarian and interventionist nature of Thatcherism as set 
against that ideology’s anti-statist credentials. The research also comes at a critical time period. At 
the time of writing, the 2019 General Election contest has ended with an unconventional right-wing 
figure, aligned to Margaret Thatcher, assuming the role of Prime Minister. At the same time, the 
home civil service in Whitehall has faced accusations that it leaked stories to the press about the 
apparent ‘frailness’ of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, in an allegedly deliberate bid to jeopardise 
Labour’s chances of winning.10 Other state and ex-state employees have recently attacked the 
Leader of the Opposition. In June 2017, on the day before the last General Election, the ex-head of 
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Richard Dearlove, wrote in the Telegraph that it would be 
‘dangerous for the nation’ if Labour won and Corbyn became Prime Minister.11 In a democracy, the 
apparatus of the state might ideally be expected to aspire to political neutrality or, at the very least, 
to publicly and superficially proclaim non-partisanship - the Civil Service Code professes absolute 
adherence to integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.12 If, however, distinctions between the 
governing party and the permanent state disintegrate and those working within the state use its 
resources for party political purposes, then democracy cannot truly be said to exist. If the Thatcher-
era led to the weaponisation of sections of the state against political opponents of the sitting Prime 
Minister then knowledge of that development might prove crucial in the very near future. This 
research is a piece of contemporary history which has a connection with, and is informed by, the 
concerns of the present. Secret state activity, such as that which is discussed here, has a long-
reaching legacy that cannot, and should not, be ignored. 
Introduction to the Primary Sources 
 
10 Peter Walker, ‘Labour calls for inquiry into civil service claim that Corbyn is too frail,’ the Guardian, 30th June 
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/30/labour-calls-for-inquiry-into-civil-service-claim-
that-corbyn-is-too-frail (Accessed 30th June 2019).  
11 Richard Dearlove, ‘Jeremy Corbyn is a danger to this nation. At MI6, which I once led, he wouldn't clear the 
security vetting,’ the Telegraph 7th June 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/07/jeremy-corbyn-
danger-nation-mi6-led-wouldnt-clear-security-vetting/ (Accessed 30th July 2019).  
12 The Civil Service Code. Gov.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-
service-code  (Accessed 7th July 2019).  
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This research is evidenced on a raft of newly-released archival material at The National Archives 
(TNA) originally produced during the years 1972-1989. However, some of the files, including those 
from the earlier part of that period, were only made public as late as July 2018. The Public Records 
Act of 1958 originally stated that departmental records such as those used here should only be made 
open to the general public after a period of fifty years.13 However, a further act in 1967 reduced that 
time period to thirty years, while the government announced in 2013 that it aimed to reduce the 
period yet further – to twenty years.14 Despite all of that, files are often held back by a department – 
often with little or no explanation. The introduction of the Freedom of Information Act in 2005 
allowed for a member of the public to request access to withheld files. However, requests are not 
guaranteed to be successful and can be turned down by the same department which held back the 
file release. Public pressure highlighting a lack of transparency might, however, force a department 
to be more prompt in its releases.  
Representing the miners and their families, the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign (OTJC) 
have long campaigned for an official, state-sanctioned investigation into the ‘Battle of Orgreave,’ 
similar to the Hillsborough Disaster Inquiry. South Yorkshire Police (SYP) interim Chief Constable, 
Dave Jones, announced in May 2016 that the force would welcome such an inquiry.15 However, the 
reason that SYP had been forced to bring Jones in as an interim was that the standing Chief 
Constable, David Crompton, was suspended in the wake of the Hillsborough verdicts. Crompton had 
made crass and insensitive remarks that attempted to defend SYP practices during and after the 
disaster, in defiance of the inquest verdicts and to the anger of the Hillsborough families.16 SYP’s 
commitment to transparency might also be questioned in response to a Freedom of Information 
Request put forward by the author of this research in August 2015. That request was in relation to 
several boxes of evidence held by the force in regard to Orgreave. Compliance Officer Neil Sheedy 
declined the request, which he thought could be ‘vexatious.’17  In October 2016 the Home Secretary, 
Amber Rudd, announced to Parliament that there would not be any government inquiry because 
there had been ‘no deaths or wrongful convictions’ at Orgreave, provoking a raft of polarised 
 
13 Public Records Act 1958, legislation.gov.uk, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/6-
7/51/section/3/enacted (Accessed 29th July 2019).  
14 Public Records Act 1967, legislation.gov.uk, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/44/section/1/enacted AND ’20-Year Rule,’ The National Archives 
Website, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/our-role/transparency/20-year-rule/ (Accessed Both 29th 
July 2019). 
15 Untitled, ‘South Yorkshire Police chief 'would welcome Orgreave review,’’ BBC News Online, 5th May 2016,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-36212531  
16  John Reed, ‘This erosion of public trust: South Yorkshire police chief suspended over Hillsborough verdicts,’ 
The Yorkshire Post, 27th April 2016, http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/this-erosion-of-public-trust-south-
yorkshire-police-chief-suspended-over-hillsborough-verdicts-1-7879541  (Accessed 22nd November 2016). 
17 Email from Information Compliance Clerk SYP Neil Sheedy to the Author, 18th August 2015. 
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opinion across the media.18 The Labour MP Andy Burnham accused Rudd of being complicit in ‘an 
establishment stitch-up,’ while the right-wing historian, Dominic Sandbrook, argued in the Daily Mail 
that it was the flying pickets who were responsible for most of the violence at Orgreave.19 In what 
was arguably an attempt to diffuse pressure, Rudd sanctioned the release of 30 boxes of Home 
Office files relating to the strike which were subsequently made public between June and November 
2017. Some of the material used to evidence this research, particularly in case study 2, comes from 
that material. Without the determination of the OTJC, that evidence might still be hidden from 
public view.  
Historians who use the type of politically-sensitive material used here might be familiar with 
the restrictions and challenges that routinely come up when using the archive to question official 
state narratives. The new evidence reveals the inner workings of closed and covert institutions and 
discloses aspects of the policy-making cycle which would usually remain hidden from public view. 
Even within the new evidence used here, several items were redacted from the files and will not be 
released for 80 years. A department may also hold back records under Section 3.4 – a restriction 
which refers back to the original Public Records Act of 1958. Section 3.4 states that records may be 
retained if they are needed for ‘administrative purposes’ or for ‘any other special reason,’ a rather 
vague statement open to interpretation.20 Freedom of Information Requests are turned down – the 
Home Office has informed the author via email that ‘what interests the public is not the same as the 
public interest,’ and, as discussed, one request was deemed ‘vexatious’ by South Yorkshire Police.21 
These are some of the challenges which occur when using state-produced primary sources that risk 
reconfiguring official memory. Undoubtedly, there are some good reasons for redactions and 
refusals to release evidence. On the other hand, those redactions and refusals, if excessively 
deployed, might be seen as an attempt by the state to construct ‘tailor-made versions of the past’ 
that suit present government preferences.22 The difficulties encountered in obtaining the sensitive 
 
18 See Amber Rudd’s announcement to Parliament here: Alan Travis, ‘Government rules out Orgreave inquiry,’ 
the Guardian 31st October 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/31/government-rules-out-
orgreave-inquiry For differing polemics on the possibility of an Orgreave inquiry, see Jason Beattie, ‘There is no 
justice: Refusal to grant Orgreave inquiry a spit in the face for every former coalfield community', Daily Mirror 
1st November 2016, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/no-justice-refusal-grant-orgreave-9167295  
(Accessed 6th June 2018) AND Dominic Sandbrook, ‘Murder, rape threats, nail-studded cudgels and a mad 
Marxist set on destroying democracy - what inquiry into the Battle of Orgreave SHOULD probe,’ Daily Mail 
15th September 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3791972/What-inquiry-Battle-Orgreave-
probe.html  (Accessed 20th December 2017).  
19 Ibid.  
20 The Public Records Act 1958, Legislation.gov.uk http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/6-7/51 (Accessed 
29th July 2019).  
21 Email from the Home Office’s Police Integrity Unit to the Author, 26th April 2017. 
22 Valerie Johnson & Caroline Williams, ‘Using Archives to Inform Contemporary Policy Debates: History into 
Policy?,’ Journal of the Society of Archivists 32.2 (2011), pp.287-303. 
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material used to evidence this research were time-consuming and obstacle-ridden for an evidence-
based researcher with a limited time period. In some cases, additional pressure did not persuade the 
state to release a particular file. The usual limitations to archival material must also be 
acknowledged. All of the archival material was created by fallible human beings who may have made 
mistakes, asserted false claims and had their own ideological agenda (the latter is indeed a central 
theme of the research). Perceptions of reality detailed by the creators of the material likely differed 
from other people’s versions of the same events. Despite those restrictions, the power of the 
archive is in now, thirty years later, having the potential to expose a part of the British state which 
had until the present remained hidden from public view. The difficulties described must be 
juxtaposed with the inherent advantages of obtaining brand new material previously unseen and 
unused by anyone else.  
Social histories of the miners’ strike have often used oral history and written testimony from 
the miners themselves, as well as from those within the miners’ support groups, to better 
understand the events of the dispute and the effects felt by those involved.23 However, the actions 
of the government and state during the strike remain a source of deep division. Allegations of state 
brutality and underhand tactics have been put forward by authors such as Seamus Milne and Clive 
Bloom.24 Those texts are necessarily journalistic - due to a lack of existing archival evidence at the 
time of publication. Although both of those texts are key secondary works in this research, Bloom 
(who argues that the Thatcher state engaged in a raft of counter-subversion and secret political plots 
against opponents) offers the disclaimer that ‘you either believe it or you don’t.’ That lack of 
evidence has led to a significant and identifiable gap in knowledge concerning the government’s 
responses to the strike. An initial reading of one set of primary sources, the Prime Minister’s Office 
papers, at TNA in 2016 revealed the noticeable involvement of the Downing Street Policy Unit in the 
government’s responses to the strike. After the Home Office files were released in 2017, details of 
another group, the secretive Leicester Unit, emerged. In both cases, much of the data consisted of 
minutes of meetings and letters, the latter including correspondence to and from the Prime 
Minister, the Home Secretary and others ministers. A deep, interpretive reading of both sets of 
sources allowed for the composition of a narrative exposition which explained the findings in light of 
the knowledge gap and the existing literature. In July 2018, another set of papers were released, 
entitled ‘the Threat of Subversion.’ Although those were produced shortly after the strike, they 
 
23 For instance: Penny Green. The Enemy Without: Policing and Class Consciousness in the Miners’ Strike 
(Milton Keynes: OpenUP 1990).  
24 Seamus Milne. The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners (London: Verso 2014), and Clive 
Bloom. Thatcher’s Secret War: Subversion, Coercion, Secrecy and Government 1974-90 (Stroud: The History 
Press 2015).  
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revealed the existence of another group, Subversion in Public Life (SPL), which appeared to have a 
similar remit to the other groups highlighted in this research and analysed up until that point. 
Several of the same people from within the state agencies involved in the Leicester Unit were 
involved again. That release of new documentation offered another insight into the relationship 
between Thatcher and some of those within the permanent state and allowed for the widening of 
the evidence base and the strengthening of the narrative composition as it existed at that time. 
Although the archive remains an enduring symbol of state authority, the release of the new 
evidence, often under pressure from agencies like the OTJC, means that a significant contribution 
can now be made toward closing the knowledge gap by replacing allegation with evidence-based 
analysis. The raw material of the archive is the central pillar on which this research is based - it has 
provided both immediacy and authenticity to the thesis.  
Research Questions and Methodological Approach 
The archival data which makes up the primary sources will undergo a process of documentary 
analysis in order to find answers to the research questions below. However, that analysis is not 
based on mere detection of bias. As discussed above, the primary documentation to be studied in 
this research is held by the National Archives at Kew. Although the National Archives is a public 
institution, it is financed by the state. The government of the day owns and controls the archive. 
Rules of privacy and secrecy continue to protect both private individuals and public bodies from 
embarrassment.25 The British state is not necessarily to be trusted in these areas – as the 
Hillsborough Inquests revealed. As such, it is widely recognised that the state archive is likely to be 
biased, and detection of those biases would not constitute a major discovery.26 Rather than bias 
detection, the method focuses on identifying the particular processes and influences by which the 
record was produced, the contextual developments surrounding the production of the document, 
and the existing historiographical framework surrounding the subject matter on which the new 
evidence gives insight.  
1. To what extent were the ideological mores of Thatcherism adopted by those working 
within the permanent state such as senior civil servants, MI5 officers and senior police? 
2. What cultural norms were established within the state in response to Thatcher and 
Thatcherism?  
 
25 Peter Claus & John Marriott. History: An Introduction to Theory, Method and Practice (Oxon: Routledge 
2017), p434.  
26 Ibid.  
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3. Margaret Thatcher has been described by Simon Jenkins as an aggressive and angry 
leader. In what way did Thatcher’s leadership and personality influence members of the 
permanent state during her tenure?  
4. Thatcher recruited private-sector loyalists directly into the state apparatus. What impact 
did they have on members of the permanent state? 
5. Clive Bloom and Seamus Milne have argued that the advent of Thatcher led to the 
politicisation of sections of the state. How far was this a new manifestation, given existing 
claims (by Miliband) that the permanent state had always been politically biased in favour 
of conservatism?  
6. Although neoliberal theory champions the rolling-back of the state, Thatcherism has been 
described by Stuart Hall as ‘Authoritarian Populism.’ To what extent is Hall’s theory 
proven or disproven by the new evidence? 
 
Questions 1 & 2: Identification of processes and influences on those described within the new 
evidence: The new evidence will be analysed in order to identify the constructed narratives and 
conceptual apparatus which state employees adhered to when making their decisions and 
undertaking their activity.27 Question 1 looks for the ideological mores of Thatcherism specifically, 
and gauges how far the Tory Party’s new ideological direction permeated the permanent British 
state. Question 2 looks for evidence of the cultural norms in which the members of the three secret 
groups operated. To sum up, were the members of the three groups proactive Thatcherites?  
Questions 3 & 4: Contextual developments: To what extent where those within the state reacting to 
contextual developments? In order to answer question 3, the new evidence will be searched for 
evidence of Thatcher’s personal relationship with those operating within the three groups, to find 
out the scale of the Prime Minister’s own impact on the permanent state. An initial reading of the 
Prime Minister’s Papers (PREM) revealed the recruitment of private-sector loyalists directly into 
Number 10. What influence did they have on the public sector employees already present? Were the 
members of the three groups reactive to new and important influences?  
 Questions 5 & 6: the new evidence in contemporary historiographical debates:  Questions 5 and 6 
will examine the new data in regard to two unresolved conflicts within existing historiography. The 
first of these conflicts, examined in Question 5, is a chronological discrepancy. Authors such as 
 
27 Valerie Johnson & Caroline Williams, ‘Using Archives to Inform Contemporary Policy Debates: History into 
Policy?,’ Journal of the Society of Archivists 32.2 (2011), pp.287-303. 
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Bloom and Milne have argued that Thatcher ushered in a politicisation of the state.28 However, 
Miliband argued that the state has always been conservative.29 Can the new evidence provide a 
bridge between these two positions by revealing the inner workings of a secretive part of the 
Thatcherite state? The second discrepancy, addressed in Question 6, concerns the authoritarian 
nature of Thatcherism as described by Hall.30 Despite Hall’s analysis, Thatcherites were publicly 
strident cheerleaders for the rolling back of the state. How will the new evidence fit into this 
unresolved issue?  
 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review  
One of the central concepts of this research is the ‘culture of conformity’ which, it is argued, was 
established across several agencies of the state apparatus. Thatcher’s brash and uncompromising 
personality (discussed below) can be seen as an important causal element of the culture of 
conformity. However, other causes must be considered. Some contemporaries have argued that the 
sycophantic deference sometimes shown to Thatcher by those surrounding her was not the Prime 
Minister’s fault, but a symptom of their own weakness - for being too afraid to offer disagreement. 
Already-established culture norms within state institutions also contributed. Moreover, Britain’s 
constitutional framework had long been identified as being particularly at risk from a ‘zealot-like 
Premier.’31 Another consideration is whether those operating within the culture of conformity acted 
with ‘political legitimacy.’ It might be argued that the activities of those within the state apparatus 
were always legitimate if carried-out with the sanction of the democratically-elected, sitting Prime 
Minister. On the other hand, the secretive nature of the groups discussed might be seen as a 
manifestation of state activities without ‘moral justification’ and therefore denoting a lack of 
legitimacy. This research is necessarily dense, covering as it does a seventeen-year time period and 
touching on several different areas of historiographical debate including ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘the 
miners’ strike.’  To understand Thatcherism, several authors have examined the electoral and 
economic elements, broken the ideological side down into constituent themes, and pointed out 
Thatcher’s own apparent belief that her cause was, above all, moral.32 Existing literature surrounding 
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the strike reveals a further conceptual framework revolving around ‘polarisation’ - in a geographical, 
political and socio-economic sense.  
The Culture of Conformity 
Writing shortly after the strike, the historian Raphael Samuel attempted to explain why Thatcher 
might have felt that it was the duty of some elements of the security apparatus to act in a manner 
which might be deemed as politically partisan, at least to some observers.33 For committed 
Thatcherites (which included the Prime Minister herself), argued Samuel, a strike represented 
societal chaos.34  Insubordination from political opponents emanating from the working-classes, 
threats to law and order and threats to private property made the NUM and the flying pickets 
subversives which in turn made them criminals and even enemies of the state. Thatcher’s own 
‘enemy within speech’ was another example of the Prime Minister’s view of the miners’ leaders, and 
Scargill in particular, not just as personal and political opponents, but as opponents of the British 
state which she represented and therefore, the British nation. For those working within the state, 
Thatcher was a leader who was angry, intolerant of dissent and not averse to replacing anyone who 
did offer alternative opinions. Her belligerent personality was well-documented by Jenkins, who 
knew her personally.35 According to Jenkins, the Prime Minister was socially gauche, lacked a warm 
and sympathetic side, and often displayed insensitivity to the plight of the poor.36  Thatcher 
appeared to hold pre-formed views on any evidence put before her and would become instantly 
aggressive and dismissive if anyone present demurred. If she felt that she was losing a point, she 
quickly switched to another.37 Those qualities made for a strong leader and meant that she never 
seemed like she was less than in command to those around her.38 Her non-toleration of dissent 
meant that she liked to surround herself with those from whom she could expect agreement and 
adoration.39 Unlike previous Prime Ministers, Thatcher preferred to hand-pick her own civil servants 
in Whitehall.40  
However, Michael Heseltine argued that some Whitehall officials and Tory MPs alike were 
responsible for allowing Thatcher to ride roughshod over them – even if they knew she was wrong. 
Heseltine felt that Thatcher’s gender was a major cause of that sycophancy. Most of those within 
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Whitehall and other areas of the state were men, and men of a certain generation. For old-school 
middle and upper-class ‘gentlemen’ like them, argued Heseltine, it was not socially acceptable to 
argue with a woman - men deferred to women and did not speak back.41 Thatcher’s personal 
assistant, Janice Richards, found that deference and sycophancy more difficult to explain. She 
rejected the notion that Thatcher was dismissive of other people’s opinions. While it was true that 
the Prime Minister’s opinion on any given subject would inevitably be adopted by everyone else, 
reflected Richards, it was because no one else had the nerve to offer one. As she reflected, ‘too few 
people dared to approach her.’42  
Others have argued that Thatcher’s hand-picked loyalists made it clear to any occasional 
dissenter that a pariah status could be expected for anyone foolish enough to be overly critical of 
the Prime Minister. One-nation Tory and Thatcher critic Ian Gilmour was told by arch-Thatcherite 
Nicholas Ridley that the Prime Minister’s election victory in 1979 meant that, unlike previous British 
Prime Ministers, she now ‘carried the responsibility of the Executive, just like the President of the 
United States.’43 When Gilmour later tried to question a decision made by Thatcher, Ridley was 
despatched to tell him that ‘she alone must be left to take the ultimate decisions which are 
important.’44 Thatcher sacked Gilmour in September 1981.  
Police historian Tom Cockcroft made the point that public organisations of the state were 
not entirely constrained by market forces, and that political and legal considerations were 
paramount – rather than financial considerations.45 In such a climate, existing political biases might 
be magnified if kickstarted by an event such as the election of a well-liked and politically-aligned 
Prime Minister. The public organisation examined by Cockcroft, the police, revealed what the author 
called a ‘structured and hierarchical culture’ which came about because of an emphasis on structural 
stability and procedural regularity.46 Adherence to, and preference for, hierarchy and stability might 
be seen to denote existing (small-c) conservatism within public organisations such as the police. In 
such an existing culture, elements of a conservative state might have existed long before the advent 
of Thatcher. It has been argued by Miliband that most state agencies, as they existed in liberal 
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democracies, were not likely to be neutral in any case.47 The author pointed to a long history of 
government-backed strike breaking and state agencies siding with employers against workers – a 
scene familiar in the modern histories of many Western democracies. Using state-coercion and 
state-sponsored violence, carried out for the supposed national interest, showed the state’s natural 
position as a coercive instrument of the ruling-class, argued Miliband.48   
As well as existing conservative biases within institutional culture, other authors have 
pointed out historic constitutional barriers which may have accounted for a lack of political 
neutrality from some within the state apparatus. Arguing as far back as the late nineteenth century, 
Bagehot pointed out that the two-party system, which has defined the British political system for 
two centuries, made it impossible for any sitting government to be anything other than sectarian.49 
However, the author felt that other elements of the state might be protected. A proponent of the 
constitutional monarchy, Bagehot believed that the danger of a despotic Prime Minister was offset 
by the fact that the monarch might step in, should the apparatus of the state be used by a ‘zealot-
like Premier.’50 By the late 20th Century, however, much of the crown’s power had been reduced. In 
the passing of legislation, royal assent was now little more than a polite hark back to former times. 
Such changes undermined the possibility of direct monarchical interference into political discourse, 
particularly in relation to policy. Bagehot had identified the British state’s constitutional vulnerability 
to the whims of a future ‘zealot-like’ or ‘despotic’ Prime Minister. Without that outlet of monarchical 
interference, Bagehot argued that the possibility of such a Premier wielding unchallenged influence 
over the state was a distinct possibility. As a Tory shadow minister in 1976, Quintin Hogg also 
recognised Britain’s constitutional flaw. Because of the archaic first-past-the-post electoral system 
and enforced party discipline, Hogg pointed out, government bills almost always passed through the 
Commons – a tendency towards executive dominance unseen elsewhere in Western democracies. 
That left the agencies of the state at the whim of an ‘elective dictatorship’ – the term Hogg coined to 
describe the constitutional dominance of the sitting Prime Minister and the governing party over 
Britain’s state institutions.51  
Legitimacy 
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 ‘Consent by the public’ was described by many authors as the main source of political legitimacy.52 
The three state agencies described in this research all operated in secret and adhered to stealth. 
Their existence and activities cannot, therefore, be legitimised in that way. Others have argued that 
‘an entity has political legitimacy…if it is morally justified in wielding its power.’53 That is, political 
legitimacy can be brought about if the consequences of state action are for the greater good – 
though must still be carried-out within the boundaries of morality.54 However, moral justification 
might be difficult to measure. Thatcher often conflated her ideological moorings with morality. If the 
Prime Minister and those acting within the secret groups felt morally justified, however, then 
deceptions such as adherence to stealth or pretending not to be involved might seem difficult to 
explain. A third interpretation states that democratic approval might bring about legitimisation. 
After the Tories second election triumph in 1983, those working within the state apparatus might 
have felt justified in carrying-out partisan activity - as long as it was ordered by a Prime Minister with 
a large mandate from the public. However, it might be argued that while the election landslide gave 
Thatcher and her loyalists ‘effective authority,’ that authority was being displayed by an amoral state 
that in fact denoted a lack of legitimacy.55 A state that used oppressive and arbitrary force lost the 
legitimacy conferred to it under the rubric of the rule of law.56 In the case of the groups highlighted 
here, difficult questions concerning legitimacy for activity which might be considered partisan could 
be bypassed entirely by the decision to carry out activities in secret and adhere to stealth.  
In August 1985 the Clive Ponting case reached court in the United Kingdom. Ponting was a senior 
civil servant who had admitted leaking documents about the sinking of the ARA Belgrano in the 
Falklands War to Labour MP Tam Dalyell. During the case, Ponting’s defence lawyers argued that 
‘the state consisted of those organs responsible to Parliament and ultimately to the voter and was 
separate from the partisan requirements of the sitting government.’57 However, the jury members 
were told to ignore that definition by the sitting judge, Justice McCowan, who took a different view - 
‘the work of the state was synonymous with the requirements of the government in power.’58 The 
Judge said that those who serve the state automatically serve the government and that there was no 
distinction. If McGowan’s interpretation was correct, then legitimacy might be achieved without 
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public consent. As discussed, however, in the main public consent gave legitimacy – which meant 
that the secretive nature of the groups might be taken to reflect the opposite. Without legitimacy, a 
sitting Prime Minister’s power over society might be considered to be a largely negative one - able to 
control sections of the population, but not in the sense of securing the cooperation necessary for the 
achievement of the government’s policies.59 Adherence to stealth meant a deliberate lack of public 
scrutiny and might be taken to denote a lack of moral authority on behalf of the Thatcherite state. 
Hall and Scraton have highlighted the government’s deliberate criminalisation of the flying pickets 
during the strike. That was a way, argued the authors, of mobilising popular approval for the state’s 
measures of containment and of gaining legitimacy.60 The pickets had become ‘politically 
threatening’ and were criminalised to underpin the control functions of the state.61 While that 
undoubtedly occurred during the strike, what happened with the three case studies detailed in this 
research was something altogether different. Legitimacy was never sought nor attained.  In its place, 
strict adherence to stealth was the distinctive feature for the covert activities carried-out by those 
within the three groups. Whether the three groups, and indeed the Thatcher government, had 
legitimacy might come down to interpretation. 
Thatcherism 
Thatcherism has been described alternately as an ideological manifestation, a pre-planned economic 
programme or even a moral crusade. Hall defined Thatcherism as a struggle on several fronts at 
once. According to Hall, Thatcher and her loyalists managed to unify contradictory ideological 
strands. On the one hand the aggressive themes of neo-liberalism - self-interest, competitive 
individualism, and anti-statism.62 On the other themes of organic Toryism – nation, family, duty, 
authority, traditionalism and patriarchism.63 Hall coined the term Authoritarian Populism to define 
those two ideological strands of Thatcherism which he summarised as a ‘blind spasm of control’ 
coupled with a ‘regression to a stone-age morality.’64 The author believed that Thatcher and the 
Thatcherites merely represented themselves as anti-statist, for the purpose of political mobilisation 
and to construct popular consent.65 In reality, argued Hall, Thatcherism was an ideology firmly 
rooted at the coercive end of the political spectrum. Jessop et al. argued that the disorganisation of 
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the political left was, in part, responsible for the ascendency of Thatcherism.66 Those authors 
criticised Hall’s description of Thatcherism because, they argued, it was too focused on the 
ideological - without an examination of the economic practices implemented by the Thatcher 
government. They argued that the goal of the Thatcherites was to completely re-structure the state 
system and its relations with civil society.67 The authors said that one aim of Thatcherism was the 
purposeful creation of a polarised society. On the one hand, consolidation of an electoral coalition, 
including most of the middle-class, through redistributive policies and creating a new base of 
political consensus. On the other hand, resorting to coercion and denying basic rights to those 
outside of that coalition. Hall in turn criticised Jessop’s description because, he argued, Thatcherism 
eschewed all concept of citizenship – including those within Jessop’s coalition. As Hall pointed out, in 
Thatcherite rhetoric, ‘worker is much less prevalent than wealth creator.’68 Harvey highlighted the 
benefits that Thatcherism brought to the middle-classes – home ownership, acquisition of private-
property and the championing of rampant individualism.69 That was happening, argued Harvey, at 
the same time that working-class solidarities were waning under the pressure of Thatcherism’s 
authoritarian wing.70 The author introduced the term ‘forced consent,’ as middle-class values were 
forced, argued Harvey, upon working-class people.71 As well as building electoral coalitions, Scraton 
pointed out the Thatcher administration’s ability to sustain a high-level of consensus between the 
government and sections of the permanent state, including senior police officers, the magistracy and 
the judiciary.72 That allowed for a united mobilisation of those forces against political protestors, the 
flying pickets, anti-nuclear demonstrators and other alien groups.73 
Some authors have attempted to define Thatcherism in terms of the Prime Minister’s own 
reactionary pronouncements attacking socialism. Saunders highlighted Thatcher’s powerful 
rhetorical speeches in the late 1970s. Rather than seeing socialism as a rival economic system, the 
Prime Minister portrayed it as immoral.74 That moralising of economic questions was a technique 
that Thatcher would use throughout her tenure – most notably the ‘enemy within speech’ in July 
1984. Thatcherism, then, was not monetarism alone. (See main text for more on monetarism). 
Longstanding monetarists within the Conservative Party, such as Enoch Powell, had, according to 
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Schofield, seen the ideology entirely as an economic endeavour – however necessary they thought it 
was.75 It was Thatcher herself who added the moral rhetoric, later on.76 Nicholas Ridley, one of 
Thatcher’s longstanding allies within the Conservative Party and a committed monetarist, 
highlighted privatisation in his memoir as the key tenet of Thatcherism. Ridley argued that Britain’s 
nationalised industries had been ‘riddled with flaws’ and that the ascent of loyalists to the top of the 
Party meant that that view was virtually unchallenged after 1984.77  
Jenkins defined Thatcherism as encompassing two distinct revolutions – the widespread 
privatisation of industry highlighted by Ridley and, later, the authoritarian centralisation of local 
services.78 Jenkins’ work can be seen to compliment Jessop’s earlier claims that Thatcherism sought 
to completely restructure parts of the system. Though insightful, however, neither author’s work is 
based in any hard empirical evidence as none was available at their respective times of writing. Ali 
pointed to the endurance of Thatcherism. He argued that New Labour was a Thatcherite enterprise 
and that Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were both descendants of the same ideological line.79 
Jenkins’ book title, Thatcher and Sons, revealed that authors agreement with Ali’s assertion. Ali 
however described Thatcherism as an ideology of the ‘extreme centre’ rather than the political right, 
with New Labour as Thatcher’s most ‘proud product.’80 Echoing Hogg, Ali used the phrase 
‘constitutional dictatorship’ – though the author places the Labour Party inside the ‘dictatorship of 
capital.’81 That is, an integral part of a Thatcherite constitutional dictatorship (both then and now) 
rather than any sort of opponent of it. 
The Miners’ Strike and the 1980s 
Two of the three case studies examined in this research took place against the backdrop of the 
miners’ strike. The third case study is also inextricably linked to government responses to that 
dispute. The debate surrounding the strike has recently returned to the public’s collective 
consciousness, in the aftermath of the Hillsborough Inquest verdicts and the renewed calls for a 
similar inquest by the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign. Opinion regarding the strike remains 
deeply divided. At the time, Thatcher maintained publicly that the National Coal Board (NCB) had no 
choice but to stand up to the country’s most powerful union, the leaders of which, she argued, were 
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ignoring economic necessity by trying to maintain a raft of uneconomic, nationalised industries.82 
Scargill in turn argued that the pit closure programmes which led to the strike were part of a bigger 
Tory plan, to destroy the British trade union movement by stealth – in doing so massively decreasing 
the influence of working-class organisations throughout the country.83 
Ackers explored the strike through two differing interpretations which he labelled ‘orthodox 
Marxist’ and ‘Eurocommunist.’84 The author was critical of those he described as orthodox – 
including Scargill himself. Ackers argued that class conflict, mass picketing and violence, along with 
the stated aim of striking for socialism, was a ‘recipe for disaster’ when used against Thatcher’s hard-
line monetarists, rather than Heath’s soft-corporatist government.85 Ackers speculated that the 
NUM and wider union movement should have focused on building alliances with newer social forces 
such as women’s rights, ethnic minorities, the peace movement and environmentalism - building 
electoral coalitions which might have defeated Thatcher. Instead, concluded Ackers, Scargill exposed 
the miners and their families to state violence and ultimate failure.86 Waddington gave a different 
take by arguing that the strike was based on industrial necessity in the face of widespread and 
enforced pit closures - and had little to do with already-existing political considerations.87 The author 
offered the example of Britain’s unemployed, many of whom used their meagre dole money to 
travel to, and join, picket-lines.88 Despite that attempted act of solidarity, argued Waddington, the 
NUM refused to offer the unemployed any assistance – an act of self-interest which infuriated strike-
supporting leftist groups such as Militant Tendency and the Socialist Workers’ Party.89 For the 
author, that lack of solidarity with those outside of the union, however unfortunate their 
circumstances were, showed that the strike was not about any grand political scheme. For 
Waddington, Scargill and the miners had no choice but to strike, while Ackers contended that doing 
so was unnecessary and played straight into their opponents’ hands.  
Richard Vinen argued that the ‘class-war’ narrative sometimes put forward by left-leaning 
academics is too simplistic, in that many sections of the working-class, particularly in the south-east, 
benefitted from Thatcher’s new ideological direction and actively supported the government during 
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the dispute. That has to be weighed up, he conceded, against the admittedly negative effects of 
Thatcherism on some parts of the country.90 Keith Gildart argued that the academic portrayal of 
striking miners has often been stereotyped, and that the men possessed a more complex identity 
than is often depicted. Pro-union narratives can be misrepresentative of working-class experiences, 
argued Gildart.91 The author, who is an ex-miner, said that many miners were a-political and that 
political factionalism was a minority concern.92 However, Gildart pointed out that the NUM 
membership was completely divided in 1984, including geographically. In north Wales for instance, 
the majority were committed to the strike – but a significant minority were against and solidarity 
was virtually non-existent at some pits.93  Allen gave further evidence of polarisation by pointing out 
the lack of solidarity with the NUM in some other sectors. Some unions, such as the National Union 
of Seamen, the National Union of Railwaymen and Associated Locomotive Engineers, and the 
firemen’s union, all backed the strikers.94 However, significant unions in other sectors all agreed to 
cross picket lines. That lack of solidarity from the Electrical Power Engineers Association, the Iron 
and Steel Trades Confederation and the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing 
Union meant that the biggest industrial consumers of coal continued receiving supplies throughout 
the strike.95  David Howell described those who remained in work as Thatcher’s ‘defiant dominoes.’96 
The author pointed out Scargill’s failed attempts to win a ballot for a national strike in both 1982 and 
1983, as well as a leftwards shift at NUM Executive level in 1984.97 In Thatcher’s own memoir, she 
pointed out that those who continued to work during the strike were intimidated – including threats 
to kill aimed at wives and children.98 The ex-Prime Minister claimed that the police had been pelted 
with bricks, darts and missiles during the strike, particularly at Orgreave.99 For Thatcher, the police 
were engaged in ‘the defence of democracy.‘100 
Rather than the government responding to militant miners, John Saville argued that senior 
Conservatives had been planning to attack the miners’ union since at least 1977, when the party was 
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in opposition. He highlighted the existence of the so-called ‘Ridley Report,’ which is discussed in the 
main text. Saville argued that the report was a blueprint of attack to be implemented once the 
Tories had regained power.101 Fine and Miller highlighted what they saw as a concerted effort by 
Thatcher, her loyalists within the state, and the media to portray the strike as being exclusively 
about law and order.102 The authors contend that this was an example of a deliberate, continued 
policy of conflating striking miners, and Labour’s left, with international terrorism and criminality – a 
cynical move designed to move public consideration away from the real political and economic 
questions behind the dispute. Seamus Milne argued that Thatcher had personally authorised a ‘get 
Scargill’ campaign during the strike. The journalist contended that Thatcher’s government used ‘dirty 
tricks’ such as surveillance, political manipulation, diplomatic deception and the use of agent 
provocateurs against the NUM.103  In another example of polarised and conflicting memories of the 
strike, Milne directly challenged the ex-Prime Minister’s memoir by asserting that the government’s 
responses to the dispute had ‘nothing whatever to do with the defence of democracy. Indeed, it 
represented the opposite.’104  
Different interpretations of the role of the police during the strike are inherently tied-up 
with the views of state legitimacy, detailed above. The Marxist view is that police forces represent 
the point of contact between the coercive apparatus of the state and the lives of citizens.105 The 
liberal view is that the state represents the general will of society, so those who act against the 
interests of the state should face the police. The occasional brutal and racist officer, so the liberals 
argue, can be purged from the force.106 Vitale puts forward the view that the liberal defence is 
flawed, because it ignores the fact that the basic function of the police has never been about public 
safety or crime control.107 According to Vitale, when elites feel that their system is at risk, they rely 
on the police to reassert control.108 Graef explained the difficulties facing the police during the strike 
by highlighting picket-line violence perpetrated by the flying pickets and highlighted in Thatcher’s 
memoirs. He argued that police memories of flashpoints such as the Brixton and Toxteth riots, in 
which many policemen were injured, were vital in understanding police responses. The author 
pointed out that many working-class policemen had been branded as class traitors by friends and 
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family for doing their jobs.109 Looking back in his own memoir, Norman Tebbit argued that his 
colleague Leon Brittan had a tough task coordinating various regional forces against the flying 
pickets which he described as extremely violent in the pursuit of their goals.110 However, Emsley 
argued that during the early 1980s, the police seemed to become increasingly associated with a 
strident law and order lobby and the abrasive polices of the Thatcher Government.111 Scraton 
pointed out that the police also appeared to undergo a period of militarisation in the run-up to the 
strike.112  In another work, Scraton placed the violent scenes witnessed at Orgreave on the 18th June 
1984 within a linear progression of increasing police violence at picket-lines, stretching back to the 
Saltley Gate incident during the 1972 miners’ strike. The author highlighted militaristic behaviour 
displayed by police at Orgreave such as horse charges, the drumming of riot shields and the 
truncheoning of pickets who had their backs to the attacking officers and were trying to flee.113 
Scraton drew a line from Saltley Gate through the Grunwick Dispute, the Lawrence Scott Episode 
and the Warrington Messenger strike, as, he argued, police violence at the picket line worsened 
significantly in the run-up to 1984. 
When considering the broader context of the strike, Todd argued that the 1980s saw the 
growth of an increasingly global community of private-sector financiers, often aligned to politicians 
and political parties, who sought to advance a neo-liberal agenda that would increase their financial 
and political power.114 Todd reminded her readers that the gains made by those financiers were 
made at the expense of the freedoms and living conditions of other people.115 Focusing on Britain in 
another work, Todd pointed out high unemployment, discontent and violent confrontations as key 
signifiers of the eighties. She attributed all three to the divisive policies of the Thatcher 
government.116 However, McSmith argued that left-leaning cultural depictions of the 1980s, and the 
strike in particular, have warped collective memory. The author highlighted rousing and partisan 
songs such as Billy Bragg’s Daddy, What Did You Do In the Strike? And Pulp’s Last Days of the Miners’ 
Strike as being guilty for offering sentimentalised memory.117 Several films and television episodes, 
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including Billy Elliott, were also highlighted.118  Beckett explained polarisation through a geographical 
context. The author focused on the regional variations which took place during the Thatcher tenure 
by comparing the meteoric rise of the City in London with the demise of northern England’s 
traditional industries.119 Turner pointed out negative television caricatures of those from each side. 
The author reminded the reader of the benefit-claiming and criminally versatile Liverpudlians in 
Bread, and also Rik Mayall’s thrusting young Thatcherite, Alan B’Stard.120  
Power, authority and legitimacy within the economic, political and ideological context.  
In analysing ‘the state,’ it is crucial to explore the relationship between power, authority and 
legitimacy. As Beetham explained, power is not necessarily legitimate. Forcible appropriation, 
exclusion or subjection is often the root cause of power.121 Once power is obtained, subsequent 
power relations will be dominated by the appropriators who will act to give legality to their own 
original acquirement of power. The question, continued Beetham, became one concerning the 
character of the relationships of power. One of the focuses of this research is in analysing those 
relationships of power during the Thatcher tenure, their character, and whether that power was 
exercised with legitimacy. With regard to ‘authority,’ Beetham pointed out that it can exist both as 
an aspect of power relations (authority automatically reflecting power), and a means of power in its 
own right (power deriving from means of command).122 The fact that the three groups studied here 
operated covertly and within stealth adherence means that further questions arise about authority 
and legitimacy. While the case studies will address this in regard to the secret groups, it is also 
necessary to consider the contextual developments discussed above. Economically, the Thatcherites 
had enthusiastically implemented economic aspects of the ‘New Right’ economic direction via 
widespread privatisation of industry. However, a key piece of contextual evidence concerning 
changing power relations can be seen in the accompanying centralisation of public services. 
Politically, the advent of such a strong personality might well have affected power relations at the 
top of the state, as argued by several commentators above. Why did the Thatcher government 
centralise power so absolutely? The three case studies gague any attempt at politicisation of the 
state, but Britain’s susceptibility to what Hogg described as elective dictatorship will also be 
considered. The Ideological context surrounding Thatcher and Thatcherism may have brought about 
changing perceptions of the limits of power, and the necessity (or lack of necessity) concerning 
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legitimacy. Forced consent of middle-class values and authoritarian populism may have allowed for a 
reassessment, and a justification, of a more authoritative government/state relationship – though 
that will be tested fully in the case studies. The rise of the ‘New Right’ preceded Thatcher and sought 
to combine economic libertarianism and social authoritarianism.123 At a glance, these two positions 
can appear difficult to reconcile. The case studies will look at how those working with in the 
Thatcherite state attempted to combine both ideological positions.   
Organisation of the Thesis 
Between the introductory chapter (1) and the concluding chapter (14), the main body of this 
research consists of three case studies which each investigate specific agencies within the state 
apparatus during Thatcher’s second and third terms in office. However, the new evidence also 
contributed toward the understanding of developments which occurred prior to that period but are 
essential to fully understanding what followed – these are investigated and explained fully in Part 1.  
Part 1: The Existing Framework provides new insights into key developments between 1972-
1983 which are relevant to what occurred later during Thatcher’s second and third terms. Part 1 is 
split into three chapters. These move chronologically toward the time period of the case studies. 
Chapter 2 gives evidence of a secretive and covert state agency set up by Edward Heath in 1972 that 
would later be revived during the Thatcher tenure. Chapter 3 details the rise of Conservative-aligned 
private-sector loyalists during the Tory period in opposition 1974-79. Chapter 4 looks at the first 
Thatcher administration and examines key developments in regard to the overall research questions. 
Overall, Part 1 uses original evidence to give a contextual overview of significant trends and 
developments within the state which preceded the 1984-1989 period. Parts 2, 3 and 4 constitute the 
three case studies. Each gives details of the existence and activities of a secretive and stealth-
adhering agency as identified in the new evidence. Each of the three ‘parts’ are also split into three 
chapters examining a different aspect of practice. Part 2: The Downing Street Policy Unit looks at 
Thatcher’s hand-picked policy unit inside Number 10. Chapter 5 shows how the DSPU involved itself 
in the early parts of the miners’ strike, and the chapter also introduces the main figures within the 
DSPU. Chapter 6 provides evidence of DSPU activity in regard to the police and judiciary while 
chapter 7 looks at the later part of the strike. Part 3: The Central Intelligence Unit (Leicester Unit) 
reveals the existence of a secretive multi-agency group for the first time and examines the group’s 
activity in line with the research questions.  Chapters 8 and 9 examine the Leicester Unit’s 
relationship with the Home Office, MI5 and the police and looks at the formation of the Unit. 
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Chapter 10 gives details of the activities of the secret organisation once it had been convened. Part 
4: Subversion in Public Life (SPL) investigates another multi-agency group within the Thatcherite 
state which was involved in state activity regarding four other areas of the public sector. Chapter 11 
examines the formation of the SPL and looks at activities taken within the rank-and-file civil service. 
Chapter 12 looks at SPL activity in regard to the education sector, while Chapter 13 investigates SPL 
initiatives toward both local councillors and NHS trade unionists. Overall, the thesis is made up of 
four parts which ae each split into three chapters – 12 chapters in total, plus an introductory and a 
concluding chapter bringing the total to fourteen. Part 1 provides a prelude and identifies political 
and ideological trends. Key contextual developments are also considered. Parts 2, 3 and 4 each offer 
a full investigation into the culture and activities of a specific, secretive state agency during the 
Thatcher period. Chapter 14, the conclusion, offers an evaluation of all the new evidence in relation 
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Part 1: The Existing Framework: 1972-1983 
Introduction 
Although the advent of Thatcher and Thatcherism were vital components in the weaponisation of 
the state, earlier developments discussed in this chapter provided a framework on which the culture 
of conformity was later established, though on a much larger scale under Thatcher. From 1972, the 
Tory government collaborated with private sector executives in a political initiative against supposed 
‘subversives’ working within Britain’s nationalised industries. At the same time, elements of the 
permanent state – including senior civil servants and MI5 officers - were used to target political 
opponents of the governing party. The events which took place between 1972 and 1983 are vital in 
understanding the intensified weaponisation of the state which would occur after the 1983 election 
landslide.  
In 1972, the Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, set-up the Subversion Home 
Committee (SHC), a small group of civil servants and Security Service (MI5) officers who were 
ordered to carry-out secret counter-subversion against trade unionists and left-wing ‘subversives’ at 
the Prime Minister’s behest. The SHC’s activities included the use of a sympathetic editor of a 
national newspaper who had agreed to smear political opponents of the government. The SHC used 
the private-sector blacklisting agency, the Economic League, to produce its own political blacklist 
which contained the names of known trade unionists from across several sectors. Between 1974-
1979, during the Conservative period in opposition, the party embraced a new ideological direction 
and became close with chairmen and executives from leading private-sector companies who all paid 
into the Economic League. Under the new hard-line leadership of Margaret Thatcher, Tory MPs and 
private-sector loyalists formed organisations such as the Centre for Policy Studies which formulated 
future policy for the Conservative Party. Another Tory initiative, the Economic Reconstruction 
Group, produced the Ridley Report in 1978, a secret plan to attack the National Union of 
Mineworkers as the start of a wider plan to weaken Britain’s public sector trade unions. Between 
1979-1983, the first Thatcher government saw the likelihood of another coal strike increase as the 
Conservatives began the implementation of the Ridley Report – while the left-wing firebrand Arthur 
Scargill was elected to the Presidency of the NUM. Polarisation - between Thatcher and Scargill, and 
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Chapter 2: The Subversion Home Committee and the Economic League 1972-74 
In January 1972, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) called a nationwide strike after pay 
negotiations with the National Coal Board (NCB) broke down. It was the first time that British miners 
had been on an official, national strike since 1926. One month into the strike, the Yorkshire Area 
Branch Official, Arthur Scargill, organised the picketing of the Birmingham coking plant, Saltley Gate. 
Though just a branch official at that time, Scargill had convinced around 20,000 flying pickets – not 
only miners but also sympathetic members of local unions from other industries - to descend on the 
plant on the 10th February. The move forced the West Midlands Chief Constable, Derrick Capper, to 
ask the depot manager to close the plant, which was seen as an instrumental moment in the 
government’s decision to back down shortly afterwards. Humiliatingly for the police, this was done 
in full view of the television cameras.1  Prime Minister Edward Heath’s Conservative government was 
forced into a climb-down, unconvincingly arguing that the government had suddenly realised that 
the miners were a ‘special case.’2 Though the strike in 1972 was primarily about pay and conditions, 
Scargill openly espoused his accompanying, ideological objectives. Using Marxian rhetoric, the 
Branch Official would call for the working-class to ‘take over the means of production,’ in order to 
‘create a new socialist society.’3 For Scargill, Saltley Gate and the 1972 Miners’ Strike was nothing 
short of a class-war, and a victorious one against Heath and the Tories.4 The NUM had also become a 
target for Britain’s small but committed Communist Party, which had been working quietly to secure 
the election of Party members to key NUM positions since the sixties, according to the CP’s own 
industrial organiser, Bert Ramelson.5 Mick McGahey, the NUM’s Vice President from 1972 onwards, 
was a member of the CP’s Ruling Committee.6 Although Scargill had distanced himself from the CP 
by 1972, he remained on friendly terms with them, and often secured backing from them at crucial 
moments. For Margaret Thatcher, then Secretary of State for Education, Saltley Gate was a symbolic 
surrender for the police and the Conservative-led state, in the face of trade union militancy.7 
The Miners’ Strike of 1972 fed myths about the strength of the NUM. Sections of the media 
portrayed the dispute as an embarrassing defeat for Ted Heath and the Conservatives at the hands 
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of powerful union barons.8 During the strike Heath was convinced that a secret group of subversives 
were pulling the strings behind the scenes - in order to further unspecified, left-wing aims.9 Despite 
being told otherwise by Security Service (MI5) officers, Heath informed MI5 that he believed that the 
strike had the hallmarks of a ‘masterplan’ being put into operation by a ‘subversive central 
organisation’ of some kind.10 Just two months after the strike ended, Heath’s fears were 
compounded when two union leaders, Jack Jones of the Transport General Workers Union, and 
Hugh Scanlon of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, were allowed to address a Cabinet meeting – 
a move designed to lessen traditional hostility between trade unionists and the Conservative Party. 
However, ex-MI5 officer Peter Wright claimed that the Prime Minister had been ‘appalled’ and 
Heath later complained to other ministers that the two working-class men had ‘spoken like 
communists.’11 In the aftermath of that meeting, Heath decided that it was necessary to move 
against the trade unions if the Conservatives were to avoid further embarrassment in the future. 
However, the Tory government had felt the strength of Britain’s trade unions during the miners’ 
strike and Heath wanted to avoid another full-on confrontation.  
Heath called for two courses of action. Firstly, the Tory government would need to develop 
better methods of covert counter-subversion, which could be deployed to damage leading trade 
unionists without a direct confrontation. Secondly, for those covert methods to be of any use, the 
government would need to know exactly who the subversives were – their names, which industry 
they were in, and their potential for subversive action. These two tasks, particularly the latter, would 
be onerous and time-consuming. Moreover, the secret collection of British citizens’ personal data, 
by a sitting government, might be difficult to legitimise in public and would cause embarrassment - if 
it ever came to light. Such activity would have to be carried out in the utmost secrecy. In that 
context, five months after Saltley Gate and the end of the miners’ strike, in July 1972, Heath 
established and convened a small committee of six senior ministers, chaired by himself, which would 
meet regularly to discuss ‘the problem of subversion in modern society.’12 The Home Secretary, 
Reginald Maudling, and Secretary of State for Employment, Maurice Macmillan, would be included. 
Completing the line-up were the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, the 
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Secretary of State for Defence, Peter Carrington, and the Lord President of the Council, Robert 
Carr.13 Carr might have seemed a particularly good choice for involvement. He had been 
instrumental in developing and introducing the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which curbed the 
freedom to strike and abolished the closed shop.14 At the group’s first meeting, the Prime Minister 
set out the terms of reference, which would be to ‘develop methods’ which could be used ‘against 
certain types of subversion.’15 However, the ministers would require a task force in order to deliver 
those methods – as well as contribute to their development. It was agreed that the ministerial body 
should be supported by ‘a small interdepartmental official group.’ The second group would be 
staffed by a selection of handpicked permanent secretaries of state and two intelligence officers. 
The second group, named the Subversion Home Committee (SHC) was assembled for the first time 
on the 3rd July, tasked with creating and developing methods of counter-subversion, carrying out 
those methods, and reporting to Heath’s ministerial group.  
The SHC was a seven-person group chaired by Patrick Dean, a former ambassador to the 
United States who was also the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC was 
nominally responsible for the coordination and oversight of MI5, as well as Britain’s other 
intelligence agencies General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Secret Intelligence 
Service (MI6). Dean was joined in SHC by other members of the intelligence community. John Jones, 
a serving MI5 officer, was recruited to take part. James Waddell, another recruit, was the Deputy 
Secretary to the Home Office who handled day-to-day liaison between MI5 and Whitehall.16 The 
other members of the SHC were Norman Reddaway (Foreign and Commonwealth), Kenneth Barnes 
(Employment), and a group secretary, J Moss (See Appendix 1).17  The seventh member was the 
Prime Minister’s Chief Press Secretary, Donald Maitland. At the very first meeting of SHC, Dean 
reflected on the covert nature of the undertaking and told the other members that the ‘existence of 
the [two] groups, ministerial and official, should in no circumstances become known.’18 Dean 
revealed that, under instruction from the ministers, he had specific Terms of Reference, under which 
the SHC would now operate. ‘[U]nder the direction of the Lord President of the Council [Carr], to 
develop methods, including appropriate publicity and exposure, by which certain types of subversive 
activity can be countered [and] to implement[,] subject to ministerial approval, specific projects for 
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this purpose and to make periodical reports to the ministerial group.’19 The Terms of Reference were 
written with some plans regarding counter-subversion at least partially formulated. At the July 
meeting, Reddaway of the Foreign Office mentioned that he had already been holding secret talks 
with ‘the Editor.’20 Reddaway revealed that ‘the Editor’ was the proprietor of a major British 
newspaper. Although no names are mentioned in the newly-released (2018) evidence, in the 
controversial Spycatcher novel released in 1987, former MI5 officer Peter Wright identified ‘the 
Editor’ as Cecil King, owner of the Daily Mirror.21 ‘The Editor’ had told Reddaway that, if SHC were to 
pass along information and stories about supposed subversives to him, he would be willing to use his 
publication to smear those in question.22 Right from its inception, the SHC had a powerful counter-
subversion weapon - the means to spread propaganda concerning political opponents. Although that 
was a powerful weapon, it would only be of any use if a list of subversives could first be amassed. 
Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon, who according to Wright the Prime Minister had taken a particular 
dislike to, were identified as targets by the SHC.23 Both had been the subject of discussion 
concerning their alleged subversive activities and ideological leanings since the previous Labour 
government in the late sixties.24 However, the SHC would need more than two names before they 
reported to the ministers’ group. Jones of MI5 was asked whether the Security Service might be able 
to compile a multiple-industry list of subversives - a blacklist. However, the MI5 officer said that it 
would be ‘beyond the resources of the Security Service to prepare a survey on an industry by 
industry basis.’25 At that point, one SHC member pointed out that such a blacklist already existed – 
though outside of government hands. If it was a compiled blacklist of left-wing subversives that SHC 
needed, there was one organisation in the private sector which had been undertaking that very task 
for over half a century.  At the end of the first meeting of SHC on the 3rd July 1972, in the last few 
lines of the minutes, it was decided that this group of senior civil servants and intelligence officers, 
who reported directly to the Prime Minister via the ministers’ group, would contact the organisation 
known as the Economic League.26 
The Economic League was an organisation dedicated to reactionary conservatism and 
historical opposition to the labour movement. The League operated by collecting and maintaining a 
 
19 SHC1, p2. 
20 SHC1, p3. 
21 Wright, Spycatcher, p369.  
22 SHC1, p3. 
23 SHC1, p3 
24 Ian Cobain, ‘Wilson government used secret unit to smear union leaders,’ the Guardian 24th July 2018,   
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/24/wilson-government-used-secret-unit-to-smear-union-
leaders (Accessed 26th September 2018).  
25 SHC1, p2. 
26 SHC1, p4.  
P a g e  | 35 
 
blacklist of alleged left-wing subversives, which large businesses and corporations would use to vet 
potential employees. Originally founded in 1919, the League was set up by powerful businessmen 
who began meeting in London to discuss the spread of working-class solidarity after the war, or as 
they referred to it in their literature, as the ‘red infection.’27 The League had adopted its deliberately 
unspecific name by 1926.28 From early on in its inception, the League attracted ruling-class members 
from across several public and private sector industries. Rear Admirals, chairmen of big business in 
both finance and industry, and senior Tories were all to be found amongst the membership.29 Early 
members included an ex-Tory Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour. Committed to an anti-socialist agenda, 
the world-view of the League’s membership can best be gauged by the reflections of its President 
Auckland Geddes in 1925, who remarked that the British working-class had become ‘infested with 
interlocking directorates of socialist and subversive organisations.’30 The League’s exclusive, rich, and 
politically-right-wing members existed to frustrate the growth of organised labour by denying union 
organisers and left-wing ‘subversives’ the chance of employment. For most of the twentieth century, 
the League had prosecuted a class war in the interests of capital.  
In 1972, well before the inception of databases and spreadsheets, the League’s blacklist 
existed in the form of a hard-copy ‘Kardex’ system, with each person on the blacklist given his or her 
own card.31 Though centred in London, the League ran regional offices and kept Kardex systems in 
several other locations throughout England. By 1968, the League had built a large network of client 
companies, who all paid a subscription in return for access to the blacklist.  That year, research by 
the Labour Research Group revealed the League’s income to be £266,000 per-annum – all of it 
donations by large private companies.32 The donations were supplied by a total of 154 corporations, 
including all of the major construction firms. Also included were 47 engineering companies, swathes 
of the manufacturing sector and nearly all of the major banks, hedge-funds and insurance companies 
including Barclays, National Westminster and the city traders NM Rothschild. Further large 
contributors were Britain’s two oil majors, British Petroleum (BP) and Royal Dutch Shell Group 
(Shell). In return for their donations, each company would be supplied with a phone number. During 
periods of recruitment, staff would call the number with a list of prospective employees’ names. 
Within a few days, the client company would get a call back, revealing whether any of the names 
were on the League’s subversion blacklist. The company would then be free to deny work to the 
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prospective employee, without ever disclosing why. An internal memo from the League’s London 
headquarters revealed in 1961 that, ‘any company can apply to the League’s headquarters opposite 
Buckingham Palace to check if a prospective employer is a communist sympathiser.’33 It has been 
alleged by Mike Hughes, the journalist who spent decades attempting to bring to light the League’s 
activities, that many people on the list were kept out of work for years, uninformed of the real 
reason why their job interviews were unsuccessful. Hughes has also alleged that the League had a 
longstanding relationship with MI5, going back nearly as long as the League’s own long history. The 
journalist is not the only person to make that claim. In Peter Wright’s Spycatcher, the author 
highlighted the activities of his associate and political ‘fixer’ Victor Rothschild – the Chairman of 
family banking dynasty and League donator – NM Rothschild. Victor Rothschild had worked for MI5 
during the war and had, in the early seventies, maintained close links with senior MI5 officers, 
including Wright himself.34 He was also Head of Research at another League donator Shell, a role 
which meant that he controlled thirty laboratories worldwide - an extensive scientific apparatus 
which he offered to make available to MI5 for the development of intelligence technology.35 With 
perhaps more than a touch of anti-Semitism, Wright alleged that ‘there are few threads in the 
seamless robe of the British establishment which have not passed at one time or another through 
the eye of the Rothschild needle.’36 However, the author insisted that Rothschild’s contacts, in 
politics and intelligence, were very real - and nothing short of ‘legendary.’37 Rothschild’s boardroom 
co-worker at Shell was the oil giant’s chairman, David Barran - the President of the Economic League 
throughout most of the 1970s.38 Though Rothschild operated in the private sector, he had good 
relationships with several Tories which, alongside his longstanding connections with MI5, made the 
NM Rothschild Chairman an influential figure in the political realm. Heath awarded him an official 
state role in 1970 by making him the Head of the Prime Minister’s policy think-tank - the Central 
Policy Review Staff (CPRS).39 Through Rothschild, both MI5 and members of the Conservative 
government had easy access to the Economic League. 
During the first meeting in July, the SHC had announced that MI5 did not possess an 
industry-by-industry list of subversives, nor had the manpower to compile such a list.  Five months 
later, after contact with the Economic League, that was no longer the case. In November the SHC 
minutes recorded that, rather than suffering from any lack of subversive targets, the group now had 
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too many subversives to pursue. The SHC members had become so busy that a number of sub-
groups had had to be formed in the interim – each tasked with developing and implementing its own 
methods of counter-subversion and reporting back to the overseeing SHC group. One of these sub-
groups was named the ‘industrial subgroup’ and was under the supervision of Waddell of the Home 
Office. Waddell officially stated his sub-group’s own terms of reference: ‘to supervise and direct the 
collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from 
subversive activities, particularly in industry, and to make regular reports to the ministers 
concerned.’40 Waddell revealed that the collection and compilation of evidence was now well 
underway.41 It was not revealed where the glut of new information being used by Waddell’s sub-
group, nor the wider SHC, had come from. However, Maitland of the Prime Minister’s Office offered 
an anecdote. Maitland told the other members that he had been approached just weeks before by 
executives from the rubber giant, the Dunlop Group - a firm with longstanding ties to the British 
government. The Dunlop executives had wanted to know whether there was ‘any way in which a 
firm could be warned when it was in danger of employing an individual who was known to have 
been a subversive.’42 They were awaiting an answer from Maitland. The Prime Minister’s Assistant 
reflected during the meeting that ‘the government could help [Dunlop] by giving unofficial publicity 
to serve as adequate warning for firms.’43 Once again, the SHC members referred to Cecil King who, 
they revealed, had already been supplied with photographs to be used to smear some individuals 
identified by the SHC as subversive. Reddaway of the FCO also informed the group that King had, just 
that week, ran a series of stories entitled ‘the Strifemakers,’ which would smear senior union men 
whose details had been passed along by the SHC.44 The group debated on the merits and pitfalls of 
passing their newly acquired blacklist directly to the Dunlop executives. Maitland concluded, 
however, that this would be too risky. It was decided that Maitland would tell the executives that 
they ‘should seek help [directly from] the Economic League.’45   
In December 1973, a full year after the SHC gained its own copy of a blacklist and began 
passing information on to ‘the Editor,’ the group was able to reveal that it now had in its possession 
a ‘series of reports’ on subversion and subversives, across different industries.46  The group had also 
reported to the ministers’ group on the ‘security significance’ of those individuals included in the 
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reports.47  The December 1973 meeting of SHC was also significant in that a new member of the 
group was in attendance. Robert Armstrong of the Prime Ministers’ Department was introduced to 
the other members. Just as Waddell had led an industrial subgroup, Armstrong would chair a sub-
branch of SHC known as the Subversion in Public Life Group (SPL). SPL was to be primarily focused on 
subversion within the civil service.48 Armstrong’s involvement is significant in light of the later, 1984-
85 miners’ strike, in which he would come to prominence, in a more senior position, but engaged in 
the same field of work. As Cabinet Secretary under Thatcher, Armstrong would take Patrick Dean’s 
role of SHC Chair (see case studies 2 and 3 for full details). 
Regardless of the work of Heath’s SHC, the relationship between the NUM and the 
Conservative government had not changed. It has been argued that Scargill and the flying pickets 
were instrumental in forcing Heath into calling an impromptu general election in 1974, after a raft of 
further strikes.49  Amongst Tory politicians, anti-NUM hardliners such as MP for Cirencester and 
Tewkesbury, Nicholas Ridley, had initially wanted an election. He felt that a large Tory majority, as 
predicted in the polls, would strengthen the government’s hand and allow the Tories to be tougher 
in their negotiations with the then NUM President, Joe Gormley.50 However, the Tories were 
hampered by Heath’s stilted public appearances and a series of damaging reports which revealed 
poor economic growth in the run up to election-day. The 1974 election also saw a surge in support 
for the Liberal Party, an unexpected development which harmed the Tories at the polls much more 
than it did Labour. The peculiarities of the British electoral system meant that the Liberal surge 
harmed the Tories without allowing them to gain any more influence of their own. Though the 
Liberals got six million votes, this transformed into a mere 14 seats. The Tories still got the largest 
share of the vote, but this was not reflected by the first-past-the-post electoral system, which saw 
the Tories trailing Labour by four seats. Heath’s election gamble had backfired in the most 
spectacular fashion. Attempting to cling to power amid a wave of criticism from every direction, 
including hard-line rebels inside his own party, Heath met with Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe in the 
hope of forming a coalition. However, talks broke down over Thorpe’s wish to become Home 
Secretary. Heath later admitted that aides had told him that ‘things in Thorpe’s private life, as yet 
undisclosed to the public, might make this a highly unsustainable position for him to hold.’51 It was 
 
47 SHC12, p2.  
48 Armstrong, as Cabinet Secretary, reminisces about his previous role during a meeting in 1985, Record of 
Meeting between Armstrong, Jones of MI5 and others, 15th January 1985, TNA Kew, CAB301/484.    
49 David Waddington. ‘Public order policing in South Yorkshire 1984-2011: the case for a permissive approach 
to crowd control,’ Contemporary Social Science 6.3 (November 2011), pp.309-324.  
  
50 Beckett, Britain in the Seventies, p146.  
51 Ibid, p153.  
P a g e  | 39 
 
left to the Labour Party to form a minority government. After the defeat, Heath’s political secretary 
Douglas Hurd wrote in his diary that, in the ongoing battle between the Tories and the NUM, the 
party was now ‘wandering vainly over the battlefield, looking for someone to surrender to.’52 The 
NUM had been instrumental in forcing Heath to call the election. As such, Heath’s defeat once again 
fed myths about the industrial and political strength of the miners’ union.53 However, Joe Gormley, 
who was considered a moderate by National Coal Board wage-negotiators, had no intention of 
bringing down the government. Heath had chosen to go to the country, despite negative opinion 
regarding his handling of the strike and widespread public sympathy for the miners’ cause.54 Heath 
had campaigned by asking the nation who ran the country. The electorate had decided that it 
certainly wasn’t him. As Hurd’s comment revealed, however, some within the Tory Party viewed the 
election loss not in terms of defeat to Labour but rather in terms of defeat to the NUM. For them, 
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Chapter 3: Private-Sector Loyalists and the Ridley Report 1974-79 
During the 1950’s and 60’s, successive British governments had adhered to the post-war settlement. 
The country had kept to a social-democratic, Keynesian economic programme, based upon a 
symbiosis of free-market capitalism and government planning.1 Although primarily a capitalistic 
economy, the government would step in when needed, propping up struggling industries until those 
sectors had recovered their own feet. Key industries, including Coal, were fully nationalised. 
Throughout those decades, Britain had experienced consistently low levels of unemployment. The 
country was home to a network of nationalised public services, protected by a robust network of 
public sector trade unions, with the NUM seen as the jewel in the crown. By the mid-1970s, 
however, the economic growth evident in those previous decades seemed to have broken down. 
Inflation was surging, causing a series of fiscal crises for Britain, which included a bail-out from the 
International Monetary Fund in 1975-6, to ward off bankruptcy.2 As such, some looked for a new 
economic direction. The mid-1970s had seen a revival, mainly in Britain and the United States, of 
doctrines of the free-market, both as ideology and as political economy.3 At the forefront of this new 
ideological direction was the neo-liberal doctrine of monetarism, championed by economists such as 
Milton Friedman.4 Central to all neo-liberal doctrine was a belief in the superiority of individualised, 
market-based competition over other modes of economic organisation.5 Named the Chicago School 
after the university that Friedman taught at, the free-market fundamentalists were highly critical of 
state involvement in economic issues. Moreover, they saw near-full employment as a negative 
manifestation. They believed that the absence of any fear of bankruptcy or unemployment had 
swung the pendulum of power too far to the side of the workers. They pointed to the huge increase, 
under Keynesianism, of the bargaining power of the trade unions. That was a major cause, argued 
the monetarists, of Britain and America’s economic stagnation. As such, the monetarists were 
hostile toward the very idea of trade unions, which they saw as artificial barriers to unregulated 
laissez-faire.  
In Britain, an early adherent to monetarist doctrine was the Conservative Secretary of State 
for Social Services, Keith Joseph. Joseph was an influential member of the monetarist think-tank, the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). Since its inception in 1955, the IEA had argued for a move toward 
 
1 Victor Allen, ‘The Year Long Miners’ Strike, March 1984-March 1985: A Memoir,’ Industrial Relations Journal 
40.4 (December 2009) pp.278-291. 
2 David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism (St Ives: Oxford UP 2007), p12.  
3 Allen, ‘The Year Long Miners’ Strike,’ pp.278-291.   
4 Andrew Gamble, ‘Neo-Liberalism,’ Capital and Class 75 (October 2001), pp.127-135. 
5 Neil Rollings, ‘Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian Settlement? The Role of Organised Business in Britain in the 
Rise of Neoliberalism Before Margaret Thatcher,’ Twentieth Century British History 24.4 (December 2013) 
pp.637-659. 
P a g e  | 41 
 
unregulated laissez-faire.6 After the Tory election defeat of 1974, Joseph became Shadow Home 
Secretary. He also became the de-facto leader of a group of rebels within the Conservative Party, 
who advised that the Tories should move away from traditional conservatism, abandon adherence 
to the post-war settlement, and embrace Friedman-style monetarism. One of Joseph’s allies was 
fellow monetarist Nicholas Ridley. Ridley was an archetypal Tory of a certain kind - an old-Etonian, 
Oxford graduate and outspoken critic of socialism. He had been aligned to the Conservative Party 
since his Oxford days and had championed monetarist theory since the 1960s, when the ideology 
was nothing more than a fringe theory.7 In 1974, Ridley was open about his involvement in Joseph’s 
rebel group. Like Joseph himself, Ridley felt that the leadership of Ted Heath had been a disaster for 
the party – culminating in the election defeat of 1974. As well as a penchant for free-market 
fundamentalism and a deeply-entrenched dislike of socialism, Ridley felt that Heath’s weakness in 
the face of trade union militancy, particularly in the form of the NUM, had cost the Tories that 
election. Ridley was personally unhappy with the Heath tenure, and believed that the former leader 
was responsible for leading the party off course, not only in the case of the election defeat but also 
ideologically.8 In 1972, Heath had appointed Ridley to a policy group tasked with determining 
privatisation policy for the Conservative government. However, Ridley soon became disillusioned at 
what he saw as dithering and backtracking from the party leader. After Heath attempted to move 
Ridley sideways, Ridley resigned, declaring that he wanted nothing more to do with a Heath-led 
government, and returned to the back benches.9 Ridley’s ingrained dislike of socialism, his fondness 
for monetarism and his personal dislike for Heath made him a willing member of Joseph’s rebels.  
Heath’s election defeat had strengthened the position of the Tory monetarist rebels. 
However, they did meet with stern opposition from traditional one-nation conservatives within the 
Party. Ian Gilmour, who had been Secretary of State for Defence prior to the election defeat, 
denounced the monetarists on two counts. Firstly, that strict adherence monetarism was no 
different to strict adherence to socialism. Secondly, that strict adherence to any doctrine was 
anathema to traditional Conservative Party politics. Gilmour would later denounce monetarism as 
‘simple-minded, text-book economics.’10 Nevertheless, the monetarist group continued to win over 
supporters. According to Ridley, a vital ally was secured later in 1974. At that time, Margaret 
Thatcher became a staunch adherent to monetarism and allied herself with the Joseph group.11 
According to Ridley, he, Joseph and Thatcher were all heavily influenced by, and met regularly with, 
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Alan Walters, a monetarist economist based at the London School of Economics.12 Walters, who 
knew Friedman personally, was, like his friend, an open supporter of Augusto Pinochet in Chile.13 
With American backing, Pinochet had overthrown the democratically-elected left-wing government 
in Chile, and turned the country into the first fully-monetarist state. Also like Friedman, Walters 
visited the Dictator in Santiago numerous times. Walters neither supported nor condemned the 
repression that Chile’s Chicago School policies appeared to necessitate.  
After the 1974 election, with Labour in power, the SHC and its sub-groups were shut down, 
or at least scaled back. Papers released from the Thatcher-era confirm that, stating that the groups 
were later ‘revived’ in the 1980s (See Case Study 3 for full details).14 One significant exception to the 
roll-back of covert counter-subversion was MI5 and the intelligence community. According to Peter 
Wright, most longstanding Security Service officers were unhappy with the Labour government and 
continued to be Conservative-aligned.15 In the final days before the 1974 election, it became 
increasingly likely as election-day approached that Labour would get into number 10. At that time 
Victor Rothschild, head of Heath’s policy think-tank and board member of two Economic League 
backers, organised a meeting between Wright, fellow MI5 officers and a collection of private-sector 
loyalist ‘sympathisers.’16 One of those present was the retired army General, Walter Walker. Walker 
was known to describe himself as an English Pinochet in waiting, who believed that a military coup 
was needed if the Conservatives were to break trade union power in Britain.17 Joining them was a 
collection of chairmen and executives of large companies from across several private-sector 
industries. One of the latter was Nicholas Cayzer, the head of British and Commonwealth Shipping. 
Cayzer was the Vice-President of the Economic League.18 At the meeting, Wright was told that the 
attendees ‘represent[ed] a group of people who [were] worried about the future of the country.’19 
With such concerns, they told Wright, they wanted, at all costs, to ‘prevent the return of a Labour 
government to power.’20  The group wanted Wright to supply evidence which could be used to 
smear Labour leader Harold Wilson in the press. Wright later claimed to have gone straight to the 
MI5 Director General, Michael Hanley, ready to give a full report to his superior concerning the 
attempts, by the ruling-class subversives, to recruit him.  According to Spycatcher, Hanley replied 
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that Wright should ‘leave it well alone,’ a surprising directive given MI5’s clear interest in left-wing 
and working-class subversives.21  Hanley’s predecessor, Martin Furnival-Jones, later admitted that 
MI5 had been aware of the coup plans since 1968 - though he dismissed the plotters as ‘a pretty 
loony crew.’22  The journalist and Economic League expert Mike Hughes has disputed the claims 
made in Spycatcher. He has argued that, rather than the concerned, hand-wringing observer Wright 
claimed himself to be, he was probably among the coup plotters before nervousness got the better 
of him.23 MI5 officers had taken part in Heath’s SHC group which had carried-out counter-subversion 
against trade unionists – but the targeting of a Prime Minister was quite another thing. Wright 
alleged the existence of a further internal plan, discussed by Security Service officers, to leak 
damaging material concerning Wilson to the press, in the run-up to the election.24 Although in 1987 
only Wright’s word existed as evidence of that plan, the same allegations were made in a BBC 
dramatized documentary in 2006.25 The resurfacing of the ‘Wilson plot’ allegations forced MI5 to 
address the issue on the agency’s official website. MI5 criticised Wright and claimed that his 
evidence was ‘exaggerated.’26 However, the agency did not attempt to deny that the plot took 
place.27 What can be said for certain due to the evidence in this research is that the smearing 
apparatus already existed via the SHC and ‘the Editor,’ and that MI5 had taken part in that initiative. 
In any case, the Tories were defeated at the ballot box. According to Spycatcher, the Labour election 
victory in 1974 signified a big change in the Security Service. It was no coincidence, argued Wright, 
that ‘intelligence on domestic subversion became the overriding priority’ for the officers of the 
Security Service after 1974.28 A particular bone of contention for the MI5 officers was the Labour 
plan to open up MI5 and make it more accountable to parliament.29  
Margaret Thatcher’s unexpected Conservative leadership election victory in February 1975 
saw the monetarists take control of the Conservative Party for the first time.30 The new Leader of 
the Opposition denounced the Tory MP’s not fully committed to monetarism – referring to them as 
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‘wets.’ Thatcher attacked some of the entrenched forms of class power and aristocratic tradition 
that dominated the military, the judiciary and the financial elite, much to the disdain of traditional 
conservatives such as Gilmour. The target for most of Thatcher’s rhetoric was, however, the political 
Left, as the new Leader of the Opposition regularly displayed an apparent emotional and moral 
abhorrence toward socialism. In a 1977 Shadow Cabinet meeting, Thatcher announced that, for her, 
the real case against socialism was ‘not its economic inefficiency, [but] its basic immorality.’31 On the 
election campaign trail in 1979, Thatcher repeatedly linked socialism with ‘evil,’ without ever 
explaining what she meant by the word socialism.32 Rather than talking about any economic benefits 
or drawbacks of competing economic systems, Thatcher, Ridley and the monetarists portrayed 
themselves as moral crusaders, whose mission was to eliminate socialism from British society.33 
Rather than viewing Britain’s economic problems in terms of policy failings, the Conservative 
leadership after 1975 began to view those problems in line with monetarist theory - as symptoms of 
a long-term malaise in both the British economy, and British society.34 Thatcher and her presumed 
mentor, Joseph, believed that if an incoming Conservative government was to deliver monetarism in 
a democratic society, the tenets of the Keynesian system – the welfare state, the nationalised 
industries, as well as working-class institutions such as the trade unions - had to be attacked and 
dismantled. In their place, industries would be fully privatised. As Joseph reflected in 1975, 
‘monetarism is not enough.’35 However, the Tories needed a detailed plan, a strategy of how they 
would go about implementing their attacks and open up those markets to privatisation, should they 
return to power, as expected, at the next general election.  
With his fellow monetarists now at the helm of the Party, Nicholas Ridley had been asked to 
join a Conservative, parliamentary speech-writing team, alongside Norman Tebbit and Nigel Lawson. 
The purpose of this team was to discuss and devise the best strategies for harassing Wilson during 
Prime Minister’s Questions.36 As a fellow monetarist back from the rebel days, and someone whose 
writing skills were being sharpened against Wilson, Ridley may well have seemed like the perfect 
choice for Thatcher and Joseph, as they looked for a candidate to write the plan of attack on the 
barriers to monetarism. Ridley’s devotion to monetarism was second to none. In 1975, Ridley’s 
admiration for Pinochet led him into a series of meetings with General Walter Walker, the man who 
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described himself as an English Pinochet and had been present at Victor Rothschild’s meeting of 
coup plotters. According to Walker, Ridley often insinuated that he agreed with the idea of a military 
coup, though ‘didn’t have the guts to say it outright.’37 In early 1977, Thatcher and Joseph tasked 
Ridley with formulating a privatisation plan via a Tory-populated think-tank, the Economic 
Reconstruction Group (ERG). This was a repeat of Ridley’s brief under Heath, from five years earlier. 
However, Ridley was ‘delighted’ to accept, given that, unlike that original brief, this was issued by a 
leadership more ideologically-compatible with Ridley himself.38 Early in 1978, Ridley released the 
ERG’s report.  
Ridley’s report was a detailed blueprint on how to firstly provoke, and secondly win, a battle 
against the so-called ‘barriers’ of monetarism. The report suggested several steps in order to achieve 
the stated, monetarist goals of ‘fragmentation’ and ‘denationalisation’ of key industries.39 Echoing 
the contemporary monetarist thinking of Joseph and Walters, Ridley outlined the motivation behind 
his report. He listed five objectives, which an incoming Tory government should look to implement. 
Breaking up the power of the ‘monopolistic’ public sector trade unions, rooting out inefficiency, 
spreading responsibility within management, the linking of worker reward and effort, and facilitation 
of denationalisation.40 Ridley argued that previously, there had been too much ‘carrot’ and not 
enough ‘stick,’ in regard to negotiations with public sector trade unions.41 Quoting neoliberal 
doctrine, he argued that the lack of fear of redundancy meant that financial discipline within the 
nationalised industries could never be achieved. Ridley was clear, in no uncertain terms, that ‘plants 
must be closed and people must be sacked.’42 The Ridley Report suggested that the first step on the 
road to privatisation should be to provoke and attack one of Britain’s powerful trade unions.43 
Despite its polemical language, however, the Report was much more than a vague proposal to be 
taken or left. Rather, it was a detailed stratagem which gave precise recommendations on how to 
prepare for and win the battle, once provoked.  
In the confidential annex to the Ridley Report, it was suggested that an incoming 
Conservative government should look to provoke a battle in a non-vulnerable industry, where the 
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Tories would be most likely to win.44 The nationalised industries were put into lists of vulnerability, 
in order to assess which one the government should attack. The report warned against an attack on 
the Electricity, Gas or Water industries, due to the small amount of time the country could last 
without those particular amenities. However, the first name on the ‘vulnerable’ list was Coal.45 The 
Report pointed to the government’s victory over striking postal workers in 1971 as the model for 
success. It was suggested that a real ‘opportunity’ could lie in destroying one of the ‘vulnerable’ 
industries. Such would be the damage, ‘it would be irreversible by a future Labour government.’46  
After a fight in a pre-chosen industry had been provoked, continued the Report, the Tories would 
only need to sit back and wait for a spark to ignite the fuse. It was presumed that the spark would 
come over wage claims or redundancies.  
The Report also warned that any incoming Tory government should be aware of the 
‘communist disruptors’ of Britain’s trade union movement whom, the Report claimed, would be all 
too happy to ‘exploit [any] discontent.’47  In order to counter the political threat, continued the 
Report, haulage companies which employed non-union drivers should be recruited to ‘help us move 
coal when necessary.’48 Also, power stations should be converted to oil-firing, undermining the 
country’s dependency on coal.49 In the Report’s confidential annex, Ridley suggested specific 
precautions be set in place to deal with the formidable flying pickets of the NUM, whom he 
described as the ‘Saltley Gate mob,’ a reference to the 1972 miners’ strike.50 The report suggested 
that a large, mobile squad of police be assembled. Also, that financial legislation be brought in to 
‘cut off the supply of money to the strikers’ during the coming, planned conflict.51 Ridley also 
suggested stockpiling supplies of coal in order to prepare for the coming battle.52 He went on to 
recommend that ‘sympathetic chairmen’ should be recruited and put in place, before the plan was 
implemented.53  However, Ridley feared the formidable strength of the trade unions within Britain’s 
nationalised industries. As such, the Report warned against a full-on confrontation with an 
admittedly strong foe. Instead, it was suggested, the next Tory government should seek to return 
the ‘industries to the private sector more or less by stealth.’54 Publicly, a future Tory government 
would feign political neutrality in regard to the dispute which it had secretly initiated. Covertly, the 
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Tories would ‘apply a whole series of different techniques’ to defeat the targeted union and bring 
about the privatisation of the sector.55 
Despite their preferred political party being in opposition, the period continued to be a 
prosperous one for the Economic League, funded as it was by its private sector benefactors. The 
usual names continued to keep the League in robust health. In 1975, Shell was the joint highest 
contributor to the League (alongside Barclays Bank) with a donation of £5,400.56  After the discovery 
of North Sea Oil, the League had expanded its operations to Scotland, setting up a new branch in 
Aberdeen.57 From there Shell, BP and the American oil giants could all have easy access to the new, 
Scottish Kardex blacklist. The League was not the only example of private-sector political activity 
during the Tory period in opposition. In the absence of the state-sponsored SHC, an extra-state 
organisation sprang up containing Tory MPs, retired intelligence officers and old armed forces top 
brass.  In 1975, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) was set-up by new Leader of the Opposition, 
Margaret Thatcher, and her private-sector loyalists, Ross and Norris McWhirter. Despite officially 
being a private sector enterprise, the CPS was charged with developing policy for a future Tory 
government, in conjunction with Keith Joseph.58 Victor Rothschild seconded one of his most trusted 
young bankers, John Redwood, to the CPS.59 Other prominent members to the CPS were founder of 
the SAS and outspoken anti-trade-unionist, David Stirling, Chairman of the Tory 1922 Committee and 
ex intelligence officer, Airey Neave, and Brian Crozier, whom Hughes alleged was a CIA agent.60 
Crozier was also the head of the ‘Shield’ organisation, a secret committee tasked with briefing 
Thatcher on world politics and fighting subversion.61 With the Tories in opposition, the CPS became a 
meeting ground between private-sector businessmen hostile to the Labour government and the 
newly-monetarism-aligned Opposition front bench. In response to the Labour plan for MI5 
transparency, Crozier advised Thatcher to do the complete opposite, and began developing plans to 
make the organisation ‘more efficient by increasing its secrecy’ – a move designed to endear the 
new Tory leadership to MI5 officers.62  After Ross McWhirter was killed by the IRA in December 
1975, Crozier also set-up the National Association for Freedom (NAFF).63 NAFF was another umbrella 
group containing both hard-right reactionary industrialists and Tory politicians, the latter including 
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Norman Tebbit.64 During the Tories period in opposition, powerful private sector individuals, many 
of them on the boards of companies which paid into the Economic League, bought into the Thatcher 
project and threw their considerable financial weight behind the Tory opposition and their new 
adherence to monetarism (as well as Thatcher’s fierce anti-socialist rhetoric). Thatcher’s private-
sector supporters had laid much of the groundwork for a Conservative victory in 1979, complete 
with a new ideological mooring and set of policies developed and paid for during the period in 
opposition.  
A central tenet of monetarism was the need to dramatically reduce the amount of money in 
circulation, in the hope of cutting inflation.65 Denis Healey, the Labour Chancellor, had embraced 
some tenets of monetarism in the late 1970s, by cutting government spending. However, Labour’s 
monetarist policies, and accompanying public-sector pay caps, were deeply unpopular with trade 
union leaders. In the winter of 1978, a wave of public sector strikes took place – weakening the 
Labour government and causing the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, to label the situation as the 
‘Winter of Discontent.’ The anti-union, right-wing press seized on the phrase – and went about 
portraying the country as being paralysed by over-bearing, over-powerful ‘union-barons’ who were 
unwilling to enter any form of negotiation.66 In reality, many of the strikes were about poor pay and 
conditions caused by the economic stagnation of the period. Between 1975 and 1980, real wages in 
Britain had fallen by 13 per cent – the biggest contraction since the 1930s.67  The minority Labour 
government warded off the threat of NUM industrial action by agreeing to terms beneficial to the 
miners. With the economy struggling and the rhetoric of ‘union-barons’ prevalent, the monetarism-
aligned Tories were able to sweep to power in the general election of 1979.  However, Tory 
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Chapter 4: Polarisation and Preparation 1979-1983. 
The Thatcher administration had its first run-in with the NUM in February 1981. That month, the 
NCB announced a plan to close 23 pits deemed uneconomic, with immediate effect. A further 50 pits 
were earmarked to close within the next five years, leading to tens-of-thousands of job losses. The 
announcement by the NCB led to a wave of strikes across the more left-wing areas of the NUM. 
Senior Tories felt that the NCB Chairman, Derek Ezra, had been foolish to announce the closure 
program.1 None of the recommendations in the Ridley Report were in place – as Ezra’s own tenancy 
as NCB Chairman showed. Moreover, the miners seemed united in support of the strikes, and the 
government was facing polls depicting large levels of unpopularity amongst the electorate.2 Fearing 
that the government was not in a position to face down the strikes, the closure program was 
withdrawn – on orders from Thatcher herself.3  Once again, the NUM seemed to have displayed its 
political clout, in doing so defeating a sitting Tory government intent on closures.  
In December 1981, Scargill was elected President of the NUM with a massive majority, 
signalling a shift leftwards in the NUM leadership. Scargill’s election was complemented by a 
corresponding left-wing shift at the NUM national conference, and a series of appointments of 
Scargill loyalists to the NUM Executive Committee.4 The new leadership felt that the only way to 
combat further closure threats was to match the NCB and the government with their own 
uncompromising, hard-line stance. However, some longstanding members of the NUM Executive felt 
alienated by the Leftwards shift. Self-described Right-winger Roy Ottey argued that he and others on 
the Right of the Executive felt intimidated during Special Delegate Conferences. One such event, in 
December 1981, had been called to discuss the NCB’s latest pay offer. McGahey, now Scargill’s Vice-
President, invited into the hall a group of lobbyists who had initially gathered outside to heckle 
Executive members deemed too right-wing. Ottey claimed that the lobbyists had been paid for by his 
political opponents.5 Once inside the hall, the hissing continued as an accompaniment to the 
speeches of those in favour of accepting the NCB’s offer. With the Left consolidating power at the 
top of the union, Scargill repeatedly claimed that the NCB were pursuing a programme of pit 
closures by stealth, on behalf of the Conservative government. He made the claim in October 1982, 
whilst addressing delegates in Stoke. 6 The threat of further industrial action was never far away. 
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McGahey warned in 1983 that another coal strike was now inevitable.7 John Saville, the left-wing 
historian who first argued the importance of the Ridley Report, supported Scargill during the strike. 
However, the historian did believe that Scargill’s incorruptible unwillingness to negotiate was seen 
by some Tories as something that they could use in their favour.8 In regard to ‘stealth,’ Scargill was 
correct.   
Thatcher began to fill key roles in her administration with monetarist allies. The original 
leader of the Tory monetarists, Keith Joseph, became Secretary of State for Industry. Another 
Thatcherite, Geoffrey Howe, was made Chancellor. Between 1979 and 1981, Howe went about 
implementing a raft of monetarist policies collectively labelled the Medium Term Financial Strategy. 
In 1980, the so-called ‘wets’ were alarmed when Howe told one of them that, for him, monetarism 
was not a political ideology, but rather an incontrovertible scientific principle, ‘like the law of 
gravitation.’9  In 1981 Thatcher appointed the monetarists’ favourite economist, Alan Walters, to the 
position of Chief Economics Advisor. In 1983, Ridley himself was rewarded with the post of Secretary 
of State for Transport. Ridley’s own monetarism had not waned. Neither had he support for 
Thatcher. In 1985, toward the end of the strike, he upset the ‘wets’ by declaring that Thatcher’s 
large electoral majorities had given her an unprecedented, unquestionable jurisdiction, meaning 
that only she alone should make important governmental decisions. The views of the ‘wets’ were 
deemed inconsequential to Ridley.10 Defending monetarism in the late 1980s, Thatcher herself 
would echo Howe’s earlier claim that for her and her ministers, monetarism was ‘as essential as the 
law of gravity.’11  
Thatcher’s monetarist policies and public service cuts exacerbated social divisions, leading to 
a reduced standard of life for many amongst the working-class. Just a year into her first premiership 
in November 1980, she gave a speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in which she stated that ‘we now 
have no alternative but to accept a reduction in the standard of living, if investment and 
employment are to recover.’12 That is, certain sections of society would have to suffer, for perceived 
longer-term economic benefits. However, it is pertinent to ask whom the Prime Minister was 
referring to by using the inclusive pronoun, ‘we?’ The living standards of Britain’s wealthiest 
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individuals did not fall during the period, though those of ordinary workers certainly did.13  Many 
leading trade unionists blamed Thatcher’s policies for a sharp decline in membership, as they lost 
over two million members between 1979 and 1984.14 By 1982, unemployment had risen to over 
10%, where it would stay for the entire decade. Also that year, the Employment Act of 1982 
restricted union rights, banned closed shops and made secondary picketing illegal. Scargill was 
defiant in the face of the new legislation. At the NUM’s annual conference, he told the assembled 
delegates that ‘we do not and will not recognise distinctions between forms of picketing.’15 Massive 
job losses in traditionally heavily-unionised sectors in northern England, South Wales and Scotland 
were entrenching geographical, as well as class, divides. Across northern Britain, middle-aged people 
who had worked all of their lives were subjected to the indignities of the dole office. They were 
joined by another generation, as thousands of school-leavers shared a similar fate.16 Cuts to welfare 
provision exacerbated economic distress yet further. Cutting back on social security would, claimed 
Minister for Social Security John Major, prevent people from falling into a ‘benefit culture.’17 In 
reality, the Tories were well aware that high unemployment was an inevitable consequence of their 
pursued fiscal policy of maintaining high interest rates, in the hope of protecting finance capital for 
the benefit of the City of London.18 However, the protection of finance capital through interest rate 
manipulation conflicted with the needs of manufacturing capital.19 Whilst the financial sector in 
London was rising, the north of England in particular was losing its political and economic leverage, 
leverage it had enjoyed since the industrial revolution a century and a half earlier.20   
The Tories’ own political entrenchment was most evident in their attitude towards the 
traditionally left-wing port city of Liverpool, one of the areas hardest hit by public-sector cutbacks 
and enduring the spectre of mass unemployment. In July 1981, Thatcher-loyalist and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, wrote a private letter to Thatcher, suggesting that the city should be 
subjected to a policy of ‘managed decline.’21 July 1981 also saw the outbreak of violent 
confrontations on the streets of several major cities between rioting local residents and police, 
including in Toxteth. Many of the riots were centred in black communities, angry at what people saw 
as inherent racism displayed by the police, particularly the ‘stop-and-search’ method that was used, 
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according to some, disproportionately against ethnic minorities.22 However, the riots can also be 
seen as a manifestation of discontent at lack of investment, poor housing and rising unemployment. 
Many working-class white people joined in the rioting, particularly in Liverpool.23 In and around 
Toxteth, any buildings that were linked with the Conservative Party were vandalised or set on fire by 
the rioters. Swainbank’s Pawnbrokers (run by a former Tory councillor), Thatcher’s Tea and Coffee 
House (run by the local Conservative association) and Sefton Park Conservative Club were all 
attacked.24 Rioting was also reported in several districts of both Birmingham and London, as well as 
across many towns and inner-cities in the north of England.25 The attacks on the Conservative 
buildings can be seen as a manifestation of the blame levelled at Margaret Thatcher and the Tories 
by some from the poorer elements in society; many of whom saw the Prime Minister as the 
harbinger and cause of the extreme economic deprivation affecting parts of the country.  
However, the Prime Minister also had her supporters. Thatcher’s policies of low tax and 
financial deregulation had led to large increases in dispensable income for sections of the upper 
middle-classes, hence the ‘yuppies’ phenomenon.26 Despite overt coverage of the yuppies in the 
mass media, they were not numerous enough to win any elections for the Tories. However, standing 
in antithesis to Thatcher’s plethora of detractors, the Conservatives had created an electoral 
coalition well-suited to the peculiarities of the British first-past-the-post system.  They were 
inadvertently, yet vitally, helped in this by the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 
1981, a move which split the vote on the Left and allowed the Tories to easily endure a sharp decline 
in their own share of the vote between 1979 and 1983.27 The SDP launch meant that the Tories were 
still able to increase their representation in Parliament, despite the decrease in vote share. 
Moreover, the Tories’ privatisation programs were enthusiastically embraced by some sections of 
the working-class. Some working-class people, particularly in the south-east of England, were 
encouraged to buy, and did buy, shares in newly-privatised companies such as British Gas. Many of 
those same people became home-owners for the first time under Thatcher’s right-to-buy program. 
Some better-off working-class people not only become home owners for the first time under 
Thatcher, but also felt that they had increased their social status and gained a real stake in society, 
through their shares in the privatised companies. These policies greatly endeared Thatcher to those 
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who benefited from them. Even for those who did not benefit from privatisation, many working-
class voters approved of Thatcher’s perceived hard-line stance on issues such as race and crime.28  
Thatcher’s personal popularity, amongst some, meant that even policies which would make 
working-class people economically worse-off would often be supported – put down to ‘common 
sense,’ Thatcher’s oft-repeated phrase. Though policies might have negative consequences for many 
people, or even most people, they were accepted as an inevitable consequence of economic realism. 
In 1983, with unemployment at its highest level for over half-a-century, a survey amongst 
unemployed people found that 24% of the jobless fully intended to vote Conservative at the next 
election.29 That figure can only be attributed to Thatcher’s personal popularity. The new home-
owning, shares-investing beneficiaries of Thatcherism were also committed supporters, matching 
the partisanship of Thatcher’s fierce detractors in their unwavering support for the Prime Minister. 
The British comedian, Labour supporter and keen football fan, Harry Enfield, would parody these 
better-off, southern working-class people with his character Loadsamoney.30 Enfield had been 
inspired to create the character after seeing Tottenham Hotspur supporters outside his north 
London flat, waving £10 notes at supporters of clubs from the unemployment-stricken north.31  
Well aware of the polarised opinions within society, the Prime Minister often used the right-
wing press to illicit surges of patriotic fervour and to quell discontent.  In April 1982, Thatcher was 
given a golden opportunity when Argentinian President Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the Falkland 
Islands. Because of the conflict, the House of Commons, media and indeed many voters got a taste 
of military aggression in pursuit of liberal-sounding causes such as the right to self-determination 
and the need to remove dictators.32  The Falklands War was the only event which saw Ridley in 
disagreement with Thatcher. In the run-up to the Argentine invasion, Ridley had visited the islands. 
On his return, he suggested to the Prime Minister that the islands be ‘leased back’ to the Argentines, 
as they had no real economic value to Britain. Thatcher’s response to Ridley was described as 
‘thermonuclear.’33 The Falklands episode helped to consolidate Thatcher’s power within the 
Conservative Party itself. Norman Fowler, who served in a number of different Cabinet positions 
under Thatcher, wrote a newspaper article in 2013 in which he claimed that prior to the Falklands 
War, Tory Cabinet meetings were often riven with dissent. According to Fowler, the one-nation 
conservative detractors of hard-monetarism criticized Thatcher’s cuts and sweeping privatisation 
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programs. Derided by Thatcherites as the so-called ‘wets,’ these included the Environment Secretary 
Michael Heseltine, the Minister for Arts Norman St John-Stevas and the Lord Privy Seal and long-
standing Thatcher critic, Ian Gilmour.34 All argued that the Prime Minister’s monetarist policies were 
hurting the poorest in society.  Fowler claimed that he was an outspoken ‘wet’ himself. In a show of 
her trademark low tolerance for dissent, however, Thatcher replaced Fowler as Secretary of State 
for Transport in October 1983. The new incumbent would be Nicholas Ridley. That would certainly 
have been seen as a promotion for Ridley, who had been serving as a mid-level Treasury secretary 
beforehand. Fowler was moved to the relatively minor position of Secretary of State for Social 
Services. Despite widespread hostility from many political opponents inside and outside the Party, in 
June 1983 the Tories won a second general election, and Thatcher’s first landslide victory. With her 
aims and methods justified by the result, argues Fowler, internal dissenters were silenced. The 
removal from the Cabinet of some who questioned the Prime Minister’s decision-making, may also 
have contributed to the decision of those who remained to be more careful with any criticism, 
eliciting the beginning of a culture of conformity within the Cabinet. After the 1983 election, 
Thatcher and her loyalists could go about their duties safe in the knowledge that the election result 
had consolidated the Tory front bench behind them.  
Despite now operating under a government much more in line with its own political stance, 
the Economic League faced a decline in the early 1980s. A downturn in the labour market and a 
recession in construction led to a sharp downturn in requests for information.35 In turn, 
subscriptions also began to slide. In August 1983, 13 workers were sacked by British Leyland, 
including the union leader Derek ‘Red Robbo’ Robertson (see case study 2 for full details). MI5 had 
identified Robertson and his co-workers as ‘subversives’ because they had met with Communist 
Party members. MI5 anonymously passed the details on to company bosses. The affair was seen as a 
failure by the once-powerful League. None of the thirteen were on the Midlands blacklist. The 
League had not only failed to prevent their employment but had no idea of their ‘subversive’ links 
until the story was in the press. In 1972, the SHC had turned to the League because their blacklisting 
techniques were more advanced than the state’s and because they had actually-existing blacklists. 
By 1983, that was not the case. MI5 and senior civil servants - engaged in counter-subversion against 
political opponents of the governing Conservative Party - no longer required the services of the 
League. Mike Hughes attempted to explain why. Under Thatcher, ‘the League was finding itself 
increasingly marginalised as the government transformed key sections of the civil service into a 
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powerful radical-right-wing propaganda machine.’36 There was, however, another reason why the 
government did not have to approach the League. In 1972, Heath had drafted Victor Rothschild 
directly into the state apparatus. From early on in her own tenure, Thatcher had rolled that tactic 
out to include loyalists from longstanding private-sector allies including NM Rothschild, Shell and BP 
            From 1972 onwards, Prime Minister Edward Heath sanctioned state-sponsored counter-
subversion against political opponents of the governing Conservative Party. Senior civil servants and 
MI5 officers collaborated to form the Subversion Home Committee (SHC) and its sub-groups. The 
SHC weaponised sections of the state against trade unionists and political opponents of the 
governing party via an extensive blacklisting exercise and by smearing some of those opponents via 
the sympathetic ‘editor.’ Heath’s ‘premature Thatcherism’ represented a disintegration of 
distinctions between the governing Conservative Party and elements of the permanent state. It 
would also serve as a framework in the 1980s when a more radical Conservative administration 
pressurised a similarly politically-aligned state to engage in comparable activity – though on a much 
larger scale.37 An important detail concerning the SHC was that the small and secretive group was 
not large enough, nor did it have the manpower or capabilities, even with the help of MI5, to carry-
out counter-subversion - without help from the Economic League. That would not be the case after 
1983. The involvement of the League revealed the closeness between the Conservative Party and 
elements of the politically-aligned private-sector. The Tories’ links with executives representing 
League-financing companies – including NM Rothschild, Shell, and BP, were cemented during the 
Conservatives’ period in opposition, particularly through groups such as the Centre for Policy 
Studies. The Tories new ideological adherence to monetarism, the Party’s more extreme leader, and 
that leader’s espoused disdain for socialism, attracted the support – financially and with policy ideas 
– of many private-sector loyalists. Thatcher’s first term in office led to societal polarisation in several 
ways - politically, socially and geographically. Moreover, the Tories’ ongoing animosity with the NUM 
continued to worsen. Ridley and the ERG had provided a detailed stratagem which suggested 
attacking the coal industry while adhering to stealth. In order to implement the Ridley Report, 
Thatcher recruited some of her private-sector loyalists directly into the state apparatus.  
Reflections on the Research Questions 
                 The new evidence used in this section was compiled before the advent of Thatcher and 
Thatcherism. However, the new data used here indicates pre-existing, conservative-aligned, 
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ideological mores within the state. These chapters reveal the politicisation of sections of the state 
apparatus during the Heath tenure – carried out on the Prime Minister’s own direct orders. Chapter 
3 revealed the those within the Conservatives’ new monetarist leadership blurring the lines with 
their private-sector supporters while the party was in opposition. Several, such as Victor Rothschild, 
had already been recruited into the state. The new data backs up Miliband’s claim concerning 
longstanding conservative state-biases. The data relating to the Thatcher era specifically, explored in 
the coming chapters, will look at any changes specific to that particular tenure. Before that could 
take place, it was vital to gain a full comprehension of the existing relationship between the 
Conservative Party and some sections of the permanent state.  
Although the evidence used in this section is too early to be used in any discussion on authoritarian 
populism, it does back-up Scraton’s claims about the Heath government. Rather than soft-
corporatism, the new evidence shows the Heath-led state as authoritarian and coercive – proto-
Thatcherism indeed. The next section reveals that, after her first election landslide and second 
victory, Thatcher began to recruit private-sector loyalists not only into the state but directly into 
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Part 2: The Downing Street Policy Unit 
Introduction 
In 1983, Margaret Thatcher populated the Downing Street Policy Unit (DSPU) with private-sector 
loyalists seconded from companies with longstanding affiliation with the Conservative Party. Some 
of those seconded into the DSPU – from Britain’s two oil majors, the nuclear fuel industry and a City 
merchant bank - had economic interest in running-down British coal. The DSPU prepared for the 
coming strike by carrying-out aspects of the Ridley Report - such as the accumulation of coal stocks 
and the upgrading of electricity power stations to run on oil, rather than coal. From March 1984, 
once the strike had begun, the DSPU was instrumental in all aspects of it. Taking advantage of 
Britain’s militarised and apparently Thatcher-aligned police force which had carried-out mass 
arrests, the DSPU advised Thatcher to disregard constitutional boundaries and lean on a compliant 
judiciary to pass down particularly harsh, exemplary sentences to striking miners. The DSPU also 
designed policy around the two most dangerous occurrences in which the government feared it 
might lose the strike – Orgreave in June and the NACODS Dispute in September. The DSPU was also 
involved in designing financial policy and enlisted the Foreign Office and other departments to 
sequester NUM funds which, alongside the Tories’ legislative assault against striking miners, created 
a financial pincer movement and defeated the miners by dire need. Throughout the strike, the DSPU 
adhered to the Ridley Report’s key instruction – that a stealth approach be applied and that the 
government should publicly avoid a full-on confrontation. By doing so, Thatcher’s private-sector 
loyalists were able to weaponise sections of the British state against the miners while pretending 
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Chapter 5: The ‘Unique Opportunity’:  The DSPU in the Early Months of the Strike  
The Downing Street Policy Unit (DSPU) was a relatively new department, having only been set up for 
the first time under Harold Wilson in 1974. Wilson had populated the DSPU with the sort of people 
he trusted and felt comfortable with - Labour-supporting academics. The Labour Prime Minister’s 
head of the DSPU – the Policy Director - was Bernard Donoghue, a left-wing, working-class academic 
who had gone to Oxford. During the mid-1970s, Donoghue had complained, like Wilson, of MI5 
spying. After 1979, the new Prime Minister had no intention of populating the DSPU with academics. 
Thatcher’s tenure as Education Minister under Heath had been an unhappy one - best remembered 
by the public for the derision she had suffered after the decision to remove free milk from British 
schoolchildren.1 Thatcher remained hostile toward the entire education sector and accused lecturers 
and schoolteachers alike of using their positions to ‘teach socialism’ to students and children.2 When 
it came to permanent members of the state such as departmental secretaries, Thatcher was known 
to prefer hand-picked civil servants and aides, and would often show hostility toward those outside 
of that circle.3 As such, the DSPU might well have appealed to her – a department that was designed 
to be filled only by those hand-picked by herself. While Labour had chosen politically-aligned 
academics, after the Tories’ 1979 election victory Thatcher populated the DSPU with the sort of 
people who she was most comfortable with - private-sector loyalists from companies politically-
aligned to the Conservatives. The new Prime Minister substantially increased the staff of the 
department, and appointed a new Policy Director, her former special advisor, John Hoskyns. Hoskyns 
was an ex-army officer, computer tycoon and strident anti-trade unionist.4 He was also a member of 
the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the Thatcher-aligned think-tank. Hoskyns had produced reports 
for the CPS since 1977 which were fiercely critical of trade unionism, including the influential 
‘Stepping Stones’ Report which argued that trade unionism led to increased unemployment.5 
Thatcher accredited the CPS, and Hoskyns in particular, with formulating Conservative strategy since 
the Tory opposition years.6 Hoskyns was particularly critical of the NUM. He argued that Tory climb-
downs, such as Heath’s in both 1972 and 1974, were counterproductive ‘capitulations,’ or adherence 
to the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ - a reference to a previous Tory Prime Minister’s perceived reluctance to 
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take on the NUM.7 In order for a Tory government to stand up to the NUM, Hoskyns argued, Britain’s 
police would have to become more militaristic and would then need to be deployed to picket-lines 
during a strike - a suggestion also made in the confidential annex of the Ridley Report.8 Under 
Hoskyns’ leadership, the DSPU constantly fired out memos and policy papers which were blunter 
and more provocative than the usual Whitehall advice.9 In the wake of the Toxteth riots in 1981, he 
had issued a paper describing the city of Liverpool as a ‘dying sub-economy.’10 Because the DSPU 
leader was neither an elected member of Parliament nor a Whitehall official, he was free to pursue 
ideological bents unhindered.11 
In 1982 another prominent army officer, Frank Kitson, was promoted by Thatcher to the 
position of Major General and Commander-in-Chief of the United Kingdom Land Forces.12 Kitson was 
a highly-regarded strategist, who had been responsible for deciding army policy in Northern Ireland 
during the troubles. He had written a book in 1971 entitled Low Intensity Operations concerning 
psychological warfare and counterinsurgency techniques. In it, Kitson argued that the British Army’s 
main operations in the coming decades would be ‘within the [mainland] United Kingdom’ and 
against ‘political extremists.’13 Kitson argued that a drop in living standards might cause those who 
had previously protested against a wide variety of causes to unite, requiring the army to step in to 
‘restore the position rapidly.’14 Kitson warned against the underestimation of ‘subversives’ and 
argued that steps had to be taken to prepare for such a conflict, something that would be of vital 
importance to ‘those whose business it is to protect the existing order.’15 According to Hoskyns and 
Kitson, trade union militancy, violence and intimidation demanded a change in the relationship 
between central government and Britain’s police force, with more militaristic techniques transferred 
from Northern Ireland, and gleaned from decades of suppression in the colonies, needed to 
transform the police into a force fit to fight the ‘subversives.’ Hoskyns retired as Policy Director in 
1982 and was replaced by the Times journalist Ferdinand Mount. Thatcher continued to value the 
DSPU and credited Mount with writing the Conservative manifesto for the Tories’ second election 
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victory, and first landslide, in 1983. Buoyed by a large Commons majority but with the threat of a 
miners’ strike ever-present, the Prime Minister decided on a new line up for the DSPU after the 
election. The new Policy Director, replacing Mount, was John Redwood.  
Redwood was a young, anti-trade-union, monetarist radical employed by the Economic 
League-donator, NM Rothschild. Victor Rothschild had seconded Redwood to the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS), in the early 80s where he had based much of his work on coming up with solutions as 
to how the Tories might achieve ‘irreversibility.’ That is, fast-paced, sweeping privatisation that 
would prove irreversible by a future Labour government.16 Here was another Policy Director whose 
sentiments echoed the Ridley Report, which had called for the engineering of a battle with the trade 
unions which would cause ‘irreversible’ damage regardless of future election results.17 With another 
miners’ strike increasingly likely, Redwood was seconded to the DSPU for a five-year period until 
1988. Two other companies who had longstanding ties to Thatcher, and were also Economic League 
donators, were the oil giants, BP and Shell. Like NM Rothschild, both seconded an executive into the 
DSPU to prepare for the strike. David Pascall was BP’s representative while John Wybrew was Shell’s. 
Through Pascall and Wybrew, BP and Shell would have a direct, influencing hand in the upcoming 
miners’ strike, despite claiming salaries from companies in a rival part of the energy sector.   
BP and Shell, their Middle-Eastern oil empires, and their UK tax payments had been 
regarded by successive British governments, since at least as early as the Second World War, as 
vitally important to the country’s economic interest. In late 1970, the companies had once again 
proved their value to the Exchequer after the discovery of North Sea Oil. By the end of 1970, BP had 
announced the discovery of the Forties Field, a huge reservoir in British waters off the coast of 
northern Scotland. A plethora of further oil-strikes followed, including, in 1971, Shell and Exxon’s 
discovery of the massive Brent Field. Those discoveries became even more valuable to Britain in 
1973, after the Middle-Eastern, oil-supplying, OPEC countries proclaimed a worldwide oil embargo, 
in response to the United States’ support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. By the mid-seventies, the 
minority Labour government had set up a new state-owned oil company, the British National Oil 
Corporation (BNOC) in order to oversee and maximise profits for British North-Sea crudes, under the 
stewardship of the Secretary of State for Energy and veteran Labour left-winger, Tony Benn. 
However, Benn’s attempts at nationalisation were thwarted after the multinationals threatened to 
hold back their North-Sea operations. Both BP and Shell, as well as the American oil companies, had 
decades of Middle Eastern experience in out-negotiating indigenous calls for oil nationalisation. As 
such, BNOC ended up with a watered-down deal which established the impression of government 
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control, but nothing more.18 For the incoming Thatcher government in 1979, the hostility of Big Oil 
towards any form of nationalisation made the companies fine exemplars of the new, ideological 
direction favoured by the Prime Minister. As Economic League donators, Big Oil operated strict anti-
union procedures aboard their off-shore rigs. American senior management had sacked whole crews 
if they believed that union organisation was being considered. Shell’s Personnel Director in 1978, 
Peter Linklater, argued that this stance was justified, as ‘the last thing we would want is to have 
political subversives on our payroll.’19 The oil companies would give potential employees a political 
screening during the interview process. As Linklater explained, ‘we are interested in identifying overt 
opponents of the system.’20  
As early as 1971, oil had replaced coal as the leading fuel consumed in Britain.21  By 1983, 
North Sea Oil was producing more barrels-per-day than the traditional oil-producing trio of Algeria, 
Libya and Nigeria combined. In response to an early 80s successful privatisation of its Nigerian assets 
(done in response to North Sea competition), BP underwent a complete change in corporate culture. 
The company, which had previously been majority-owned by the British State went about 
implementing competition-based individualism within its different sectors, in the hope of becoming 
more ‘entrepreneurial.’22 The company became dominated by traders and commercial people, who 
replaced the old-guard of supply-planner diplomats.23 Pascall and Wybrew, recruited into the DSPU, 
represented not only the biggest economic rival to coal, but also the anti-nationalisation, anti-union 
ideology professed by Thatcher and her loyalists. The Ridley Report had stated the importance of 
converting power stations from coal-burn to oil-burn, in the hope of undermining the NUM.24 
Despite an overt conflict of interest, the two oil men were now a part of the state apparatus which 
would be influential in the day-to-day running of the strike.  
The early 1980s had also seen nuclear power make a rapid entry into electricity generation. 
The fourth member of the DSPU was Peter Warry. Warry was the chief-executive of British Energy, 
which operated Britain’s eight nuclear power stations. He was also seconded from 1983 onwards. 
While Redwood took the job title of Policy Advisor, the other three were given the official title of 
‘Special Advisor.’ Redwood, Pascall, Wybrew and Warry, representing the City Banks (NM 
Rothschild), BP, Shell and British (Nuclear) Energy respectively, would determine policy for the 
government for the duration of the coal strike.  
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The Ridley Report had made another specific recommendation with regards to coal. In order 
to prepare for the engineered strike, the government should set out to achieve the maximum 
quantity of coal stocks possible. Between 1980 and 1983, coal stocks had indeed risen to their 
highest recorded levels. The NCB Director General of Industrial Relations, Ned Smith, dismissed 
claims that stocks had become high as a means of preparation, at least as far as the NCB were 
concerned. Smith pointed out that stocks of coal began to accumulate in the early 1980s because of 
a recession-induced poor market for coal, culminating in a reduced demand for energy between 
1980 and 1983. Smith was not aware of the existence of the Ridley Report, however, until after the 
strike had ended.25 Moreover, he could not explain, nor would he have been aware of, the DSPU’s 
clear fascination with coal stocks from 1983 onwards. A series of periodical DSPU reports on coal 
stocks culminated in a report issued to Thatcher just days after the beginning of the strike. The 
report, entitled ‘endurance levels of coal,’ revealed that ‘measures had already been undertaken to 
increase power station coal stocks.’26 Whatever these ‘measures’ were, it seems unlikely that the 
DSPU were talking about naturally-occurring economic cycles inherent within the coal industry. 
Thatcher underlined a section highlighting that, in fact, ‘coal stocks at power stations are at record 
levels.’27 Six months before the strike, in September 1983, the NUM and the NCB had begun what 
were supposed to be routine wage negotiations. A report from the Cabinet Office argued that 
sensitivity would be a key issue in the upcoming negotiations, and offered a generally positive 
outlook on achieving a settlement. After reading the report, Thatcher dismissed it with a single 
word, crossing out Cabinet Undersecretary Peter Gregson’s suggestion of sensitivity, and writing 
‘NO’ over the top of it.28 
As another means of preparation, the Report had suggested that the government should 
begin to ‘recruit chairmen sympathetic to our objectives.’29 Thatcher had personally selected Walter 
Marshall and Ian MacGregor to run the CEGB (Electricity) and NCB (Coal) monopolies respectively.30 
Both were huge advocates of nuclear power, running down the coal industry and privatisation.31 
MacGregor had gained notoriety in the United States as a hard-right, reactionary strike-breaker who 
had initially been appointed by Thatcher as Chairman of British Steel – quickly becoming a public 
hate figure amongst many British steelworkers.32 MacGregor commanded the same animosity from 
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the miners. Scargill branded him the ‘American butcher of British industry.’33 Even right-wing 
members of the NUM Executive, such as Roy Ottey, thought that the appointment of MacGregor 
was provocative.34 Tory ‘wets’ agreed. Ian Gilmour, now relegated to the backbenches, later claimed 
that the position of the so-called ‘moderates’ within the NUM had been destroyed by the 
appointment of MacGregor.35 NCB executive Ned Smith criticised Scargill and the NUM Left for their 
overly-negative portrayals of MacGregor. As the Director General of Industrial Relations, however, 
Smith admitted that even he reacted to the news of MacGregor’s appointment with great dismay.36 
In September 1983, shortly after MacGregor’s appointment, Scargill again made the claim that the 
Tory government was ‘operating a pit closure programme by stealth,’ and that MacGregor was a 
part of that plan.37 Although he could not have known for certain at the time, Scargill was again 
correct, in that both the need to use stealth, and the recruitment of ideologically-aligned chairmen 
were central instructions in the Ridley Report. In early February 1984, during a trip to a Northumbria 
colliery, the 70-year old American was jostled and knocked to the floor, sustaining bruising to his 
head and neck. At a Cabinet meeting, several Tory ministers seemed more interested in exploiting 
the media coverage of the incident, rather than MacGregor’s health.38 Nevertheless, the incident 
showed the levels of animosity that existed between a section of the miners and the new NCB chief. 
Despite that animosity, the Ridley Report’s suggestion of recruiting politically-aligned chairmen had 
been followed.  
On 6th March 1984, MacGregor announced that 20 pits were to be closed outright, with the 
loss of twenty-thousand jobs across the country. Scargill claimed to have seen secret evidence that 
put the hit-list figure closer to 70 pit closures. Prime Minister’s Papers released in 2014 confirmed 
Scargill’s figure as correct.39 A mass walk-out at the Cortonwood Pit in Yorkshire, one of those 
named on the list, followed. The NUM President may well have taken that personally. Cortonwood 
was just down the road from where Scargill lived. The leaders of the Yorkshire Area of the NUM 
announced a strike across their area, in resistance to the closure threat. At the same time, strike 
action was taking place in Scotland, over the proposed closure of the Polmaise Colliery. However, 
not all pits in either the Yorkshire Area or the Scottish Area joined the strike, which had not been 
officially sanctioned by the NUM Executive. Although Scargill and McGahey wanted a national strike 
they were reluctant to call a national vote amongst NUM members to determine it. In accordance 
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with his repeated claim that the NCB and government were attempting to close swathes of the coal 
industry by stealth, Scargill had attempted to win national ballots for strike action in both 1982 and 
1983 and was voted down on both occasions.40 As such, he, McGahey and other NUM Executive left-
wingers were reluctant to call another ballot which they feared they might lose. At a meeting of the 
Executive on the 8th of March 1984, called to discuss Cortonwood and Polmaise, several right-
wingers on the Executive pushed for a national ballot on strike action, convinced that it would be 
rejected by the NUM rank-and-file.41 However, a rival motion was put forward by the South Wales 
Area President and Scargill ally, Emlyn Williams. That is, the Executive should give official sanction to 
the ongoing strikes in Scotland and South Yorkshire. Ottey, the right-winger, saw that as both 
undemocratic, and as a backhanded way to begin a national strike without holding a ballot.42 Once 
Scotland and South Yorkshire were out, flying pickets could be deployed to spread the strike not only 
across those regions, but nationwide. The flying pickets could travel en-masse to non-striking pits in 
non-striking areas and converge around the pit entrances, in the hope of either persuading or 
intimidating working miners to join the strike in solidarity. As discussed, those tactics had given 
Scargill a satisfying victory over the Tories at Saltley in 1972. As the meeting closed, the Executive 
members voted outright to either hold a ballot, as favoured by the right, or officially endorse the 
Scottish and Yorkshire Area strikes, as favoured by the left. With the left now in the ascendency on 
the Executive, the latter vote won by 21 votes to 3.43 With the Scottish and Yorkshire Areas 
endorsed, the miners’ strike had begun.  
The Ridley Report had called on the next Tory government to provoke one of Britain’s 
strongest unions into a battle. It had named the coal industry as the best target. It had stated that a 
threat to jobs was the best way to go about it. MacGregor’s closure plan can be seen as a move to 
fulfil all of those requirements, delivered by an ideologically aligned chairman - another move 
suggested by Ridley in 1978. Later, on the same day as the NUM Executive meeting had taken place, 
a Cabinet meeting was held at Downing Street. While Scargill seemed to know about the ‘closure by 
stealth’ plan, government ministers seemed to be aware of the NUM Executive’s discussions and 
decisions from earlier that day. Thatcher and her ministers were aware that Scargill and the NUM 
leadership would not call a national ballot for strike action. The Minister for Energy, Alick Buchanan-
Smith, told Thatcher so at the meeting. The Prime Minister gave a vote of confidence to Ian 
MacGregor, replying that ‘the chairman of the NCB should be allowed to handle the matter as he 
thought best.’ Thatcher was also well aware that without a legitimising ballot, the striking miners 
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would deploy pickets. As such, she assured attending ministers that measures had already been 
taken to alert Chief Constables to ‘the possibility of violence from flying pickets.’44  
The reason for engineering a coal strike, according to the Ridley Report, was to inflict a 
defeat on the trade unions and achieve ‘irreversibility.’ Just a few weeks into the miners’ strike, in 
March 1984, BP’s David Pascall advised Thatcher that the DSPU, who had continued to monitor coal 
stocks, felt that the time was right for a ‘unique opportunity to break the power of the militants in 
the NUM.’45 The BP Executive cautioned that if such a ‘great opportunity’ was passed up, industrial 
relations would continue to be dominated by, as he saw it, the ideologies of the left.46 Redwood 
agreed. In August, he advised Thatcher that, as far as the DSPU were concerned, ‘it is clear that we 
are in a political rather than an industrial strike.’47 Thatcher agreed with that sentiment.48 However, 
both Redwood and Pascall were keen to abide with the adherence to stealth, which was one of the 
main tenets of the Ridley Report. As such, they were critical of some Thatcher loyalists from within 
the permanent state whose behaviour threatened to bring about difficult questions about state 
neutrality – particularly policemen. A report in June from the Home Office outlined how pickets 
arrested in Mansfield had been asked ‘political questions’ by Thatcher-aligned police officers.49 The 
arrested miners had been asked if they voted for Scargill, and whether they belonged to any political 
organisation. They were asked about how they would vote in a general election, if the only two 
options were Conservative or Communist.50 The DSPU advised that senior officers be dissuaded from 
overt shows of political partisanship.   
The peculiarities of the coal industry meant that, during a miners’ strike, it took a long time, 
several months, before the strike would affect electricity-generation supplies. That gap was one of 
the reasons why the Ridley Report had targeted coal. It was also the reason why Scargill had 
picketed Saltley Gate in 1972, as the then-Yorkshire Branch official knew that shutting-down a coking 
plant would speed up the process and bring pressure onto the government to make a deal much 
sooner. At the start of the 1984/85 strike, the DSPU confidently estimated that it would be a 
minimum of 26 weeks before the miners’ strike would have any effect on the British economy. 
However, Pascall suggested the implementation of a further precaution. The Ridley Report had 
suggested that electricity power stations be run on oil, rather than coal. On the 30th March, Pascall 
told the Prime Minister that the Department of Energy was now pursuing a policy of maximum oil 
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burn at power stations, at the expense of coal, in the hope that this would increase endurance even 
further.51  Ignoring the BP executive’s clear conflict of interests, Thatcher underlined her agreement. 
Two weeks later, in mid-April, the Energy Secretary Peter Walker announced that Pascall’s plan had 
been implemented, and that maximum ‘oil burn [was] working well.’52 Pascall was not alone in 
promoting his other field of work. Once the strike was underway, nuclear power chief Warry 
suggested the building of a raft of new nuclear power stations.53 Shell’s Wybrew also favoured the 
oil option - dismissing the calls from some ministers for large purchases of imported coal and 
insisting that ‘imported coal [was] unlikely to be cheaper’ than increased oil usage.54 The private-
sector loyalists inside the DSPU had, just a month into the strike, made use of their backgrounds to 
implement another element of Ridley’s report.  
At the outset of the strike, Thatcher had set up a regular meeting group, to be attended by 
cabinet members, to discuss the ongoing strike. Chaired by Thatcher herself, the meetings were 
officially entitled ‘the Ministerial Group on Coal.’ Ministers referred to the meeting group by the 
shorter title of ‘MISC101.’ Regular attenders at MISC101 meetings were Thatcher loyalists such as 
the Home Secretary Leon Brittan and the new Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas Ridley. One 
MISC101 meeting took place in late April, four weeks after the DSPU’s suggestion of power station 
conversion to maximum oil burn. Thatcher voiced her own satisfaction that this directive was being 
met.55 Ridley assured the Prime Minister that the recruitment of non-union haulage firms had been a 
success, and that ‘virtually all coal [was] being delivered.’56 Ridley had been able to carry-out that 
particular aspect of his own report via his position as Transport Secretary.  
Although they were officially part of the state through their secondments, the DSPU 
members were loyal only to the Prime Minister and, safe in the secretive nature of their work, 
appeared to be unconcerned with any pretentions of state impartiality. As such, they were free to 
engage in openly-partisan language concerning Thatcher’s political opponents. In June, the day after 
the Battle of Orgreave, Pascall referred to the striking miners as ‘Scargill’s shock troops.’57 Redwood 
was scathing about what he saw as a socialist challenge to Tory power, decrying the ‘extreme left, 
mounting a major extra-parliamentary challenge to the government.’58 Full of Cold War bravado, 
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Redwood railed against ‘revolutionary strategies,’ used by dockers and miners alike.59 He also used 
dehumanising language, telling Thatcher in July that strike-supporting workers in other sectors, such 
as those in local government offices, might be a ‘breeding ground’ for left-wing activity.60  Redwood 
also took action, issuing a policy for the government to adopt a tougher stance toward ‘political’ 
enemies. He suggested closing pits in militant areas as a punishment, regardless of economic 
viability – as long as the government’s real motives were not made public. By doing so, reflected the 
Policy Director, the government could ‘gain something from this long dispute.’61  
As well as her private-sector loyalists drafted into the state via the DSPU, Thatcher 
continued to enjoy the support of private-sector chairmen and executives still outside of the 
apparatus of the state – but keen to get involved. John Plessey was the Chief Executive of Plessey 
Inc, a major British arms trader and Economic League donator.62 Plessey wrote to the Prime Minister 
in July to give his full support. He claimed that, among most private-sector company executives like 
himself, loyalty to Thatcher was unwavering and that ‘the basic issue of the miners’ strike – namely 
the fundamental conflict between capitalism and collectivism [was] now well understood.’63  
Thatcher also received a message of support from her counterpart across the Atlantic. Ronald 
Reagan wrote to send ‘considerable empathy’ to his opposite number in Britain.64 Thatcher wrote 
back, seemingly eager to convince the President that ‘the ports are open again, and a substantial 
portion of the [coal] industry is back at work.’65 Despite the DSPU’s own preference for politically-
charged language, the members were quick to label any public figure who spoke out against 
government strategy as a leftist ideologue who could easily be dismissed. The Bishop of Durham was 
secretly lambasted for criticising government policy. He had written to the Prime Minister, seeking 
to highlight the plight of suffering miners’ families. The DSPU derided him as a ‘minor folk-hero of 
the left.’66 They advised that the bishop be ignored.  
In private, Redwood had stated that the strike was political. In order to maintain adherence 
to the stealth instruction, however, all efforts had to be made in public to argue that the strike was 
economic, and that the pit closure program was being undertaken purely as a response to sound 
financial advice. Pascall wrote to Thatcher in May to suggest that it be publicly asserted in the press 




61 Redwood to Thatcher, 1st August 1984, TNA Kew, PREM19/1332. 
62 Mike Hughes. Spies at Work: The Definitive History of the Economic League (London: Lulu 2012), p329. 
63 Plessey to Thatcher, 22nd July 1984, TNA Kew, PREM19/1331.  
64 Ronald Reagan letter to Thatcher, 15th July 1984, TNA Kew, PREM19/1331. 
65 Thatcher, letter to Ronald Reagan, 18th July 1984, TNA Kew, PREM19/1331. 
66 DSPU report, 3rd October 1984, TNA Kew, PREM19/1334. 
P a g e  | 68 
 
liability.67 No evidence was offered to support that assertion, though the BP executive would have 
been aware of the benefits of publicly backing the two areas where the strike was at its weakest. The 
government’s public claim to be acting solely on economic principle was undermined by the fact that 
a string of Britain’s leading economists lined-up to dispute that claim. An independent, impartial 
report by London Weekend Television was commissioned in September 1984. The report was 
compiled by, among others, Gavyn Davies, the chief UK economist and David Metcalf, Professor of 
Economics at Kent University. The report found that the government had ‘failed to address the social 
costs which were inherent in the straightforward closure option.’68 In December, the Journal of 
Accountancy published a critique of the accounting methods of the NCB. Five academic accounting 
specialists, including professors in the field from the University of Sheffield and UMIST, agreed that 
the coal industry appeared to be operationally viable.69 Other economists, such as Emile Woolf, 
accused the NCB of having accounting books which were ‘a supreme masterpiece in the art of 
obfuscation.’70 That is, the NCB had laid a ‘maze of artfully presented decoys,’ designed to make it 
look as if a profitable industry was losing money.71 In private, Thatcher herself acknowledged that 
some pit closures were not entirely due to economic consideration. In a cabinet meeting in 
December, the Prime Minister spoke of the importance of closing pits even when it was not practical 
or cost-effective to do so. This had to be done to ‘preserve the principal.’72 Rather than saving 
money, the closure program and the ensuing strike was costing millions. In May, the Treasury 
estimated the cost of the strike at £3 million per-week.73 In August, after Orgreave, the figure had 
risen to £25 million per-week.74 A huge chunk of that was spent on providing busses and organising 
police protection for working miners. At each striking pit, the police were spending large amounts of 
money to get a small number of working miners past the flying pickets. Despite the costs, they 
continued that expensive practice, believing it to be worth every penny as a propagandistic 
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gesture.75 The DSPU response to spiralling costs was to remind the Prime Minister that financial 
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Chapter 6: ‘A Word to the Wise’: The DSPU, the Police and the Judiciary 
The early 1970s were a relatively peaceful period in police / picket line confrontation. Between the 
early 20th century and the Heath era, stronger trade unions, closer government supervision of the 
police, the growth of civil liberties groups and a societal decrease in inequality had all served as 
factors which changed the nature of factory-gate confrontations.1 However, the troubles in Northern 
Ireland had forced the British police to adopt more militaristic approaches previously reserved for 
the former colonial police. From 1974 onwards, every British police force was assigned a Police 
Support Unit (PSU). The PSUs were made up of 23 officers – one inspector, two sergeants and 
twenty constables. The PSU officers did not wear traditional police uniforms. Instead, they were 
equipped with riot shields, American-style riot-sticks and visored helmets. One of the first major 
deployments of the PSU’s was at the Notting Hill Riots in 1977.2 In April 1979, a New Zealand-born 
teacher, Blair Peach, had attended an anti-fascist demonstration in Southall, London. As the demo 
ended and Peach was walking home, he was clubbed to the head by a member of the Met’s Special 
Patrol Group. Peach died from the blow. Later the same day, militarised police entered an African-
Caribbean community centre, lined the stairs, and batoned everyone who tried to leave the 
building.3  
The PSUs saw a marked increase in their deployment, particularly in the 1980s. The military-
style units were deployed at the Bristol riots in 1980 and the Brixton riots in 1981. At both of those 
disturbances, aggressive, military-style policing – beforehand only seen in Northern Ireland, was 
evident. Helmets, shields, batons, cavalry, military formations, snatch squads and organised violence 
were all deployed.4 In the Liverpool borough of Toxteth, flashpoints and standoffs between 
Merseyside Police and the predominantly black community had become frequent by the end of the 
1970s. However, there was also a series of clashes in the mainly white, working-class borough of 
Knowsley. In June 1979, a series of mass confrontations between police and locals in Huyton left 
three officers hospitalised, numerous locals injured and 14 people launching complaints against the 
police for assault and perjury.5 In the case of Toxteth, the area was within walking distance of 
Liverpool city centre, but Merseyside police would patrol the junction between the two locations, 
turning back black youths. On the 6th July 1981, the streets of Toxteth exploded into a series of riots 
that would last for over a month. In their response to the riots, Merseyside police deployed army-
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style Land Rovers onto Toxteth’s streets. CS gas was fired at the public for the first time. ‘Barrier-
penetrating’ projectiles were fired at four people, who were all seriously injured. The Merseyside 
Chief Constable, Kenneth Oxford, later admitted that these devices were not meant to be fired in 
public order situations.6 By 1981, in Liverpool at least, militarised policing was now commonplace as 
police focus seemed to move away from crime control and toward the control of public order, 
industrial action and political protest.7  
Giving advice on how the government should conduct itself after it had provoked a strike, 
the Ridley Report had highlighted police and picketing as a key issue to address. Instruction was 
offered on how best to overcome the violence that had marred previous industrial disputes, with 
Ridley making direct reference to what he called ‘the Saltley Gate mob’ of 1972.8 The Report had 
called for the formation of a ‘large, mobile squad of police,’ to be used in any ‘crunch situation to 
uphold the law’ and to overcome ‘violent picketing.’9 Before 1979, there had been no national police 
force in Britain. The police were organised into 52 local forces, each headed by a Chief Constable. 
Authority was divided between the Home Secretary, local police authorities and Chief Constables.10 
However, the Thatcher government had set up the National Reporting Centre (NRC) in 1979, 
centralising Britain’s police forces for the first time. During the early stages of the strike, Thatcher 
made it clear that she thought that certain forces were not ‘enforcing the law’ strictly enough when 
it came to the flying pickets.11  In adherence with the stealth approach, Thatcher publicly distanced 
the government from any hands-on practicalities in regard to policing the strike. In private, however, 
the Prime Minister went to great lengths to make it clear to senior officers that she ‘would not let 
them down’ and would offer all of the ‘practical support’ that was required.12 By 1984 the NRC 
controlled 416 well-drilled PSU units totalling 13,500 officers.13 PSU’s could be sent into any area in 
the country to swell the numbers of regional police. The establishment of the NRC and its mobile 
squads was a definitive move away from traditional forms of policing. Whereas in 1972, the flying 
pickets of the NUM had come up against regular policemen, by 1984 the NRC’s forces were in the 
form of the shield-clad and baton-wielding PSU’s.14 Rather than impartial defenders of the law, the 
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new equipment made the officers look more like a powerful paramilitary organisation, at the 
disposal of the state – a spectacle previously unseen in British policing.15  
In March 1979, during the last months of the Labour government, Thatcher wrote to the 
then Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, asking him if he could, for future reference, inform chief 
constables of their ‘responsibilities’ when it came to picketing.16 Rees wrote back, offering 
reservations about being asked to intervene in that way. He told Thatcher that it was 
‘unconstitutional’ to ‘tell chief constables how to enforce the law.’17 The Leader of the Opposition 
was distinctly unimpressed, and wrote a strongly-worded reply, accusing Rees of previously stating 
that such interference could occur – in particular circumstances such as ‘1972’ (a reference to Saltley 
Gate).18 Thatcher was keen to point out that she was not asking Rees to act unconstitutionally, 
though that seemed an odd claim given her previous letter. Rees was resolute. He wrote again, 
rebuffing Thatcher’s criticism and feeling the need to tell her directly that ‘it is not the job of the 
Home Secretary to give instructions to the police about the day to day conduct of their job, and that 
includes the enforcement of the law.’19  By 1984, the Home Secretary was the committed Thatcher 
loyalist, Leon Brittan. Thatcher told Brittan to ensure that all Chief Constables in strike-bound areas 
were reminded that ‘vigorous action’ against the pickets would be popular with the public, and that 
the chief constables should be ‘expected to take account of that.’20 Unlike Rees, Brittan offered no 
reservations concerning unconstitutional interference.  
The behaviour of the NUM’s flying pickets was not always faultless. During picket-line 
confrontations throughout the early part of 1984, the flying pickets aimed to make themselves a 
match for the police. They would make life as difficult as possible for the officers sent to marshal 
them. The striking miners were tough, physical men; well-used to hard labour and furious with the 
lines of police who faced them.21 Using 1972 as their template, they would push police lines back, 
chanting ‘easy, easy,’ pour ridicule on the officers and, when massing in such large numbers, match 
the police by offering a very physically-intimidating sight.22 Thatcher alleged that she had seen 
reports of miners on the picket-line pelting police officers with bricks, darts and other missiles.23 The 
Prime Minister also highlighted other reports which had revealed violence and death-threats aimed 
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at working-miners and their families.24 With the Tories still carrying the NUM-inflicted scars of 1972 
and 1974, Scargill’s militant tactics were enough to give the union demonic status with Brittan.25  
Speaking early in 1984, the Home Secretary asserted that ‘Mr Scargill..hate[s] our democratic 
system.’26 In contrast, the police were portrayed by Thatcher-aligned Tory ministers as the defenders 
of democracy, a brave bulwark against the bureaucratic dictatorship of Scargill and other union 
leaders.27  
The Tories had implemented the Edmund-Davies Pay Increase, a substantial wage rise 
throughout the entire service, on the first full day of Thatcher’s administration.28 More pay had led 
to a swell in new recruits in the early eighties.29 That financial reward, coupled with Thatcher’s 
continuing public statements supporting the police, seemed to attract the loyalty of many rank-and-
file police officers, many of whom were sent to marshal the picket-lines and some of whom were 
part of the new, militarised PSUs. A PC from the West Country, who was present at several picket-
line confrontations in the early months of the strike, revealed that his force had been practicing 
taking on the miners for two years, by ‘marching around wet army camps and having people throw 
squeezy-bottles and things.’30 A Met PC compared police baton-charges to colonial policing, 
reflecting that it had been ‘like Palestine or something.’31 More senior officers also used the 
language of military campaigners. Remembering his own part in picket-line violence, a Sergeant in a 
northern force remembered that ‘they had the advantage of higher ground.’32 A Superintendent 
from the Home Counties remembered that ‘there was a railway bridge that you could defend. We 
moved two units and took it, then held it for an hour – but at a cost.’33 Those statements seem to 
denote a feeling among some police officers that, rather than disinterested arbiters of the law, they 
felt themselves to be, as one Deputy Chief Constable from a northern force put it, as an ‘army of 
occupation.’34 Many of those opposing the police appeared to agree with that appraisal. As well as 
on the picket-line, the police were deployed into pit villages deemed to be militant. Village and 
 
24 Ibid, p365.  
25 Seamus Milne. The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners (London: Verso 2014), p23.  
26 Leon Brittan quoted in Milne, Enemy Within, p10.  
27 Bob Fine & Robert Miller (&eds.) ‘Introduction,’ in Policing the Miners’ Strike (London: Laurence and Wishart 
1985), p2.  
28 Tom Cockcroft. Police Culture: Themes and Concepts (New York: Routledge 2013), p77.  
29 Reiner, The Politics of the Police, p93.  
30 Roger Graef. Talking Blues: The Police in Their Own Words (London: Collins Harvill 1990), p61.   
31 Ibid, p67.   
32 Ibid, p73.   
33 Ibid, p62.  
34 Ibid, p72.   
P a g e  | 74 
 
county borders were controlled and ‘sensitive districts’ occupied.35 As one Rotherham miner 
reflected, ‘it is now easier to get out of East Berlin than it is to get out of South Yorkshire.’36 Many 
officers seemed spurred on by the hostile and stigmatising climate of opinion against the miners.37 
As well as their fondness for Thatcher, some police officers appeared to display general animosity 
toward trade unionists. PC Sloan, in the February 1984 edition of the Police Review, offered an 
insight when he remarked that strikers of any description were often, according to him, 
‘brainwashed by their union reps and unwilling to show themselves to have any human feelings.’38 
As well as using public speeches to support the police, senior Tories used the same method to 
portray trade unionists and the Labour Party as anti-police. At a Police Federation Conference on the 
30th May, Douglas Hurd, now a Home Office Minister, asked the gathered officers a loaded question 
- ‘it must worry many policemen when police are regularly attacked by one of the main parties of the 
state?’39  
The private-sector loyalists of the DSPU had warned previously that such open political bias, 
and accompanying aggressiveness, was not beneficial to the overall adherence to stealth 
recommended in the Ridley Report. On 18th June, a day that would become infamous in British 
industrial relations history, Redwood and Pascall both wrote to the Prime Minister to urge police 
caution.40 They argued that the government had to be careful to avoid accusations of creating a 
police state. The DSPU reminded the Prime Minister of the importance of stealth in the overall plan. 
To avoid a head-on collision, they advised Thatcher that ‘preventative patrols’ should be stepped-up 
in ‘vulnerable villages.’41 Thatcher underlined the suggestion. Residents of those villages continued 
to live under the watchful eyes of a besieging army of police officers, brought in from all over the 
country. Of particular notoriety was the Metropolitan Police Force of London, drafted in on paid 
overtime to occupy many northern mining villages.42 Within the mining communities, there were 
numerous accusations of invading Met officers physically and verbally abusing women and 
children.43 As animosity continued to escalate between the mining communities and the 
confrontational, occupying police - who were publicly supported by Thatcher and other senior 
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ministers - the DSPU’s attempt to steer the government back away from a full-on confrontation – 
warned against in the Ridley Report – would not succeed. 
On the afternoon of the 18th June, the Battle of Orgreave occurred after mass picketing at 
the Orgreave coking plant in South Yorkshire. For Scargill and the miners, Orgreave was to be a 
repeat of the famous Saltley Gate victory in 1972. For South Yorkshire Chief Constable Peter Wright 
and his deputy Tony Clement (the latter of whom was in charge of policing on the day), a chance to 
inflict revenge on the miners and reciprocate Thatcher’s perceived unwavering support for the 
police, by re-establishing the force’s Saltley-damaged reputation for dealing with large numbers of 
gathered pickets. All of that was, however, in complete antithesis to both the Ridley Report’s 
recommendations and the advice of the DSPU. Any notions of stealth were abandoned as scenes of 
hand-to-hand fighting and pitched battles between riot-gear-clad, truncheon-wielding police and 
thousands of flying pickets were broadcast nationwide. Miners’ described nightmarish scenes as 
hundreds of mounted police charged lines of unarmed pickets screaming ‘come on you bastards’ 
and carried out brutal and, at times, indiscriminate violence.44 Many miners were assaulted and 
received injuries, hundreds were arrested. Several officers were also hospitalised. In 1990, several 
officers present at Orgreave retold their experiences to the police historian Roger Graef. An officer 
from a northern force reminisced that ‘it was great to see [the mounted police] smashing into all 
them bastards. It was the greatest thing I ever saw.’45 A PC from an eastern force resented the fact 
that the police had been politicised, but admitted that ‘no question, we were Maggie’s boys.’46 A 
Met PC, the same one who had compared the picket-line to Palestine, defended the indiscriminate 
batoning of pickets. The officer admitted that ‘you are going to hit some innocent people.’47 
However, he felt that this behaviour was justified in the circumstances. A PC from the Home 
Counties agreed. Reflecting on his own picket-line violence, he fondly remembered the time as when 
‘some poor sods meet Mister Wood.’48 The PC went on to opine that ‘breaking a collarbone is best, 
then an elbow or a leg.’49 Solicitor Gareth Peirce, who arrived at Police Headquarters to represent 
arrested miners, reflected that ‘they needed doctors, not lawyers.’50  
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The scenes at Orgreave had worried some within the government enough to secretly 
consider drastic measures – the use of the British Army. Fearing further disturbances, Brittan 
requested that funds be made available in order to convert the local RAF barracks to receive more 
police PSUs, even though up to 8,000 officers were already present.51 If no funds were forthcoming, 
he warned, then the armed forces would have to be used instead.52 Some government officials now 
wanted a head-on collision, and called for army troops to be brought in to the fight.53 They pointed 
out that the Queen could be used to declare a state of emergency.54 This left the DSPU at odds with 
some ministers. The DSPU were still committed to the Ridley Report’s stealth approach. The day 
after the Battle of Orgreave, with ministers calling for Scargill’s blood, Pascall warned Thatcher that 
arresting Scargill at that moment, without sufficient charges, would make a ‘martyr’ out of the NUM 
President.55 The Prime Minister wanted the miners’ leader arrested, but the right evidence would 
have to be in place first, to secure a successful prosecution (see Case Study 2). In the direct 
aftermath of Orgreave, with no guarantee that an arrested Scargill would be jailed, she followed the 
advice of those she trusted the most - her private-sector loyalists within the DSPU. Deciding against 
any overt use of the armed forces, Thatcher authorised the large release of funds requested by 
Brittan and sought assurances from the Home Secretary that the money would be speedily and 
directly delivered to the police forces who needed it for extra manpower.56  
The DSPU did not, however, rule-out the use of the army – only the overt use of the army.  
They drew attention to the Emergency Powers Act of 1964, which would allow troops to be brought 
in covertly, without declaring a state of emergency. Thatcher underlined the idea, to show her 
approval.57 There is no clear evidence that troops were deployed, despite claims from some miners 
that this was the case. Nevertheless, the evidence does show that such a move was a serious 
consideration. A month after Orgreave, with the dust settled, the Prime Minister attended a meeting 
about the strike. With Thatcher, the DSPU and senior ministers present, it was decided that the best 
policy was to ‘use troops as far as possible without declaring a State of Emergency.’58 Thatcher’s 
private-sector loyalists within the DSPU had found a way to deploy armed troops against the miners 
while still adhering to the stealth principle. The army might be brought in, as long as it was not 
publicly known. Because they were on the front line, the stealth approach was not applicable to the 
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police. Some senior police officers became annoyed by the DSPU’s approach which to them seemed 
like the government was attempting to run the strike, and simultaneously pretend that they had 
nothing to do with it. After the strike, at a Police Federation Conference, an inspector told the 
conference that in his view ‘the police were being abused and violently assaulted in order to allow 
the government to maintain a low profile for political purposes.’59  
Although the Ridley Report had not mentioned the British courts, it soon became obvious to 
Thatcher, Brittan and the DSPU that interference into that area would be vital – or else the changes 
in policing might prove meaningless. By December 1984, 8,907 people had been arrested in 
connection with the strike.60 Most, as to be expected, were arrested in Nottinghamshire (2,374), 
Derbyshire (1,179) and South Yorkshire (1,256).61 Most arrests were for public order offences or 
obstructing police. However, there were 32 different offences in total, ranging from reckless driving 
to murder. Thatcher and the DSPU knew that it was pointless getting the police to make so many 
arrests, if the offenders were soon to be back on the streets, and back on the picket line. After 
Orgreave, the police implemented a policy of maximum arrests on picket lines.62 As well as that, 
snatch squads were sent to miners’ houses, kicking down doors and arresting people in their own 
homes.63 With so many arrested, the government faced a backlog of cases that needed to go before 
a magistrate.  
Rather than let the miners stand trial fairly and without prejudice, the DSPU called on 
ministers to strong-arm judges and magistrates into giving out particularly harsh sentences. In 
August, two months after Orgreave, Redwood called for pressure to be put on courts ‘to give 
exemplary sentences to miners,’ as long as such a request could be made without public attention.64 
In turn, Thatcher asked the Attorney General, Michael Havers, whether there existed ‘any means of 
increasing [the] effectiveness and enforcement of criminal law.’65 Responding, Havers wrote to 
highlight the ‘usefulness of offences such as riot, unlawful assembly and affray.’66 The Attorney 
General appeared to acquiesce to Thatcher’s request by insinuating that such unspecific offenses 
could be used as a cover - for issuing unusually harsh sentences. To cope with the backlog, 
temporary courts were set up in Chesterfield, St Helens, Mansfield and Peterlee. All achieved 
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notoriety throughout the mining communities.67 Any magistrate with any connection to the Labour 
Party, the NUM or other trade union was disqualified from hearing cases of striking miners.68 This 
meant that the majority of judges held Conservative sympathies, though those faced no such 
disqualification. Judges were brought in from elsewhere in the country to hurry through the 
sentencing.69 A Thorseby Picket noticed that the ‘judges are always on the government’s side.’70 An 
Ollerton Womens’ Action Group member complained that ‘the courts are all Tory-run.’71 An Ollerton 
picket had been in trouble before. He remarked that the ‘last time I was being tried for my crime. 
This time I was being tried as a striking miner and no other reason.’72 Indeed, the courts were being 
used to generate a ‘picketing equals crime’ equation.73 However, the spectacle of senior government 
officials pressurising judges and magistrates to hand-out harsh sentences might be difficult to 
legitimise if it ever became public. The Lord Chancellor, Quintin Hogg, had warned of Britain’s 
susceptibility to an ‘elective dictatorship’ in 1976.74 In response to the DSPU’s call for exemplary 
sentences, he told Thatcher that ‘it may be inappropriate, or even unconstitutional for the 
government to seek to influence judges in this way.’75 However, Hogg was operating within an 
established culture of conformity. Despite his warning, the Lord Chancellor demonstrated that he 
understood the adherence to stealth approach as well as anyone else. He left a handwritten note at 
the end of his letter stating the following – ‘This is sensitive territory. Verbum Sapienti Suffcit’ [A 
word to the wise is sufficient].76  
Due to government pressure suggested by the DSPU, total custodial sentences for miners 
shot up from 47 between the whole of March to November, to 106 by the end of December.77 
Nevertheless, this might still have felt like a defeat for Thatcher and her loyalists, when the total 
number of arrests was 8,907. Writing to the Prime Minister in November, Havers explained the 
problem. He remarked that it was ‘one thing to be satisfied that an offence had been committed, 
quite another to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a particular person committed it.’78 Despite 
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Hogg’s ‘word to the wise,’ it was not proving possible for the judiciary, however compliant, to bend 
the law far enough to lock up Thatcher and the DSPU’s political opponents on a large enough scale - 
without serious constitutional infringements, the risk of unwanted publicity and a threat to the 
overall stealth approach. Hogg’s note echoed the recommendations of the DSPU – both in his 
willingness to cross constitutional boundaries and lean on the judiciary, but also in his mindfulness 
regarding stealth and his willingness to conform, despite his reservations.  As such, the Ridley Report 
might be seen as leaving a mark on the justice system - via the DSPU and in the Lord Chancellor’s 
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Chapter 7: ‘The Enemy Within is So Much Harder to Conquer’: The DSPU, the NACODS Dispute and 
the Sequestrators  
Throughout the strike, the DSPU produced weekly reports on the national trickle back to work. By 
September 1984, the amount of pits on strike compared to those working fully was 102-42 in favour 
of the strikers, with some men present at 24.1 Although more pits were on strike than not, the fact 
that nearly a third of pits were operational meant that the government still had a strong hand. Those 
operational pits, alongside the record levels of stockpiled coal, the increased oil-burn at power-
stations, and the industry-specific peculiarities which meant that a coal strike took a long time to 
have any effect, meant that the DSPU could afford to advise a hard line against the NUM.  
After the miners had tried and failed to repeat the Saltley Gate incident, at Orgreave in June, 
Redwood called for the suspension of all talks – believing, as the Ridley Report had suggested, that 
the government needed only to wait out the miners.2 In September 1984, however, a series of 
events led Thatcher and the DSPU to fear defeat. Of particular concern to the DSPU was the 
‘NACODS’ union. The National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) 
represented colliery deputies and officials in every pit. A strike by their members would shut down 
the operational coalfields in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, as well as pits in other areas that were 
defying the strike. That would, for the first time, change the strike into a truly national one and be a 
major boost to Scargill and the flying pickets. For the DSPU’s Policy Director, it was imperative that 
this did not occur. Redwood advised the Prime Minister that ‘all efforts [must] be made to appease 
[the] NACODS leaders.’3 That same day, Peter Walker told the Cabinet that he had it on good 
authority that the NACODS President was sympathetic to Scargill and might try to influence the 
NACODS membership to vote for a strike.4 The cause of the NACODS dispute had been a circular 
issued on the 15th August. The NCB had hastily retracted the circular, and Redwood stressed the 
importance of informing the NACODS leaders that this was the case. In complete contrast to his 
policy toward the NUM, Redwood proposed a ‘full week of talks,’ in the hope that this might 
‘confuse the issue.’5 In case that did not prove enough, Redwood advised ministers to make sure 
that they could still access their accumulated stockpiles of coal, in case of a NACODS strike.6 A report 
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in late October confirmed that, if a NACODS strike did take place, endurance would last only until 
January.7  
British Nuclear Fuel Chief and DSPU member, Peter Warry, warned that the drift back to 
work was too slow, and that the government was in danger of losing the initiative.8 Shell’s Peter 
Wybrew offered a contingency plan. He pointed out that power stations, already at maximum oil-
burn on the recommendation of both the DSPU and the Ridley Report, could now be run on oil 
burners alone, taking coal out of the equation altogether.9 However, the Prime Minister seemed 
reluctant to undermine the entire coal industry in that way – perhaps considering such a move as a 
full-on attack, one out-of-step with the continued, pursued policy of stealth. Moreover, the NACODS 
dispute had come at a time when the government was feeling vulnerable due to a raft of other 
industrial disputes. The Department of Employment had reported that workers at Cammell Laird in 
Birkenhead, British Aerospace in Filton, and rank-and-file civil servants in both Durham and 
Longbenton, were all taking strike action.10 Up until the NACODS dispute, however, Thatcher’s 
private-sector loyalists within the DSPU did not appear to consider the possibility that they, and the 
government, might actually lose the strike and be forced to back down. The threat of a NACODS 
strike did not dampen the taste for the theatrical often displayed by the DSPU members. Warry 
worried about a ‘Dunkirk spirit’ emerging amongst the miners.11 He warned that upcoming 
government negotiations with local government councils could end with ‘the forces of darkness 
joining in a cause celebre.’12  Alongside the miners and the city of Liverpool, many of the country’s 
local authorities had been the target of Thatcher’s ‘enemy within’ speech in July. While the DSPU 
concentrated on the miners, local councillors and civil servants were both being secretly targeted by 
others sections of the state by November (see case study 3).  
Disappointingly for Scargill and the striking miners, NACODS accepted a last-minute deal 
from the NCB, and called off their strike in the most dramatic circumstances - on the very morning it 
was due to begin. At a Cabinet meeting, Thatcher correctly labelled this last-minute u-turn as a 
‘serious blow’ for the NUM.13  For the DSPU, the possibility of a catastrophic setback had been 
averted by following Redwood’s line of ‘appeasement.’ Reassured, Wybrew called for MacGregor to 
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implement redundancies approaching one-hundred-thousand, as long as the NCB Chief did not 
publicly state where that idea had come from.14  
Despite the continuing adherence to stealth, the role of the media was seen as vital to the 
DSPU during the strike. The private-sector loyalists (and government ministers) often talked about 
the importance of the police and the NCB being seen to win, as if that was as important as the 
victory itself. As such, they heavily monitored the newspapers and television news, and relied on 
Tory support from the right-wing press to ram their case home. One tactic, suggested by the DSPU, 
was to present the argument in the media as one exclusively about law and order. That allowed the 
government to avoid discussion of the real political and economic issues behind the strike. From the 
early days of the strike, Pascall advised Thatcher of the importance of presentation. The BP-man told 
the Prime Minister that the government had to be successful in ‘present[ing] anti-picketing 
measures as police action to maintain law and order.’15 The media seemed happy to oblige. On 
television news, police attacks on pickets went un-reported.16 Police numbers and heavy-
handedness were under-reported or ignored.17 TV camera crews were four times as likely to be 
behind police lines, than picket lines.18 On the evening news after the Battle of Orgreave, sequences 
were shown in a different order to which they had occurred, in order to create a narrative of a 
beleaguered police force.19 In the press, the miners were portrayed as crazed ideologues, led by a 
madman. Scargill suffered endless personal attacks and was ridiculed for claiming (correctly) that the 
NCB had a secret closure list for pits. The Sun was the most notorious. A strident cheerleader for the 
Thatcher government, the paper often used crude and hostile language to deride the miners and 
their leaders. Scargill was recast as Hitler, a comparison so obviously flawed that the papers’ printers 
at Wapping refused to print the edition.20 The newspaper went ahead and printed that day’s edition 
with a blank page on the front. Throughout the mainstream media, there existed a consensus of 
unquestioned assumption of police neutrality.21 The government also enjoyed positive spin, 
portrayed as the benevolent, neutral guardian of the national interest. The DSPU encouraged that 
positive propaganda and advised more.22 In December, after the tide had turned decisively the 
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government’s way, Warry advised that the Conservative-supporting media should now be leaned on 
to push the narrative a step further. ‘Anyone who supports the strike is also a supporter of the 
violence.’23 
Though the government benefitted from acute media bias in their favour, the DSPU 
members were still cautious. They took out adverts in what they saw as the left-wing press. Taking 
out a full-page advertisement in the Mirror in April 1984, the government portrayed the NUM as 
belligerent deal-refusers. As discussed above, this was the exact opposite of the truth. Thatcher was 
personally pleased with the ad.24 Both Redwood and Pascall wrote of the dangers of ‘going soft’ in 
the eyes of the general public.25 In June, a fortnight after the Battle of Orgreave, Thatcher reminded 
the Cabinet of the vital importance of media coverage of the dispute.26  Wary of any deviation from 
the orthodox narrative, Redwood lamented an episode of the BBC’s Newsnight in September.27 The 
episode had stated that coal stocks could be running low. Redwood ordered all three of his DSPU 
deputies to step up the propaganda and push the narrative of stocks lasting well into the next year. 
Throughout sections of the media a false narrative was created, in order to recast the miners’ 
leaders as belligerent and militant deal-refusers, the NCB as offering sensible and generous deals, 
and the government as rational peace envoys. As Pascall put it, in the eyes of the press, ‘we have 
been very successful in keeping the dispute at industrial rather than political level – this should be 
continued.’28 The DSPU had long admitted that they viewed the strike as political. In adherence with 
the stealth narrative, however, the opposite was to be maintained publicly.  
By November, the strikers’ advantage had fallen to 47-45, with some men present at 82. 
Victory now appeared only a matter of time for the DSPU and the government. The Ridley Report 
had instructed that the Tories would, once all of the other recommendations were in place, only 
have to wait out the miners. Redwood and the DSPU had repeatedly made the same 
recommendation – even during the heated aftermath of Orgreave. Thatcher, despite her personal 
dislike of Scargill, had in public at least, kept up the pretence that the government was scarcely 
involved.29 By the end of January 1985, the amount of pits on strike compared to those working fully 
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was 22-49, with some men present at 103.30 Thatcher was informed by ministers in late January that 
some amongst the NUM leadership, now faced with the very real prospect of outright defeat, had 
become increasingly desperate to resume negotiations. Thatcher was clear. ‘There is no purpose in 
further negotiations.’31 Ned Smith, the NCB senior executive, was appalled by the government’s 
refusal to enter into talks. Smith had met with Scargill and McGahey in December, when both of the 
NUM representatives had told the NCB man that they wanted to resume talks. Later that month, 
Smith also met with NUM General Secretary Peter Heathfield, after which both men left happy that 
an agreement could be reached. Upon leaving the meeting, however, Smith was outraged to find 
that that one of MacGregor’s own private-sector ‘Special Advisors,’ David Hart, had given a press 
release announcing that the talks had broken down acrimoniously. Not only was Hart not present at 
the meeting, but the press release was made whilst the meeting was still taking place. Smith, it must 
be remembered, was a harsh critic of Scargill and the other left-wing members of the NUM 
Executive. Nevertheless, he had become fed-up of the ‘unjust and immoral’ behaviour of the 
government, MacGregor and the ‘advisors.’ He tended his resignation.32 The miners’ leaders 
continued to press for talks. In February, the government wrote to Heathfield to ask him to cease 
with constant requests for dialogue because the government no longer found any ‘basis for entering 
into talks.’33  
Although the Ridley Report had not mentioned the law courts in regard to arrested miners, it 
did suggest, very clearly, that the courts could be useful to the government in another field - finance. 
The Report had pointed out that the ‘greatest deterrent to any strike is to cut off the supply of 
money to the strikers.’34 As such, it continued, the government should look to introduce legislation 
to deny unemployment benefits to strikers. Social security benefits were highlighted as an area 
which could become a particularly ‘fruitful field’ in the planned attack.35 As soon as they had gained 
power in 1979, the Tories began introducing a raft of legislation aimed at limiting the ability of 
potential strikers to fund themselves. After less than a year in office, the Social Security Bill was 
brought in. The bill included clause 6, which changed the law so that strikers were not entitled to any 
unemployment benefits. The Social Services minister and self-proclaimed Thatcher-critic, Norman 
Fowler, defended the bill, branding it as a means to ‘restore [a] fairer bargaining balance between 
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employers and trade unions.’36  By July 1984, four months into the strike, the government had 
moved to block tax rebates that were due to striking miners. A letter from the House of Lords asked 
under what authority they were being withheld. Quoting the Finance Act of 1981, Thatcher 
defended the move, replying that ‘any refund can only be applied once an employee is back to 
work.’37 After successfully navigating the NACODS scare in September, and with the striking miners 
struggling to feed themselves and their families, the government kept the new legislation coming.  In 
October, a report welcomed another ‘change in regulations’ which stopped mortgage interest being 
paid to striking miners, as had been their entitlement under existing legislation.38 In November, the 
Department for Health and Social Security announced ‘new rules’ which meant that there would 
now be higher deductions from the dole payments of anyone under suspicion of striking.39 At a 
Cabinet meeting in November, Thatcher floated the idea of cutting off the small allowance that 
strikers could claim if they had children. The Prime Minister was only talked out of it after Fowler 
argued that such a move might buy the destitute families’ sympathy from the general public. 
Thatcher reluctantly dropped the idea.40  The idea for the raft of legislation targeted at the striking 
miners and their families had been clearly laid out in the Ridley Report. However, in the case of the 
NUM, the government had a further problem not identified by Ridley in 1978. With such a large 
membership, the union itself was rumoured to be worth millions of pounds – money which could 
potentially be used to defy and undermine the government’s legislative assault.  
For the DSPU, the funds of the NUM became a prime target. After Orgreave, Redwood had 
urged Thatcher and Brittan to lean on the judiciary in order to influence sentencing. Although the 
results of that intervention were mixed, it might be possible to have another ‘word to the wise,’ or 
at least convince some elements of the seemingly compliant judiciary to turn a blind eye to 
unconstitutional meddling. From July onwards, Redwood and the DSPU made the same 
recommendation of direct intervention in the law courts – though this time in order to seize NUM 
funds.41 Within two weeks, Redwood’s suggestion was implemented. In South Wales, Welsh pickets 
had defied an injunction against picketing, granted to two haulage firms. The DSPU spotted an 
opportunity. On the 1st August, a high-court judge ordered the seizure of the entire funds of the 
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South Wales area of the NUM.42 That was a massive blow for the Welsh miners, who called for help 
from the Trade Unions Congress. Their calls were ignored. For Redwood and the DSPU, a method 
was needed to expand the sequestration to the entire NUM.  
MacGregor’s ‘special advisor’ and property dealer, David Hart, was a millionaire who lived in 
an apartment at Claridges in London. Hart was an outspoken, committed Thatcherite – a right-wing 
libertarian who had inherited a fortune from his banking father. Although other business leaders had 
offered full support to Thatcher’s monetarist project, Hart decided to go further. The banker’s son 
would tour the Midlands in his chauffeur-driven Mercedes, trying to find dissatisfied miners who 
could be used to take the NUM to court, for not having a ballot. As well as having his own wealth to 
fund him, Hart was bankrolled by other business leaders including John Paul Getty II, Hector Laing of 
United Biscuits and Lord Hanson of the Hanson Trust – the latter of which was a large donor to the 
Economic League.43  Hart was known to have an inflated view of himself. He claimed that he had 
personally orchestrated the Battle of Orgreave in order to inflict a defeat on the striking miners.44 
Hart, alongside Tim Bell of Saatchi & Saatchi, acted as unofficial ‘advisors’ to MacGregor during the 
strike – in a similar fashion to Thatcher and the DSPU.  
Ned Smith, the NCB’s Director General of Industrial Relations, expressed concern at the level 
of influence MacGregor’s private-sector loyalists seemed to have over the chairman. At one meeting 
between Smith and MacGregor, during the NACODS dispute, Hart and Bell denounced the NACODS 
leaders as communists in conspiratorial allegiance with Scargill and the NUM Executive.45 According 
to Smith, Hart boasted that his ‘contacts’ could help him to overcome any NACODS strike, just as 
those ‘contacts’ would help to defeat the NUM. Despite accusations that Hart was a fantasist, he did 
have a direct line to Thatcher. In-keeping with his brash personality, Hart publicly bragged about his 
access to the Prime Minister. Alarmed at Hart’s haphazard approach to the stealth plan, Thatcher 
informed ministers in October that Hart should be told to stop talking about his direct access, 
particularly to the media.46 Nevertheless, Thatcher did not move to restrict Hart’s access, signifying 
that she must have considered him to be at least partially valuable. The Special Advisor promised 
ministers he would be more careful with the press in the future.47 Hart’s tactic was to embroil the 
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NUM in long-winded and difficult-to-fight legal cases.48 He was instrumental in setting up the 
National Working Miners’ Committee (NWMC). He was a regular attender at the early meetings of 
the organisation, whose main aim was to sue the NUM on behalf of anti-strike miners.49 Hector Laing 
raised £30,000 for the NWMC from other pro-Thatcher business leaders.50 The organisation’s funds 
were handled by Hodgkinson and Tallents solicitors, a firm with longstanding ties to the 
Conservative Party.51 Considering himself as an insider, Hart sent regular reports to Thatcher on the 
progress of the lawsuits, as well as information about both striking and working miners’ morale. In 
October, he told the Prime Minister that NACODS members were very unhappy about the strike call, 
and advised that the government ‘should not show any weakness’ in the continuing dispute.52  
Encouraged by Hart’s progress, Redwood suggested that the confiscation of funds be 
broadened to the entire NUM in relation to an ongoing court-case about unpaid fines.53 On the 25th 
October, Judge Nicholls found against the NUM on all counts and ordered the seizure of all NUM 
funds, in Britain and abroad.54 The reason given was an unpaid fine previously meted out to the 
NUM, accrued through endless court actions brought about by Hart’s NWMC. By November the 
central NUM funds had been sequestered. A Tory-appointed lawyer was named as ‘receiver’ of all 
union funds. In effect, the judiciary had ordered the NUM to hand over its £8.9 million assets, to the 
very people that the money was supposed to be used to fight against. Peter Warry was stirred to 
consider abandonment of stealth over the sequestration of funds, which had come only weeks after 
the collapse of the proposed NACODS strike.55 With the NACODS strike averted and the 
sequestration all but complete, the nuclear energy chief pushed for a propaganda offensive to finish 
of the NUM. He maintained that the government had to keep the initiative, by ‘closing more [coal] 
faces with full publicity.’56 It was Thatcher’s turn to remind a member of the DSPU of the stealth 
plan. The Prime Minister cautioned all allies and ministers that they should ‘avoid gloating,’ at least 
publicly.57 The NUM leadership launched an appeal against the decision. However, the judiciary 
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again seemed less than impartial. After rejecting the appeal out-of-hand, Justice Nicholls forecast a 
coming ‘day of reckoning’ for the miners.58  
The NUM had foreseen the attack on its funds, and had moved the vast bulk of its money 
overseas – making it much harder to seize. The NUM’s struggle against the Thatcher government 
had won it many admirers abroad. The large French union, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), 
attempted to send funds to the NUM. When their money was sequestered, they sent convoys of 
lorries to England, carrying food and clothing for the striking miners. Home Office Assistant to 
Brittan, Nigel Pantling, reassured Thatcher and the DSPU that some [lorries] may be refused 
admission [at Dover] under normal immigration procedures.59 Despite that veiled threat, Pantling 
was left to concede that ‘the Home Secretary can find no way to exclude them all.’60  The NUM also 
received help from the USSR.61 That may well have been seen by Redwood and some ministers as 
vindication of their earlier attempts to compare their ideological enemies within and without. 
Toward the end of 1984, a Soviet delegation was due to visit London on unrelated issues. At the 
same time, the press was rife with stories of Soviet funding for the miners.62 A confidential report 
estimated that the Soviets had handed over more than £1 million.63 As part of their delegation, the 
Soviets had provocatively included the top Soviet coal-pit foreman, Strelchenko.64 The government 
saw this as a clear act of provocation, and it was decided that the Soviets would be asked outright 
whether they had donated to the NUM. The Minister for Trade and Industry, Norman Lamont, did 
raise it with the Soviets, who asserted that the money had been raised and sent directly from 
Russian miners, in an act of solidarity. Lamont pointed out that Soviet citizens lacked any access to 
convertible Roubles and could therefore not have taken money out of the USSR.65 Lamont urged the 
Prime Minister to tell the Soviets to ‘stop meddling in our internal affairs.’66 Thatcher urged stealth 
and caution. Urging Lamont to be careful, she reminded him that ‘we are always seeking clemency 
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and exit visas from them for Soviet citizens.’67 The Foreign Office also sent reports on a cheque for 
ten-thousand pounds given to the NUM by Afghan trade unionists.68 The Foreign Office had been 
indirectly brought into the implementation of the Ridley Report, chasing and reporting on gestures 
from the miners’ allies from around the world. The justification for FCO involvement was the link 
with the USSR. As one of the Prime Minister’s assistants said in a letter to the Foreign Office, ‘the 
British government now have an interest, going beyond their ordinary political interest, in the 
sequestrators laying their hands on NUM funds.’69 The Attorney General Michael Havers, tasked with 
locating the miners’ funds, reported in November that the NUM had up to £5 million in 
Luxembourg.70 He also suspected that the NUM had another deposit in bank accounts in Eire. He 
reassured the Prime Minister that actions were in place to ‘freeze and obtain’ those overseas 
funds.71 Thatcher and the DSPU did not have to wait long. In February, a letter from the Law Officers 
confirmed that the Luxembourgian government had been pressurized to back down, and hand over 
all NUM assets.72 Although Dublin proceedings were still awaited, the Receiver had also ‘laid his 
hands on £600-thousand from Switzerland.’73  Following the instructions in the Ridley Report and the 
guidance of the DSPU, the government had waged a successful, legal war on the NUM.  
In December, a rival union to the NUM had been set-up by working miners from 
Nottinghamshire. The Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM) was set-up by Roy Lynk and was 
fiercely critical of Scargill and the continuing strike.74 Despite that stance, the working miners would 
have nothing to do with David Hart’s NWMC, which they correctly identified as a front for 
government coercion.75 Hart, who had originally coveted the support of the UDM, was not 
concerned. By February 1985, the goal of full confiscation of funds for the strikers was finally 
achieved.  With the sequestration of funds completed, Hart wrote to Thatcher to boast of his own 
involvement, claiming that ‘humiliation was at hand’ for Scargill and the striking miners.76  
By February 1985, with the strike all but defeated, Redwood announced that Thatcher and 
the private-sector loyalists within the DSPU were ‘on the brink of a great victory, one even greater 
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than the Falklands, because the enemy within is so much harder to conquer.’77  On the 3rd March 
1985, the South Wales area called for a return to work on the condition that men sacked during the 
strike would be re-instated. However, the NCB knew that the miners’ leaders were no longer in any 
position to negotiate. With its funds sequestered, the NUM could no longer fund striking miners. 
Faced with the stark choice of going hungry or returning to work, many miners had already, 
reluctantly, chosen the latter. As such, the return-to-work rate had increased exponentially since 
January. Safe in that knowledge, the NCB refused all concessions. On the 5th March, the NUM 
officially called the strike off. Some pits in Kent defied the return to work, but by the 6th of March, 
Redwood reported to Thatcher that 97% of miners were not on strike.78 
After the defeat of the miners’ strike, the four members of the DSPU were all rewarded well 
for their contributions. John Wybrew went back to Shell, where he was promoted to the position of 
director.79 By the end of the 1980’s, he was given an OBE.80 He later moved to British Gas, which had 
been fully privatised whilst he was in the DSPU. David Pascall went back to BP. In 1987, Thatcher 
sold the government’s last remaining shares in the company, worth £7.5-billion, to the Kuwait 
Investment Authority. A new post was created, for a director to oversee that transition to full 
privatisation. That director was David Pascall.81 No comment was made on the seeming hypocrisy of 
‘privatising’ BP by selling the shares to a company controlled by the Kuwaiti Government. Pascall 
received a CBE in 1992.82 British Nuclear Fuel Chief, Peter Warry, was kept on by the Tory 
administration as a member of the ‘deregulation taskforce’ for the Department of Trade and 
Industry, helping to implement a raft of privatisation programs for the government. In the dying days 
of the Tory administration in 1996, he helped to oversee the full privatisation of nuclear power in 
the United Kingdom.83 Perhaps the best-known former member of the DSPU is its leader, John 
Redwood. In 1987, the Policy Director was rewarded for his work by being made an MP in the safe 
Tory seat of Workingham. He was also promoted within NM Rothschild to the role of ‘Head of 
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International Privatisation.’84 Redwood later became a cabinet member, taking up the position of 
Secretary of State for Wales. He made a bid for the Tory leadership in 1995, but was defeated. When 
Tory David Cameron became Prime Minister in 2010, he offered Redwood a new role which he still 
holds to this day – co-chairman of the policy review group on economic competiveness. He claimed a 
second salary from NM Rothschild until at least 1989.85 During their time in the DSPU, the private-
sector loyalists had followed the Ridley Report and the central adherence to stealth. The writer of 
that report, Nicholas Ridley, remained in his Cabinet position of Secretary of State for Environment. 
For Ridley and others who might be aligned to Thatcher within the public sector, the private-sector 
loyalists had acted as fine exemplars of how to weaponise elements of the state apparatus against 
political opponents of the Prime Minister. The private-sector loyalists had seen no divide between 
party and state. No legitimisation was ever sought, granted nor needed. As long as stealth was 
adhered to, politically partisan activity was carried out with impunity.  
Despite claiming salaries from companies in rival parts of the energy sector, Special Advisors 
David Pascall, John Wybrew and Peter Warry involved themselves in every aspect of the dispute and 
used the language of politically-aligned, Thatcher loyalists who viewed the miners’ strike as a ‘great 
opportunity’ to inflict a defeat on the political opponents of the sitting Tory government. The leader 
of the DSPU, John Redwood, also viewed the strike as a ‘political rather than an industrial’ battle. At 
Orgreave in June and during the NACODS dispute in September, the government had successfully 
circumvented the two events which could have won the dispute for the NUM. New, more militaristic 
methods of policing suggested in the Ridley Report and implemented by the Thatcher government 
since 1979 had seen off another potential Saltley Gate at Orgreave – though Thatcher-aligned 
officers working within their own culture of conformity had used gratuitous violence in doing so. The 
country’s constabularies had been altered considerably and the law courts had been leaned on – on 
advice from the DSPU. The Lord Chancellor’s ‘word to the wise,’ despite his own earlier misgivings 
concerning ‘elective dictatorship,’ was another example of adherence to the culture of conformity 
evident within elements of the Thatcherite state. Politically-influenced state interference in the 
courts and police brutality at the picket-line can both be seen as evidence of the weaponisation of 
sections of the state apparatus during the strike.  In another example, a financial pincer movement 
had been undertaken, attacking miners’ personal finances through legislation and NUM funds 
through endless legal proceedings. The kernel of most of those ideas had been the Ridley Report of 
1978 and its plan for an ideological and political attack on the trade unions – particularly the miners’ 
 
84 Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, p299.  
85 Untitled, ‘John Redwood Biography,’ All Souls College Oxford Online, https://www.asc.ox.ac.uk/person/55 
9Accessed 10th May 2019).  
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union. The basic ideas in that report had been fleshed-out and then implemented by the specifically-
picked DSPU.  
The weaponisation of sections of the state had taken place in line with the Ridley Report’s 
overall instruction of adherence to stealth. In the aftermath of Orgreave, Thatcher chose to follow 
the advice of the DSPU, returning to the methods of stealth, despite calls from some Tory ministers 
for a full-publicity clash.  During the NACODS dispute, Redwood’s advice for the government to 
temporarily abandon inherent, ideological antagonism with trade unions and make a behind-the-
scenes deal with the NACODS leadership at all costs had also been followed. The DSPU’s loyalty to 
the Prime Minister and overtly political partisanship made the members an extreme example of the 
lack of distinction between party and state during the Thatcher tenure, and in response to the 
miners’ strike. However, those private-sector loyalists were not the only example. Their adopted 
method - weaponisation under the cover of stealth – had also taken place within other areas of the 
state during the dispute – specifically in regard to Arthur Scargill. 
Reflections on the Research Questions 
The existence and activities of the DSPU offer an extreme example of the politicised state. 
Adherence to Thatcherism inside the unit was so pronounced as to be almost exaggerated at times. 
Private-sector loyalists such as Redwood and Pascall brought pre-existing ideological mores with 
them. Indeed, those loyalties explain their recruitment in the first place. Cultural norms such as the 
open espousal of political language became commonplace. The evidence used in this section 
suggested that Thatcher did not have to do much pressuring – the DSPU were committed 
Thatcherites and did not need to be convinced regarding issues of legitimacy concerning the 
weaponisation of the state apparatus. However, because the DSPU were private-sector loyalists, the 
evidence used in this section cannot tell us what effect Thatcher and the DSPU had on members of 
the permanent state active under Heath and highlighted in Part 1. The Home Office, MI5 and the 
police will be examined in Part 3. While Part 1 of this thesis established longstanding conservative 
biases within the state, the evidence here backs up Milne and Bloom’s claims about the politicisation 
of the state specific to Thatcher and Thatcherism. The scale of the recruitment of private-sector 
loyalists and their interference in other parts of the state was something different to what had been 
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Part 3: The Central Intelligence Unit (The Leicester Unit) 
Introduction 
Over a six-month period during the miners’ strike, the Home Office, MI5, Special Branch and the 
country’s chief constables collaboratively weaponised elements of the state apparatus against a 
trade union leader at the behest of the sitting Prime Minister. In line with the stealth approach 
suggested by the DSPU, Thatcher had resisted calls for the arrest of Arthur Scargill in the aftermath 
of Orgreave. By mid-July, however, the Prime Minister had decided that she did want the NUM 
President prosecuted and asked senior civil servants, MI5 and the police to produce a ‘dossier of 
evidence’ to that end. The Central intelligence Unit (CIU – known as the Leicester Unit), was a secret 
collaborative effort which attempted to carry-out Thatcher’s instruction by amassing that ‘dossier of 
evidence.’ From September 1984, Police Special Branches from 16 strike-bound forces collated 
information regarding picket-line activity and then sent that information to the Leicester Unit to be 
analysed in the hope of finding ‘patterns and trends’ which might denote the central, ‘coordinating 
hand’ of Scargill. If that was detected, then the NUM President could be charged with illegal 
secondary picketing. The data would also be analysed to try to link Scargill to other criminal activity 
on the picket-line. The scale of the operation against Scargill was so large, the Home Office had to 
finance a computer installed with a crime-analysis programme directly out of its own budget. The 
work of the Leicester Unit was highly secretive. Adherence to stealth was a constant theme for those 
involved. Those within the Leicester Unit were acutely aware of the partisan nature of their task. The 
Unit was set-up in response to pressure from above – as a response to the Prime Minister’s stated 
aim to have Scargill prosecuted. That pressure from above combined with existing and longstanding 
political biases from some within those state agencies to create a collaborative, multi-agency 
weaponisation of sections of the state - carried out at the behest of the Prime Minister and 
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Chapter 8: ‘A Thoroughly Thatcherised Satrapy’: The Home Office and MI5  
In the early months of the first Thatcher administration, the Prime Minister called the MI5 Director 
General, Howard Smith, to a meeting with her and the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw. Whitelaw 
told the MI5 chief that he had read all of the official MI5 reports concerning the so-called Winter of 
Discontent, the wave of strikes which had occurred six months before the Conservatives came to 
power. MI5 had produced detailed reports on leading trade unionists throughout that wave of 
industrial strife, though had concluded that the rank-and-file union members involved were not 
subversives, nor was the wave of strikes being organised to overthrow democracy. Because they 
were not subversives, it had been deemed by MI5 officers that the strikers were not appropriate 
targets for any specific counter-subversion. Although the Security Service’s reports were based on 
first-hand surveillance, Whitelaw told the Director General that MI5’s conclusions were incorrect, 
and that the Winter of Discontent had in fact shown ‘marks of skilled and highly-coordinated 
direction’ from some sort of central organising committee.1 Before the Thatcher government, MI5’s 
official definition of ‘subversives’ had come from the spy agency’s charter of 1972. That is, ‘those 
which threaten the safety or well-being of the state and are intending to undermine or overthrow 
Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.’2 That definition was accepted by 
Heath, Wilson and Callaghan - the three Prime Ministers’ prior to Thatcher.3 Director-General Smith 
found the new Prime Minister unwilling to listen to MI5 appraisals that ‘subversion’ was declining in 
Britain by 1980.4 He filed an internal report which said that ‘Mrs Thatcher assumes a greater role and 
influence on the part of the Communist Party and the Trotskyists in the trade union and industrial 
fields than they did in fact enjoy.’5 According to Smith, Thatcher had highlighted her belief in the 
existence of what she called the ‘wreckers,’ who were working behind the scenes at the top of the 
trade union movement to undermine the new Tory government. When Smith offered an opinion 
that this was not the case, the MI5 man was snubbed. 
 In December 1979, Thatcher called a meeting at Chequers with ideologically-aligned 
minsters to discuss how best to react to the ‘wreckers,’ and to ‘consider action to counter hostile 
forces working for industrial unrest.’6 After Smith’s questioning of the existence of those wreckers, 
neither he nor any other MI5 officers were invited to attend. Instead, Thatcher invited her private-
sector loyalists such as Victor Rothschild, as well as Thatcher-appointed senior civil servants such as 
 
1 Christopher Andrew. The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of M15 (St Ives: Penguin 2010), p670.   
2 Ibid, p667.  
3 Ibid, p670. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, p671.  
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Robert Armstrong. As the vice-President of the Economic League and the chief executive of the 
family business NM Rothschild, the city bank which would later second Redwood to the DSPU, 
Rothschild was representative of the private-sector loyalists favoured by the new Prime Minister.7 
Armstrong, however, had spent most of his working life within the public sector.  
Robert Armstrong was a senior civil servant who had been involved in the Heath-led 
Subversion Home Committee (SHC) in 1972.8 From as far back as his days as a member of the SHC, 
Armstrong had been regarded as industrious and ambitious by those whom he worked with. The civil 
servant’s membership of the original SHC meant that he had longstanding ties with MI5 officers, 
who were well aware of Armstrong’s equally-longstanding desire for the coveted position of Cabinet 
Secretary.9 After Thatcher’s election victory in 1979, he got his wish. The Prime Minister was known 
for her non-toleration of dissenting opinion and liked to surround herself with trusted, ideologically-
aligned advisors.10 She personally picked the former SHC man for the role.11 Around the same time, 
Thatcher’s press secretary Bernard Ingham recalled that Thatcher’s attitude towards MI5 and other 
members of the permanent state (other than those who, like Armstrong, she had appointed 
personally) was less than sympathetic, and that the new Prime Minister ‘wanted them to know who 
was boss.’12 With access to and good-standing with both Thatcher and several MI5 officers, 
Armstrong could act as a key mediator.  Given the subject up for discussion at the Chequers meeting, 
it seems possible that Armstrong told Thatcher about the work of the SHC in the 1970s. In any case, 
one idea that came out of the meeting was for a new counter-subversion unit to begin operating, 
though initially much smaller in scale than the 1972 model. The Cabinet Office Unit (COU) would be 
manned by a single MI5 officer under the supervision of Armstrong himself. That would allow the 
Security Service to come back into the fold – as long as the officer provided was willing to comply 
with Thatcher’s directives – via Armstrong. Those directives would be similar to those of the SHC, the 
last time the Tories had been in power. Duties would include the distribution of propaganda against 
‘subversives,’ the compiling of blacklists, and carrying out other counter-subversion operations on 
behalf of the sitting Tory government. The MI5 officer chosen for the role was John Deverell.13  Keen 
to deploy the same stealth as the SHC had in 1972, Armstrong advised senior Tories to exercise 
 
7 For full history of the Economic League, see Mike Hughes. Spies at Work: The Definitive History of the 
Economic League (London: Lulu 2012).  
8 Robert Armstrong, as Cabinet Secretary, reminisces about his previous role during a meeting in 1985, Record 
of Meeting between Armstrong, Jones of MI5 and other civil servants, 15th January 1985, The National Archives 
Kew, CAB301/484.    
9 Peter Wright. Spycatcher (New York: Viking Penguin 1988), p352.  
10 Simon Jenkins. Thatcher and Sons: A Revolution in Three Acts (London: Allen Lane 2007), p107.  
11 Wright, Spycatcher, p352. 
12 Bernard Ingram quoted in Clive Bloom. Thatcher’s Secret War: Subversion, Coercion, Secrecy and 
Government 1974-90 (Stroud: The History Press 2015), p10.   
13 Bloom, Thatcher’s Secret War, p10. 
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caution against any exposure of Deverell’s activities. The Home Secretary, William Whitelaw agreed, 
though seemed upbeat about the ‘political angles to be explored’ by Deverell’s work.14 Deverell was 
to have a significant impact.  
Deverell’s counter-subversion techniques were instrumental in the ‘Red Robbo/ British 
Leyland’ affair. In August 1983, British Leyland sacked thirteen members, including Derek ‘Red 
Robbo’ Robertson, for being members of left-wing ‘subversive’ organisations. As his nickname 
suggested, Robertson was regarded by many, including Thatcher, as a notorious agitator.15 The 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AUEW) had threatened strike action. Unknown to the union, 
Robertson had held a series of meetings with Midlands-based members of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, all of which were secretly taped by MI5. Anonymously, Deverell sent copies of the 
recordings to British Leyland Chairman Michael Edwardes who, in turn, passed them on to AUEW 
President Terry Duffy. Duffy called off the strike. Keith Joseph told Armstrong to direct MI5 to 
engage in further use of the ‘brown envelope technique’ (the tapes were delivered in an anonymous 
brown envelope). Deverell may well have had more opportunities to use the technique. The Home 
Office was able to tell Thatcher in 1984 that his activities had had a ‘significant and beneficial impact 
on the course of events.’16 Joseph asked whether Deverell could not just pass information straight 
on to other company bosses, as he had with British Leyland. However, Deverell warned Armstrong 
about possible breaches of MI5’s Charter. Instead, Joseph was satisfied that the Home Office and 
Deverell could make the same recommendation as the SHC had in 1972 – by directing the employers 
directly to the Economic League.17 Through Deverell and his work MI5 had proven its worth, and its 
willingness to conform, to Thatcher. Seven months after the riots, in February 1982, Armstrong 
wrote to the Prime Minister to tell her that, in light of Deverell’s work with the Cabinet Secretary, 
MI5 had produced a report concerning possible targets in other areas – including in response to the 
previous summer’s riots. The report warned that ‘subversive groups have exploited the aftermath of 
last summer’s civil disturbances.’18 Three days later, Thatcher’s Principal Private Secretary Clive 
Whitmore wrote a reply to confirm that ‘the Prime Minister was very interested [in any details of] 
exploitation by subversive groups.’19   
Despite Thatcher’s earlier snub, MI5 was not known for having a relaxed attitude towards 
subversion. Speaking at the time of the Spycatcher affair in 1987, ex-Labour Home Secretary Roy 
 
14 Ibid, p671.  
15 Ibid, p672.  
16 Ibid.   
17 Ibid.  
18 Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong to Margaret Thatcher, 19th February 1982, TNA Kew, CAB301/485.  
19 Clive Whitmore PM’s Office to Armstrong, 22nd February 1982, TNA Kew, CAB301/485. 
P a g e  | 97 
 
Jenkins drew on his own experience as head of the Home Office to say that he had always believed 
MI5 to be a poor choice of agency, in dealing with ‘subversion.’20 As Jenkins put it, ‘an organisation 
of people who lived in the fevered world of espionage and counter-espionage [was] entirely unfitted 
to judge between what is subversion and what is legitimate dissent.’21 Those whose day-to-day lives 
were often a battle with the KGB were likely to see subversion even when it was not there. 
Nevertheless, Thatcher had visibly alienated the organisation for questioning the existence of the 
wreckers. Rather than offering the Prime Minister unquestioned agreement, Director General Smith 
had offered evidence-based disagreement -but it was disagreement nevertheless. The Chequers 
snub might well have made Smith’s position untenable. Although he carried on until 1981, Home 
Secretary Whitelaw had been openly sourcing a replacement.22 Smith’s successor would need to be 
someone who was less concerned with issues of constitutionality and more politically-aligned to the 
Thatcherite project – ‘one of us’ to use Thatcher’s oft-used phrase.  
In 1981, the right man was found. The new Director General of the Security Service would be 
John Jones. Like Armstrong, Jones had been a member of the Subversion Home Committee in 1972. 
Shortly after the appointment of Jones, MI5 began sending lists of subversives directly to Thatcher, 
at the Prime Minister’s request. Seven leading members of the Greenham Common Peace Camp, 
set-up in 1981 by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), had detailed files compiled against 
their names. Jones was asked to provide ‘dirt’ on the women after Thatcher herself had announced 
her belief that the Greenham women were colluding with the Soviet Union – an accusation which 
the MI5 chief knew to be preposterous.23 The ‘dirt’ was handed over regardless. Under the new 
Director-General, MI5 had proved itself to be much more amiable to the Prime Minister’s world-
view – particularly concerning subversion.  
Thatcher had installed loyalists and ex-SHC members into the positions of Cabinet Secretary 
and Director-General of MI5. In 1983, after the Tories’ second election victory and first landslide, she 
began to fill Cabinet positions with her supporters. When Nicholas Ridley was promoted to 
Environment, another ally, Leon Brittan, was made Home Secretary. Brittan was a committed and 
outspoken Thatcherite.24 During the early months of the miners’ strike, he denounced the striking 
 
20 The Spycatcher Affair – Spycatcher was a book written by former MI5 officer Peter Wright. It was published 
first in Australia in 1987. Its allegations proved scandalous on publication, but more so because the British 
Government attempted to ban it, ensuring its profit and notoriety.  
21 Roy Jenkins quoted in Richard Norton-Taylor. In Defence of the Realm?: The Case for Accountable Security 
Services (London Civil Liberties Trust 1990), p30.  
22 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p555.  
23 Ibid, p674.  
24 Richard Vinen. Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s (London: Simon & Schuster 
2009), p180.  
P a g e  | 98 
 
miners as ‘anarchists.’25 The Home Secretary was fond of giving television interviews in which he 
would insinuate that miners arrested at picket-lines would be charged with riot – which, he was 
keen to point out, carried a possible life sentence.26 Before Jones’ appointment, MI5 had fallen foul 
of the Prime Minister by analysing trade unionists’ behaviour during the Winter of Discontent, 
applying that behaviour to the existing definitions of subversion in their own charter, and concluding 
that the strikers were not subversives. Brittan had a different approach. If striking miners were not 
subversives because they kept within the law, then perhaps the definition of ‘subversion’ needed to 
be changed.27 Labour MP John Prescott wrote to Brittan at the end of 1984 to express his concerns 
that some striking miners, who did not appear to be breaking any laws, were being targeted for 
state-sponsored counter-subversion such as surveillance and phone-tapping - at the hands of MI5. 
Prescott pointed out that these men had committed no crime. Brittan defended the actions of the 
Security Service. He replied that unlike 1972,‘the definition [of subversion] is not limited to possible 
acts of a criminal nature. In an open society such as ours, it is all too easy to use tactics which are not 
themselves unlawful for subversive ends.’28 Under MI5’s definition of the term, subversion was 
synonymous with the overthrow of democracy – a criminal act. Under the new definition, adherence 
with the law could be passed-off as a tactical measure, undertaken by subversives to throw off the 
security apparatus. During the miners’ strike, Thatcher had constantly pointed to Scargill’s refusal to 
call a ballot as anti-democratic and would later, in her July 1984 ‘enemy within speech,’ call all 
miners ‘a scar across the country’ and a threat to democracy.29 The Prime Minister’s speech linked 
Scargill and the miners to subversion via the old definition. Under the new definition, however, 
Scargill and other NUM leaders could be subversives in any case – whether they had broken the law 
and intended to overthrow democracy – or not.  
In March 1984, Brittan visited MI5 headquarters at Leconfield House in central London. The 
Home Secretary was introduced to the Security Service’s recently promoted Assistant Director of 
Counter Subversion, Stella Rimington. Rimington was seen as something of a high-flier within MI5. 
Despite being part of an organisation that she herself described as old-fashioned and male-
dominated, she had become only the second female ever to reach the level of Assistant Director.30 
During his visit, the new Home Secretary made clear his new interpretation of subversion, and also 
 
25 Leon Brittan, Cabinet Meeting, 22nd March 1984, TNA Kew, CAB128/78. 
26 Gareth Peirce in Battle For Orgreave. Dir. Yvette Vanson. Prod. Vanson Wardle and Channel 4. Youtube. 
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27 Leon Brittan, Cabinet Meeting, 22nd March 1984, TNA Kew, CAB128/78.  
28 Leon Brittan note to John Prescott, cited in Norton-Taylor, In Defence of the Realm?, p31.  
29 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to the 1922 Committee: the Enemy Within,’ 19th July 1984, Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation Online, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105563 
30 Stella Rimington. Open Secret (London: Arrow 2002), p101, p159.  
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his expectations that MI5 should follow his lead in terms of the new definition. Rimington was 
constitutionally-bound to MI5’s own definition of the term. However, the MI5 officer revealed how 
the organisation had justified the handing-over of the information on the Greenham women to 
Thatcher. Although CND was a legitimate and legal organisation, MI5 knew that the Soviet Union had 
targeted the pressure group – in the hope of undermining a nuclear rival from within.31 Viewed from 
that perspective, Rimington would later reflect, CND became a ‘legitimate target’ – despite not being 
a subversive organisation in of itself.32 This was the same rhetoric that the private-sector loyalists of 
the DSPU had used when justifying Foreign Office involvement in the miners’ strike. In regard to 
non-criminal subversives involved in the strike, Rimington told Brittan that ‘we will accumulate 
information and…pass it to Whitehall, but then it is up to you.’33 While this was much less than a 
ringing endorsement of the new interpretation of subversion, neither was it a protest against 
government pressure to carry out operations against those who would not have been classed as 
subversives under the old definition.  
Brittan was able to single-handedly change the definition of subversion, and order others 
within the state to accept it, because of a legal grey area surrounding the terminology. There was no 
definition of ‘subversion’ in English law.34 Journalist Norton-Taylor claimed to have seen it in Special 
Branch manuals and it was also in the aforementioned MI5 Charter. Nevertheless, the actual 
meaning of the term was open to subjective interpretation and, arguably in the case of Brittan, 
purposeful manipulation. It was that legal leeway that had allowed the Home Secretary to change 
the meaning to one more fitting with his own ideological mores and more beneficial to the Prime 
Minister’s own belief that ‘wreckers’ were running the trade unions. In April 1984, a few weeks after 
the start of the strike, the Commons Home Affairs Committee happened to be holding an inquiry 
into Special Branch, during which the definition of ‘subversive’ was brought up. During the inquiry, 
John Alderson, the former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, told MPs that ‘some [Special 
Branch] officers have a much wider understanding of the term ‘subversive’ than others. To some, all 
activists may be subversive, and both individuals and groups critical of the established order are 
marked out for surveillance and recording.’35 Alderson’s statement, which was made one month 
after Brittan’s visit to MI5 headquarters, revealed how the Home Secretary’s re-imagining of 
‘subversion’ was able to permeate the police and security service. However, the speed of that 
 
31 Ibid, 163.  
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permeation might be said to reveal that many within the state’s security apparatus needed little 
encouragement to adopt Brittan’s new way of thinking.   
Many MI5 officers were ex-military men (and occasionally women). Some tended to view 
democratic politics with distaste, suspicion and even hostility, particularly towards the Labour 
Party.36 Guy Burgess, one of the Cambridge Spy Ring, claimed that the reason he and his fellow 
defectors were able to go undetected for so long was because of inherent class-biases within the 
organisation.37 All four spies were upper-class Oxbridge graduates who spoke in Received 
Pronunciation. As the ‘right sort,’ they were, for a long time, above suspicion.38 Rather than the 
British state or the British people, newly recruited officers would profess their loyalty to the 
nebulous entity known as ‘the Crown.’39 Though MI5 reported nominally to the Home Office (along 
with GCHQ and Special Branch, while MI6 reported nominally to the Foreign Office), none of those 
agencies were officially bound to anybody and often acted as independent wings of the permanent 
state.40  
Officer Charles Elwell, a veteran of the Security Service who was due to retire at the time of 
the incoming Thatcher government, wrote a message to the Director General in May 1979 to warn 
that, for him, ‘the communist threat has become more insidious because of the blurring of the edges 
between communism and democratic socialism.’41 Elwell’s comments might be said to reflect the 
longstanding charges laid against MI5 and the other security agencies that those organisations held 
highly-partisan biases in favour of the Conservative Party, with many of their members holding an 
accompanying, deep-seated antagonism toward the Labour Party, which, as Elwell’s letter reveals, 
was often tarred with the same ideological brush as the Security Service’s international foes, the 
Communist Soviet Union. Michael Hanley, Smith’s predecessor as the Director General of MI5 
between 1972 and 1978, often spoke positively about Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, 
but was scathing about both of Heath’s successors, Harold Wilson and Jim Callaghan. Hanley denied 
that the targets for his derision were chosen because, unlike Heath, they were Labour Premiers.  He 
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later claimed that ‘I’m not anti-Labour, but I thought they were [both] amateurish.’42 However, it 
could certainly be argued that an animosity seemed to exist between the government and the 
Security Service when Labour was in power, which would dissipate during Tory terms of office. 
Wilson in particular was convinced that MI5 were spying on him and taping his conversations. As 
discussed, he was probably correct. During his last weeks in office, the Labour Prime Minister had 
taken to pointing at the ceiling if anyone tried to engage him in conversation, even in the lavatory.43 
Wilson’s DSPU Policy Director, Bernard Donoghue, believed that the agency had tapped his phone as 
well. Wilson claimed that Hanley admitted to him, off the record, that MI5 ‘did contain a disaffected 
faction with extreme right-wing views’ who were probably guilty of the espionage Wilson accused 
them of, though they were acting outside of official policy.44 Hanley later denied his confession.  
When Hanley was earmarked for replacement in 1978 by then Labour Home Secretary 
Merlyn Rees, the MI5 man was furious to hear that the moderate Howard Smith was to be his 
replacement. Upon hearing the news, the outgoing MI5 Director-General took the unprecedented 
step of visiting the leader of the opposition, Margaret Thatcher. Hanley was glowing about Thatcher, 
and later wrote in his memoirs that ‘I met Maggie and poured out my woes. I think she took note of 
one or two things…I was very frank.’45 That closeness between the agency and the Conservative 
Party was mirrored by the continuing hostility shown by MI5 towards Labour. In February 1980, with 
Thatcher now in government, The Observer exposed the tapping of the phones of three Labour MPs, 
Neil Kinnock, Michael Meacher and Bob Cryer.46 In July 1980, the Post Office Engineering Union 
(POEU), went public to voice concerns that several Post Office employees were being ordered by the 
‘relevant agency’ to carry out the technical work of phone tapping often against people who seemed 
to have committed no crime other than trade union membership or affiliation with the Labour 
Party.47 In 1981, however, Smith had been replaced by John Jones – Member of the SHC in 1972, ally 
of Thatcher confidante Armstrong and a man personally selected by the then Home Secretary, 
Whitelaw.48 The MI5 hierarchy seemed much less antagonistic about Conservative meddling in their 
managerial structures to remove Smith than they had been about the Labour meddling of 1978 
which had instated him.  
Jones’ tenure as Director-General was marked by a series of damaging whistleblowing 
episodes by former officers, which brought the agency, and its alleged political biases, to public 
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attention. Miranda Ingram went public after being forced to ‘engage in acts of dubious legality’ by 
‘monitoring one’s fellow citizens.’49 Ingram highlighted what she called a ‘prevailing right-wing 
atmosphere’ where an ‘officer who dissents from the official line does not feel encouraged to voice 
his concerns. He feels that it will be futile or detrimental to his career.’50 Ingram later claimed that 
MI5 was a reactionary and conservative organisation, almost comically so, to the degree that 
‘anyone wearing jeans was seen as a possible subversive.’51 Michael Bettaney was a rogue MI5 
officer who was arrested and jailed after being found guilty of being a Soviet double-agent. In his 
April 1984 trial, Bettaney publicly railed against the agency, which he said ‘cynically manipulates the 
definition of subversion and thus abuses the provision of its charter so as to investigate and interfere 
in the activities of legitimate political parties, the trade union movement and other progressive 
organisations.’52 Bettaney claimed that it was MI5’s extreme political partisanship which had led to 
his attempted defection. Although Thatcher’s Chequers snub toward the previous Director General 
and Brittan’s changed definition of subversion might be examples of pressure from above on MI5 
officers to conform to the Thatcherite project, the whisleblowers’ comments reveal a pre-existing, 
deeply-conservative organisation whose membership needed little persuasion to comply.  
Whilst MI5 could denounce Bettaney’s claims as the rhetoric of a Soviet double agent, they 
could not so easily brush off Ingram’s similar criticism, when Ingram seemed to have no obvious axe 
to grind. Moreover, a third whistleblower, Cathy Massiter, came forward with a series of similar 
allegations on a Channel 4 documentary which was broadcast nationwide in 1985. Massiter’s claims 
echoed the sentiments of the others. She claimed to have left the agency because it had been 
‘violating the rules against political bias’ by launching politically-motivated surveillance operations 
against members of the CND and Labour MPs Harriet Harman and Patricia Hewitt.53 MI5’s 
justification for monitoring the Labour MP’s was that they were members of the perfectly legal 
organisation, the National Council for Civil Liberties. Massiter rejected the notion that this made 
them ‘subversives’ worthy of state spying. The whistle-blowers depicted an organisation defined by 
deep-rooted conservative biases. If Thatcher was to target ‘the wreckers,’ MI5 might have seemed 
like a good organisation to lead the way, now that the Thatcher-aligned Jones was the Director 
General. Moreover, the organisation had been keeping files on senior miners’ leaders for decades. 
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The Security Service had engaged in heavy espionage and surveillance against the NUM 
since the previous miners’ strike in 1972 - when Margaret Thatcher had been a junior minister. Mick 
McGahey, NUM Area Co-Ordinator for Scotland, had his phone tapped, just as he would twelve 
years later. During both strikes, the MI5 officers assigned to listen to him would report having 
trouble understanding his thick Glasweigan accent.54 In 1972, Heath’s SHC industrial subgroup 
produced a blacklist of those deemed ‘most likely to become involved in subversion.’55 One of the 
people identified by the SHC was the young NUM Yorkshire Area organiser. That was MI5’s first file 
on Arthur Scargill.56 In 1984, Thatcher repeatedly identified Scargill as the person she believed was 
the lead wrecker.57 However, Thatcher’s claims were not based on the evidence provided by MI5. 
Security Service officers were well-aware of the inaccuracy of Thatcher’s claim. An MI5 Director’s 
meeting on the 13th March indicated that, according to the agencies’ own evidence, ‘there did not 
appear to be any significant subversive involvement [in the strike].’58 A report from the 4th April, 
from the same Director, revealed that ‘subversive organisations were not making a significant 
impact on events.’59  
Despite the fact that they knew that they were carrying out operations against non-
subversives, MI5 officers were now operating within the culture of conformity. As such, they 
continued to commit acts of counter-subversion against the NUM’s leaders. Carole Massiter, the 
officer who later went public, revealed that Scargill would ‘occasionally shout abuse into the phone 
at the people who were tapping him’ whilst agents assigned to listen to McGahey would complain 
about having to listen to hours of private and not particularly useful conversations between Mrs 
McGahey and her family members.60 Stella Rimington later stated that she had to ‘agonize’ over the 
decision to keep up the surveillance against Scargill, since all of the evidence pointed to the fact that 
he was not a communist and was acting perfectly within the law.61 However, MI5 had been 
reprimanded by the Prime Minister under the previous Director General for offering evidence-based 
opinions which appeared at odds with Thatcher’s ‘wreckers’ stance.  Those within the organisation 
now understood that the new Prime Minister represented something different to what had gone 
before. The Security Service was not being asked, but was rather being told by Thatcher that Scargill 
was a subversive.   
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Despite that pressure from above, Rimington was personally taken with the Prime Minister – 
another woman who had achieved high status in a male-dominated field. During the mid-1970s, 
MI5’s Leconfield House had also been the base of the Ministry of Education. During one of 
Thatcher’s visits as Prime Minister in the 1980s, she discovered that Rimington’s office was the same 
one that she had inhabited when she was Minister of Education under Heath.62 In her 
autobiography, Rimington said that the revelation left her both proud, but also mortified.63 The MI5 
officers were so enamoured by Thatcher, they would practice mixing drinks before her arrival - 
desperate that every single detail of the Prime Minister’s visit would be perfect.64 An occasion when 
Thatcher sent back a glass of whisky for being too weakly mixed was spoken about in shamed tones 
by MI5 officers for years afterwards.65 In regard to Scargill, Rimington used the same justification 
that she had used when the counter-subversion division had passed along the ‘dirt’ on the 
Greenham women. Although the NUM was a legal and legitimate organisation, and the vast majority 
of miners were not subversives, reflected the Assistant Director, ‘a triumvirate’ at the head of the 
organisation was intent on overthrowing Thatcher.66 As such, those at the top of the miners’ union 
were subversives.  With that, the MI5 Officer sanctioned the continued surveillance of the NUM 
President – to be maintained throughout the rest of the strike.67  
A monolithic part of the public sector at-odds with the Thatcherites’ anti-statist credentials, 
the civil service, and those that worked within it, were nominally duty-bound to serve whichever 
political party was in power, without displaying any political biases of their own. During the first 
Thatcher tenure, between 1979 and 1983, the Prime Minister had been openly hostile toward - and 
displayed a fierce aversion to - the civil servants which she had inherited from the previous Labour 
administration.68 Their stated commitment to impartiality, however strictly or loosely enforced, had 
set the civil service at odds with Thatcher’s private-sector loyalists drafted into the DSPU. In 1979 
Thatcher’s first DSPU Policy Director, John Hoskyns, wrote a paper which argued that Thatcher 
should implement large-scale cuts to the entire sector which would ‘de-privilege the civil service’ 
with immediate effect.69 Many civil servants railed against the DSPU’s assertion. Ian Bancroft told 
Thatcher that it was ‘absolute nonsense to tell a 20-year-old girl working in a DHSS office in 
Merseyside that she was privileged.’70 Backed-up by her DSPU loyalists, Thatcher retorted that ‘we 
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have several friends in the private-sector who could do the job better.’71 Another senior civil servant, 
Donald Drex, had a face-to-face argument with Thatcher in which he dismissed the DSPU report and 
told the Prime Minister that she and her private-sector loyalists were wrong.72 In response, Drex was 
widely believed to have gotten a black mark against his name - and appeared to be overlooked for 
future promotions.73  
Thatcher and her private-sector loyalists considered themselves an ‘alternative civil 
service.’74 Alan Walters, Victor Rothschild and the DSPU members were all allowed to attend 
ministerial meetings, while senior civil servants were not – unlike under previous Prime Ministers.75  
While some civil servants were at odds with Thatcher and the DSPU, some appeared ideologically-
aligned with the new Prime Minister. One of these was Derek Rayner. In 1979, Thatcher went with 
the DSPU’s recommendation and appointed Rayner to the role of Head of the Civil Service.76 On the 
Prime Minister’s orders, Rayner formed and led ‘the Efficiency Unit’ - a group of Thatcher-aligned 
senior civil servants in Whitehall which was tasked with ‘lead[ing] a crusade against waste and 
inefficiency in the civil service.’77 Rayner and his team, labelled ‘the Scrutineers,’ were feared by 
rank-and-file civil servants as they went about different parts of the sector identifying people and 
areas to be cut. Rayner and his team reported directly to the private-sector loyalists of the DSPU and 
through them, to Thatcher.78 The Scrutineers referred to Thatcher as ‘she who must be obeyed.’79 By 
December 1982, they had produced £170 million of savings and axed 16,000 jobs.80 The Scrutineers 
continued to operate throughout the Thatcher tenure. By December 1984, they had a full-time team 
of nine members and produced regular reports for Redwood and the DSPU.81  
As with the Security Service, senior civil servants such as those employed by the Home Office 
swore their allegiance to the crown.82 Many of those recruited for senior roles within Whitehall 
came from a specific milieu - having a shared education level and coming from the same social 
class.83 As well as educational and class ties, such men, whose daily jobs involved being deeply 
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immersed in public affairs and determining policy, were not likely to be free of shared ideological 
inclinations and conservative biases.84 Moreover, before their appointment to the role, each would 
have been subject to screening and security checks – carried out by people of the same social class 
and political allegiance.85 In 1963, Labour Cabinet Member Richard Crossman had criticised the 
permanent civil service in Whitehall and said that a successful left-wing government was not 
possible in Britain, unless many within the permanent state were replaced.86  
Despite those pre-existing biases, however, Thatcher had not been satisfied. After the first 
landslide in 1983, the Prime Minister and the DSPU changed their policy toward the now-
streamlined civil service. As Prime Minister, Thatcher was personally responsible for the 
appointment of the top two levels of civil servant – permanent secretaries and their deputies.87 
Using her oft-used phrase ‘is he one of us?,’ between 1979 and 1985, 43 permanent secretaries and 
138 deputies departed Whitehall and were replaced by those seen as ideologically sound – virtually 
a complete turnover.88 Power was consolidated among the Prime Minister’s trusted loyalists. Robert 
Armstrong, the Prime Minister’s hand-picked Cabinet Secretary, took over Rayner’s role as the Head 
of the Civil Service. The move toward consolidation led the Guardian’s political commentator, Hugo 
Young, to warn that Britain was now home to a ‘politicised civil service,’ the upper-grades of which 
resembled a ‘thoroughly Thatcherised satrapy.’89 One of the few non-Thatcherites to survive the 
purge was Douglas Wass, the permanent secretary for the Treasury. In April 1986, Wass warned that 
the biggest losers in a politicised state were likely to be the ministers themselves.90 He gave two 
examples - Kenneth Stowe, Thatcher’s new Principal Private Secretary and Clive Whitmore, 
appointed to Defence - as men hired exclusively because they had passed the ‘one-of-us’ test.91  The 
recruitment of a raft of civil servants who had Thatcher to thank for their positions created a culture 
within departments where much depended on the leader’s will.92 Despite the anti-statist credentials 
of Thatcherism as an ideology, the Prime Minister needed the conservative-orientated state to face 
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down her enemies including the NUM in general, parts of the public sector, and Scargill personally.93 
The Home Office became a vital part of the chain of command, linking Thatcher with those loyal to 
her in other parts of the state such as the police and the Security Service.  
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Chapter 9: ‘National Picketing Coordinators’: The Home Office, ACPO and Special Branch 
  
A month before Orgreave, in May, picketing Kent miners had taken over the regional NUM 
headquarters, Hobart House. Upon hearing of the action, Thatcher told the Kent Chief Constable in a 
phone call that ‘Scargill should now be arrested and charged.’1 In the direct aftermath of Orgreave in 
June, however, the DSPU had warned the Prime Minister that arresting the NUM President directly 
after that widely-viewed event might make him a martyr. By late July, Thatcher had abandoned that 
post-Orgreave caution and decided that she wanted her political and personal enemy to be 
prosecuted. That month, she wrote letters to two senior civil servants within the Home Office, Roy 
Harrington and David Hilary, to let them know that she expected them to get involved in initiating 
charges against Scargill, and to enlist the help of the police.  
Harrington was the head of the Home Office’s counterterrorism unit – F4 Division.2 
Harrington and F4 were usually charged with overseeing the state’s responses to the IRA.3 Hilary was 
the Home Office Police Department Chairman.4  On 24th July Hilary wrote to his superior and Deputy 
Undersecretary of State Michael Partridge to say that, as he and Harrington understood it, ‘the 
Prime Minister was really interested in the compilation of some kind of dossier of evidence that 
would enable a charge of conspiracy to be made against someone for organising violent picketing.’5 
There was little doubt as to whom Hilary was referring. He continued that the ‘Director of Public 
Prosecutions has said that there is insufficient evidence [at the present moment] to prosecute Mr 
Scargill.’6 Scargill was not facing prosecution because no evidence had been found to link him to any 
serious criminality. The NUM President was a divisive figure, but the union was a legal organisation 
and Scargill had been democratically elected as its leader. His animosity toward Thatcher might 
previously have been passed off as opposition to the governing party – rather than opposition to the 
British state. Harington and Hilary responded to the Prime Minister’s request by agreeing to develop 
plans to supply the ‘dossier of evidence’ which might be used against Scargill. Hilary revealed that he 
had already enlisted the South Yorkshire Police Chief Constable, Peter Wright, to that end. Wright 
had deployed a Chief Superintendent to ‘watch Scargill’s activities.’7 The CS had been told by Wright 
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to look for the ‘coordinating hand’ of Scargill in regard to picketing or criminal behaviour.8 
Specifically, to ‘keep an eye on Mr Scargill’s activities in order to continually assess the available 
information with a view to possible prosecution.’9 Harrington had also asked the Director of Public 
Prosecutions about the likelihood of Scargill’s conviction if arrested. The Director had again replied 
that the existing evidence was insufficient.10 Despite that, CC Wright had assured Harrington that his 
force was ‘well aware of the coordinating hand of Mr Scargill in organising disorder at particular 
places.’11 However, conceded Wright, there was ‘no immediate prospect of prosecution or any 
serious charges.’12 More work was needed, and perhaps more than one regional force would need to 
be included, if the Home Office was to succeed in producing Thatcher’s ‘dossier of evidence’ against 
Scargill. Such enlistment would need to take place with the upmost secrecy. Harrington and Hilary 
were aware that their task might be difficult to legitimise if exposed to the public. No legitimisation 
would be required, however, if the Home Office adhered to stealth. The civil servants would need to 
enlist more chief constables to the cause – though Wright and the Chairman of the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) David Hall, who had both been made aware of the Prime Minister’s 
directive, had already been reminded of the ‘sensitive’ nature of the task.13   
As discussed, Scargill had been instrumental in organising the massive, strike-defining Saltley 
Gate picket in 1972. Also discussed previously, the years between 1972 and 1984 saw the 
militarisation of Britain’s police forces which was to prove decisive at Orgreave, while many rank-
and-file police felt politically-aligned to Thatcher’s perceived hard-stance on crime. For Britain’s 
most senior policemen – the chief constables, conservative-leanings appeared to stretch back much 
further. Since the mid-1970s, many of Britain’s chief constables appeared to become more and more 
associated with the law and order lobby and, later, the abrasive policies of the Thatcher 
government.14  
In April 1976, a women-led strike took place at the Grunwick factory involving workers who 
were striking for the right to form a trade union. The pickets soon realised that a ‘special 
relationship’ existed between the Grunwick management and senior officers. The Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner, Robert Mark, announced publicly that the Grunwick management had 
 
8 Roy Harrington to Hugh Taylor, both Home Office, 16th July 1984, TNA Kew, HO325/899/2. 
9 Ibid.  




14 Clive Emsley. The English Police: A Political and Social History (Harlow: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1996), p179.   
P a g e  | 110 
 
‘courageously and successfully stood firm against politically motivated violence.’15 In his book 
released in 1978, Mark had even stronger words for the Shrewsbury pickets. In 1973, the police 
charged 24 flying pickets in the construction industry with conspiracy. Some had been given what 
appeared to be excessive jail terms, including three years for Des Warren and two for Ricky 
Tomlinson. The jailed construction workers continued to maintain, to the present day, that they 
were jailed because of their political beliefs and because they had demonstrated successful picketing 
techniques.16 Commissioner Mark argued that the pickets had ‘committed the worse of all crimes – 
even worse than murder – the attempt to achieve an industrial or political objective by criminal 
violence.’17 Mark went on to compare the Shrewsbury 24 to Hitler.   
In November 1981, the workers at the Manchester engineering firm, Lawrence Scott, went 
out on strike. Picketing the front entrance of their site, the workers were bewildered when bus-loads 
of police arrived without explaining their purpose. Soon after, police helicopters flew in, so that the 
management could break the strike by airlifting the goods out, right over their heads. The airlift had 
been laid on by the Thatcher loyalist and Manchester Chief Constable, James Anderton. Anderton 
was known for launching public, right-wing tirades in which he would rail against what he described 
as Britain’s ‘moral descent,’ in which ‘left-wing groups and factions within the ethnic minorities’ 
were ‘pecking away at the foundations of society.’18 A newspaper report from 2012 alleged that 
Thatcher was forced to step in to save Anderton’s career after he said that Aids patients were ‘living 
in a cesspool of their own making.’19 Rather than acting as unbiased agents of the law, some senior 
officers appeared to be becoming more and more politically aligned. An open, publicly-stated 
animosity was emerging toward those on the political left. In 1980, Peter Wright’s predecessor as 
the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police explained on television that it was ‘common sense to 
keep files on anyone with an affinity to communism.’20 He also wanted files kept on homosexuals 
and anyone found guilty of ‘indiscipline in schools.’21 The hard-right rhetoric being espoused by the 
country’s most senior policemen was indistinguishable from the law-and-order dogma being 
expressed by Margaret Thatcher and other members of the Conservative Party. In 1981 the Head of 
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the Police Federation, Leslie Curtis, went further by openly questioning the willingness of the British 
police force to work under any future Labour government.22  
However, the majority of British police officers had always been politically and morally 
conservative.23 Much academic literature on the police revealed an ‘ingrained antagonism of police 
officers toward the political left.’24 That reflected the fact that much public order policing in the 20th 
Century had revolved around labour disputes and union activity. However, the evidence might be 
taken to suggest that the years prior to the miners’ strike saw a move toward open partisanship 
among Britain’ most senior police officers. The rhetoric from senior officers was not only 
ideologically conservative in nature, but also widely supportive of the Conservative Party, and hostile 
toward Labour. The police were also hostile toward anyone who questioned their methods, 
dismissing any criticism as the work of subversives. In an interview with the Liverpool Echo in 
October 1981, the Chief Constable of Merseyside, Kenneth Oxford, responded to critics regarding 
the alleged brutality of his officers by denouncing his detractors as people of ‘dubious political 
intent.’25 Writing in the New Statesman in November that year, Police Federation Chair, James 
Jardine, dismissed anyone critical of the police as ‘the usual ragbag of people who spend their time 
sniping at the police service.’26 Although some chief constables appeared politically aligned to 
Thatcher’s loyalists within the state, their public statements were at odds with the adherence to 
stealth favoured by those in Whitehall, MI5, and the DSPU. A lack of guardedness concerning 
political persuasion had earned senior officers a rebuke by the Home Office in June 1984.27 
During the first weeks of the strike, one of either Harrington or Hilary called a selection of 
politically-aligned Chief Constables to a meeting in London. At the meeting, the gathered policemen 
were given a ‘personal message’ from the Prime Minister.28 The Home Office mandarin announced 
that, in Thatcher’s opinion, a subversive cell was orchestrating violence in regard to the strike, and 
that weakness in police intelligence-gathering was entirely responsible for failing to prove it – thus 
far.29 Thatcher wanted the chief constables to set up a ‘Public Order Intelligence Unit’ to gather 
intelligence related to the strike which might be used to prove that certain subversive leaders were 
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orchestrating the whole thing behind the scenes.30 If such information came to light, then those 
centrally-orchestrating subversives could be prosecuted accordingly. Many of the Chief Constables in 
attendance responded enthusiastically to the new directive.31 Given the anti-union activities and 
reactionary public statements displayed by the chief constables, they might well have appeared to 
be the perfect candidates to join the Home Office and MI5 in any attempt to compile a dossier of 
evidence against Scargill. However, the senior policemen could hardly go about the country 
collecting evidence themselves. Each chief constable would need a small, secretive force to 
undertake the legwork - with no qualms about engaging in politically-partisan activity and a good 
working relationship with MI5. Each chief constable had just such a force at their disposal.  
Originally founded in 1883 to combat Irish republicans, The Metropolitan Police’s Special 
Branch (SB) were revered and feared in equal measure. Since the late 1960s, SB had spied on 
pacifists, unemployed workers, striking unionists and communists.32 In the sixties, SB had numbered 
225 elite police officers. By the early eighties, the number was 1,600.33 Also during that period, 
Branch officers had spread out across other areas of the United Kingdom into provincial forces. In 
1978, the Labour Home Secretary Merlyn Rees had explained that the exact role of SB was to ‘collect 
information on those who I think [might] cause problems for the state.’34 The Metropolitan Special 
Branch’s commander during the mid-1970s was Conrad Hepworth Dixon.  
Dixon reminisced about the peculiar recruitment process that he and other prospective 
policemen underwent (only those with exemplary records were considered). Dixon was marched 
into a room and told to strip naked. Then, ‘a man in a white coat came in and stared at my lower 
half, examined my feet, and walked wordlessly away.’35 Shortly afterwards, Dixon was transferred to 
Special Branch. Rising through the ranks to eventually become the commanding officer, Dixon was 
credited as the man who set-up the Special Demonstration Squad, a unit within Special Branch which 
infiltrated left-wing groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s. ‘Bob Robinson’, whose real name was 
Robert Lambert was a Special Branch officer who went undercover in a number of animal rights and 
left-wing groups between 1977 and 1987. ‘Robinson’ was on the picket line at the Wapping dispute 
in 1986 alongside his genuinely animal rights-aligned girlfriend Charlotte. ‘Robinson’ later fathered a 
child with Charlotte before disappearing overnight. Charlotte was only made aware of the deception 
in 2010 when, completely by chance, she saw a picture of the real Robert Lambert in the Daily 
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Mail.36 In the meantime, Lambert had made no effort whatsoever to contact either Charlotte or his 
now 24-year-old son.  
In light of the Lambert case, a public inquiry into undercover policing began in 2011, led by a 
retired judge, Sir John Mitting. The inquiry was to examine the mass, covert infiltration of political 
groups by Special Branch over a period of 50 years. Mitting and his team were given the task of 
scrutinising a range of misconduct, including the frequent deception of women into intimate 
relationships.37 By 2013, fourteen more inquiries had been announced after it became clear that 
several other Special Branch officers had, like Lambert, fathered children while undercover.38 Dixon 
justified the work of Special Branch’s undercover officers by claiming that the left-wing groups 
infiltrated were ‘subversive,’ even under the old definition.39 The Special Branch commanding officer 
argued that ‘the more vociferous spokesmen of the Left are calling for the complete overthrow of 
parliamentary democracy and the substitution with various brands of socialism and workers 
control.’40 In 1984, Special Branch was able to significantly broaden its list of targets. As previously 
discussed, in early 1984 the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall had stated to a Commons Select 
Committee that many Special Branch officers took the view that ‘all activists may be subversive, and 
both individuals and groups critical of the established order are marked out for surveillance and 
recording.’41 SB officers even had their own justifying term - ‘domestic extremist’ - to account for 
counter-subversion and infiltration against left-wing targets.42 Bob ‘Robinson’ Lambert was awarded 
an MBE for services to policing in 2008.  
Special Branch had longstanding ties with MI5 and had gained a reputation as Britain’s 
‘political police,’ who acted as the Security Service’s ‘footsoldiers.’43 A secondary Home Affairs Select 
Committee in 1985 recorded that SB was acquiring the ‘sinister reputation of a force which 
persecutes harmless citizens for political reasons, acts in nefarious ways to assist the Security 
Service, is accountable to no one, and represents a threat to civil liberties.’44  A Special Branch 
whistleblower, Peter Francis, came forward in 2015 to tell The Guardian that a string of Labour MPs 
including Diane Abbott and Peter Hain had secret files kept on them and had been monitored 
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regularly by Special Branch for decades.45 At the back end of the 2017 general election campaign, 
The Telegraph quoted an unnamed former Special Branch officer who said that the Labour leader 
Jeremy Corbyn was monitored for over 20 years because he was ‘deemed to be subversive’.46 As 
well as Labour MPs, Special Branch spied on members involved in numerous political campaigns 
including those against apartheid, the arms trade, nuclear weapons, the monarchy, as well as several 
trade unions.47 Such was the scope of the multi-decade operation, it was reported in 2018 that, since 
1968, Special Branch had monitored 124 different groups.48 Those 124 were overwhelmingly left-
wing and progressive groups which challenged the status quo. Just three far-right groups, including 
the National Front, were infiltrated.49  
As with MI5, it might be argued that the overwhelming propensity for monitoring left-wing 
groups identified Special Branch as a reactionary and inherently conservative organisation. As such, 
they would make an important addition to the growing list of state agencies charged with producing 
Thatcher’s dossier of evidence. Most of the evidence in the paragraphs above only came to light in 
or after 2010. During the miners’ strike, the exact nature of Special Branch’s role was kept secret. 
Police authorities were kept in the dark about the work of their respective Special Branch.50 Any 
inquiry would be rebuffed. In 1983, Oxford and Anderton had both come under pressure from their 
respective police authorities regarding the accountability of each force’s Special Branch. Anderton 
wrote to the Home Office to seek support for the withholding of any information concerning ‘the 
function of my Special Branch and its relationship with the Security Service. I would like to be 
assured of full Home Office support in the event of my choosing to refuse that information.’51  
Established in 1948, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) provided a forum for the 
country’s chief constables to share ideas and discuss strategic responses to nationwide policing 
issues. As such, ACPO had been meeting regularly for the duration of the strike to discuss training, 
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equipment and coordination of forces.52 However, ACPO was not an authorised or official body.53 In 
May 1984, two months into the strike, ACPO President David Hall prepared a report for other chief 
constables which they might use in response to media questions concerning the National Reporting 
Centre at New Scotland Yard, discussed in the last chapter. Hall gave a mundane run-down of the 
NRC’s brief history which had, admitted the chief constable, been set-up in response to the Saltley 
Gate incident during the 1972 miners’ strike.54 However, Hall made one point which earned him a 
severe reprimand - the ACPO President admitted that the Home Office had been instrumental in 
setting up the NRC and was involved in the miners’ strike again in 1984. The Home Office’s Peter 
Honour labelled Hall’s report ‘unusually naïve and vulnerable’ - for revealing evidence of the Home 
Office’s central involvement in the running of both the 1972 and 1984 strikes.55 Honour berated Hall, 
and reminded him that when it came to the general public, it was to be maintained that the central 
apparatus of government was neutral, the Home Office was not involved in the strike, and that chief 
constables acted without central command from Whitehall.56 Rather ironically given that statement, 
Honour then re-wrote the report before it was dispatched to the country’s other chief constables. 57  
The top-down interference by the Home Office was matched by the inherent biases 
displayed by some senior policemen. On the same day as Hall’s reprimand, shortly before Leon 
Brittan was due to give a speech to the Police Federation broadcast live on the BBC’s World at 1 
radio programme, the Federation’s Chairman Leslie Curtis took to the airwaves to say that ‘since the 
coal dispute began, the police service had discovered who their enemies were.’58 The comment was 
met with applause from the gathered policemen.59 The political partisanship was so extreme that 
the Home Office worried that such public displays of loyalty might be detrimental.60  Although ACPO 
was a useful organisation to have on-side, Hall, like some other policemen, had needed reminding 
that the Home Office preferred adherence to stealth.  
Nottinghamshire Chief Constable Charles McLaughlan, a staunch Methodist and outspoken 
conservative, was a man cut from a similar cloth to other Thatcher-aligned chief constables such as 
Anderton and Oxford.61 Unlike those other two, however, McLaughlan’s county was right on the 
front-line of the strike. In May 1984, the split between the majority of working and minority of 
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striking Notts miners made the county’s pits a major target for Yorkshire’s flying pickets. On May 
Day, scuffles had broken out and arrests were made outside Mansfield NUM Headquarters as rival 
marches between working and striking miners clashed.62 The county was also a major target for the 
new Police Support Units, sent by other forces as mutual aid via the NRC. During the first week of 
the strike alone, 9,700 police officers were deployed from other areas into Nottinghamshire. By 
May, that had led to over 900 arrests.63 For McLaughlan, that should have been pleasing news. The 
chief constable had a close relationship with senior Tories and had hosted a social evening attended 
by both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary in March. McLaughlan had sent personal thanks 
to both for their attendance.64 Thatcher had made it clear that she expected those arrested in 
Nottinghamshire to be quickly put on trial and jailed – as an example to others.65 However, there 
was a problem. McLaughlan told the Lord Chancellor, Quintin Hogg (who would later suggest the 
‘word to the wise,’ with the judiciary), that he had some reservations about ‘the quality of some of 
the evidence upon which arrests had been made and for this reason [was] not anxious for the dates 
of trial to be fixed too soon.’66 More specifically, ‘police officers preparing evidence in relation to 
charges for offences in relation to the miners’ dispute have been offered a standard passage for use 
in statements.’67 In May 1984, one month before Orgreave, police officers drafted into 
Nottinghamshire under mutual aid arrangements had been given pre-written standard passages to 
be used in statements justifying the arrests that they had made. Moreover, CC McLaughlan and 
through him the Lord Chancellor, knew about it. Here was another example of Hogg ignoring his own 
warning about elective dictatorship. 
On the 19th July 1984, at the height of the strike, Thatcher gave her ‘enemy within speech’ 
for the first time to the 1922 Committee of Tory backbenchers. The Prime Minister thundered that 
‘we had to fight the enemy without in the Falklands.’68 Crucially, Thatcher then seemed to tie in the 
striking miners with Galtieri’s forces - ‘now we have to fight the enemy within.’69 The terminology 
used by the Prime Minister was not new. Enoch Powell, of ‘rivers of blood’ fame, had used the same 
‘enemy within’ phrase in a 1970 speech against Irish republicans, trade unionists and ethnic 
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minorities.70 Powell’s speech had been dug-up by Norman Tebbit and copied to Whitelaw while the 
Tories were in opposition in 1977.71 In the original speech, Powell also used the phrase ‘enemies of 
the state’ interchangeably with ‘the enemy within.’72 Although Thatcher had ditched the more 
overtly racist targets of Powell’s ire, it seemed clear that those who she did target – the miners, ‘the 
city of Liverpool,’ and ‘some local authorities’ – were likewise recast.73 Echoing Powell’s earlier 
speech, Thatcher publicly announced that she regarded her political opponents as enemies of the 
state – though she later denied that the phrase was meant to be applied to rank-and-file men. 
Instead, argued the Prime Minister, ‘critics have distorted the meaning [of the enemy within] by 
suggesting that the phrase was a reference to the miners at large - rather than Marxist militants.’74 
The real target for her speech, she claimed, was much more specific. Thatcher railed against those at 
the top of the trade union movement who were ‘conspiring to use union power…to break, defy and 
subvert the laws.’75 In as many words, Thatcher had indicated to those loyal to her within the state 
apparatus and operating within the culture of conformity that the miners’ leaders –particularly 
Scargill – were enemies of the state and should be dealt with as such.76 As the journalist Seamus 
Milne put it, the enemy within speech was a ‘calculated signal of unambiguous clarity to all 
government agencies that the gloves should come off.’77 The Home Office, MI5 and ACPO chief 
constables would be expected to respond to that. In private, the Prime Minister was even more 
explicit.  
A few days before the enemy within speech on the 16th July, Harrington and Hilary set up a 
meeting in Whitehall with Rimington, a further MI5 officer, Cecil Shipp, and two ACPO chief 
constables. Harrington warned all attendees that this type of interdepartmental meeting, 
particularly involving as it did the Security Service, should be kept secret, as it might ‘look bad’ in the 
eyes of the public, given what was about to be discussed.78 At the opening of the meeting, 
Harrington read out a statement in which he revealed that the Prime Minister had ‘made further 
complaints regarding police handling of the strike,’ particularly concerning Scargill.79 Rimington 
argued that, in order to proceed, the Security Service needed a clearer and more specific view of 
Thatcher’s requirements. Despite the lack of clarity however, she had kept up surveillance on 
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Scargill. The Assistant Director offered the reassurance that the Security Service had active 
informants, and that through them she would ‘probably get wind of another Orgreave.’80  
The interdepartmental meetings between the Home Office, ACPO and MI5 continued 
throughout August. The civil servants revealed exactly what it was that the meetings were meant to 
produce. If it could be established that the NUM President was organising picketing nationally, 
charges could be brought for illegal secondary-picketing.81 If it could also be established that the 
NUM leader was ordering criminal acts such as violence, intimidation and criminal damage to be 
carried out, a secondary charge might be brought.82 Here was a way for all three agencies to 
combine to produce Thatcher’s ‘dossier of evidence’ which could then be used in a court of law to 
prosecute Scargill. The problem for the three agencies was that picketing tended to be organised at 
regional level. Moreover, although there was some evidence of striking miners engaging in criminal 
acts at and around the picket-line, no evidence had been found to suggest that that they were under 
specific orders to do so. Because they were engaged in surveillance and espionage against the 
miners’ leaders, MI5 were aware of that. Rimington showed some reservations about the Home 
Office’s mission to compile evidence against Scargill, given that her agency’s own surveillance had 
revealed no such central organisation. The MI5 Officer also knew that the brief pushed 
constitutional boundaries and cautioned that any ‘interception directed at NUM headquarters would 
not be within Security Service guidelines.’83  The Home Office seemed less worried about 
constitutionality – but again cautioned of the importance of stealth. Harrington and Hilary’s 
superior, Partridge, was worried about how meetings between chief constables, the Security Service 
and supposedly impartial senior civil servants – all of them permanent members of the state - might 
look to the public, particularly given the apparent partisan nature of the remit being discussed. 
Partridge warned that the ‘Labour Party and TUC might use this [information of the existence of the 
meetings] against us, due to [their] sensitive nature.’84 This might have seemed like an odd turn of 
phrase for a supposedly non-partisan civil servant such as Partridge, who used the inclusive pronoun 
‘us’ and seemingly viewed the opposition Labour Party as an enemy organisation to which 
information should be restricted.  
Brittan wrote to Thatcher on the 3rd August to tell her that the plan to compile the dossier 
was for the Home Office, the police and MI5 to secretly collaborate in an effort to look for picketing 
coordination and criminal activity emanating from those at the top of the NUM. The Home Secretary 
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told the Prime Minister that there were now ‘possibilities [that] operations might be mounted 
against subversives [which] might throw light on the way picketing is being organised...this is being 
pursued.’85 Civil servants from other government departments were also brought into the 
interdepartmental meetings, to offer any assistance that they could. On the 6th August, the 
Permanent Undersecretary for the Department of Employment, George Wake, gave his 
department’s full support for the plan and encouraged the identification of what he called ‘national 
picketing coordinators.’86 In case anybody was left in doubt as to who Wake had in mind, he 
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Chapter 10: ‘Activities Which Transcend Police Boundaries’: The Leicester Unit  
Once the dossier of evidence was produced, Scargill would have to have a day in court. It seemed 
unlikely that the evidence might come about by MI5 finding someone to testify against the NUM 
President. Despite Rimington’s earlier assertions about undercover operatives, Brittan had told 
Thatcher about the difficulties in getting informants into the NUM hierarchy.1 During one of the 
three-agency meetings in July, a programme of ‘telephone intercepts’ in which the NUM President 
might implicate himself was dismissed - because Scargill knew that his phone was tapped.2 The three 
agencies decided that the information needed to target Scargill as a ‘national picketing coordinator’ 
might, in a sense, already exist. If time was spent analysing data from picketing as it was already 
occurring nationwide, reflected Partridge, trends or patterns might emerge which might suggest 
central planning of some kind.3 It might then be possible, with the right solicitor, to convince a jury 
of Scargill’s ‘coordinating hand’ – as South Yorkshire CC Peter Wright had put it. Such a solicitor had, 
in September, made himself available. Francis Bennion was a private sector solicitor and committed 
Thatcher loyalist. Bennion wrote to the Attorney General Nigel Havers to argue that ‘conspiracy 
charges should be brought against [the] miners’ leaders.’4 Bennion was highly critical of Havers, who 
he accused of ‘disclaim[ing] all responsibility’ that charges had not already been brought and that 
the miners’ leaders were still free men.5 Havers might well have been affronted that the private 
sector loyalist had criticised him in that way. However, Bennion’s letter had been very well received 
in one quarter. A copy of the letter had found its way to the Prime Minister. Thatcher wrote directly 
to the solicitor to express her interest in what he had said. Although the Prime Minister stopped 
short of echoing Bennion’s criticism of Havers because it ‘wouldn’t be right or proper,’ she did 
inform the solicitor that she had ‘requested that [Havers] should let you have his comments on the 
points which you make.’6 Any attempt to successfully prosecute Scargill would depend on whether 
the dossier of evidence of ‘picketing coordination’ could be produced.  
In August, the three agencies revealed their collaboratively-developed plan. A new, secret, 
cross-agency unit was to be set-up, operating with the purpose of collecting and collating 
information from local forces and then analysing that data to look for trends and patterns, which 
might later be used to prove Scargill’s involvement. Partridge and his deputies, Harrington and 
Hilary, were key proponents of the new plan. Partridge wrote to Private Secretary to Brittan, Nigel 
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Pantling, the next day to inform his superior of the setting-up of the unit. Partridge explained that 
the new group would ‘pinpoint targets’ in respect to four potential ‘crimes’ which the miners’ 
leaders might have been instigating others to carry out. Evidence of ‘criminal damage, intimidation, 
conspiracy [including secondary picketing], and subversion’ would be searched for.7 The Unit, it had 
been decided, would be manned by six Special Branch officers and an MI5 officer.8 The new seven-
person unit, officially the Central Intelligence Unit (CIU), would set-up its base of operations at 
Leicestershire Constabulary’s Communications Centre in Enderby.9 In preparation for the setting-up 
of the CIU, Harrington and Hilary had charged Frank Taylor, the Assistant Chief Constable of 
Lincolnshire Police, with the preparation of a report on the functional actualities of the Unit. The 
Enderby location, which was a remote outpost away from Leicester’s main police headquarters, was 
chosen on the advice of Taylor’s report, which had asserted that the CIU should be situated in a 
location not directly at the heart of the strike, but one nearby.10 That would give the CIU physical 
proximity to the front-line without being close enough that its existence might be publicly 
discovered. 
 Taylor’s report described the Unit’s official terms of reference as the ‘identification of 
individuals engaged in organised criminal activities [which] transcend police boundaries.’11 In order 
to function, the central CIU would need local forces to each collect their own intelligence from the 
picket-line and then pass that information on to the CIU. Sixteen strike-bound local forces were 
given instruction to do that, under their own terms of reference.12 Each local force would be duty-
bound to ‘provide intelligence leading to the obtaining of evidence to support the prosecution of 
persons committing criminal offences.’13  Taylor advised that in each force, local Special Branch 
officers were best suited for the role.14 By the last week of September, the CIU had been set-up in 
Enderby and was fully operational. Throughout its existence, it would be referred to by Home Office 
civil servants, MI5 officers and Special Branch officers alike as the Leicester Unit.15  
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On 9th October, Pantling, wrote to Brian Cubbon, another Home Office Permanent Secretary, 
to confirm that the Leicester Unit had been fully operational for two weeks. MI5 remained involved 
with the project. As well as seconding an officer, Pantling remarked, ‘the Security Service gave a 
considerable amount of private advice…to facilitate the exchange of information, and they will 
remain closely in touch with the work of the Unit.’16 Cubbon passed the information about the 
setting-up of the unit directly to the Prime Minister the next day. He told Thatcher that both ‘the 
Home Office and the Security Service stand ready to help.’17 That may have been well received by 
the Prime Minister. Solid steps were now being taken to amass the dossier of evidence.   
One of the Leicester Unit’s chief members of staff was Deputy Chief Constable Robert Goslin 
of Cambridgeshire.18 DCC Goslin had been involved in the establishment of the National Reporting 
Centre, and as such was a perfect candidate for a multi-agency, multi-location undertaking like the 
Leicester Unit. However, Harrington was careful to maintain distance between the new, official 
police headquarters at New Scotland Yard, and the secretive Leicester Unit, advising that ‘a clear 
distinction’ had to be upheld, or at least simulated, in case of any public exposure.19 The reality was, 
concluded Harrington, that Goslin’s ‘experience with the NRC would be invaluable.’20 Another 
member of the Leicester Unit was Detective Superintendent Martindale, of the West Midlands 
Special Branch.21 From September onwards, Goslin and Martindale were the chief correspondents to 
Home Office inquiries. A meeting on the 9th October revealed the procedural flow of the Unit. 
Martindale, who was identified as the head of the unit, reported through Goslin who in turn 
reported to the new ACPO President - Charles McLaughlan.22 McLaughlan, who was trusted and liked 
by Thatcher personally, had replaced David Hall at the same time as the Leicester Unit had been set 
up.23 This procedural flow made the CIU seem like a police initiative. In reality, the CIU also sent its 
reports directly to Partridge, Harrington and Hilary at the Home Office, while MI5 had an officer 
inside the unit (Appendix 2 for full procedural flow). 
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Once the Leicester Unit officers began their analysis of the incoming evidence, a problem 
became evident. The sheer amount of evidence coming in from the front line seemed like the scale 
of their task might have been underestimated – and was perhaps more than could be expected for a 
seven-man team. Martindale told the Home Office that the Leicester Unit needed a computer, if 
they were to succeed in their task of using the intelligence sent to them to identify patterns linking 
back to Scargill. The computer should be installed with the police’s state-of-the-art Crime Patterns 
Analysis Program (CPAP) used by the Metropolitan Police to link together unsolved crimes, argued 
Martindale.24 In 1984, however, the installation of a computer and programme would come with a 
very large financial cost. Although that might have put off the Home Office, they got a timely 
reminder of their objectives on the 16th October. Robin Butler, Thatcher’s Principal Private Secretary 
and another hand-picked civil servant, wrote to the Home Office to advise them that the Prime 
Minister was more than ‘a little disappointed that the police are still so far from being able to 
identify likely sources of intelligence more specifically,’ despite several weeks of CIU operation.25 
Butler reinforced the Prime Minister’s expectations regarding the Leicester Unit by adding that 
Thatcher ‘hoped’ that ‘[the police] and the security services will continue to give priority to obtaining 
information which will assist in the prevention and punishment of crime now being committed in 
support of this dispute.’26  
The Prime Minister’s own frustrations were being exacerbated by her new ally Francis 
Bennion, the private sector solicitor. Bennion had, by that time, developed a personal 
correspondence with Thatcher. He told her in a letter that ‘Scargill should have been prosecuted and 
convicted for his undoubted offences at Saltley in 1972. We should have heard no more from him.’27 
Whether he meant to or not, Bennion had stumbled across the best way to gain Thatcher’s approval. 
That is, to tell her exactly what she wanted to hear. The Prime Minister was renowned for 
intolerance of the airing of any opposing view or offered criticism, however constructive, emanating 
from her advisors.28 Bennion told her that it was not only possible to prosecute Scargill, but that in 
fact the NUM President should have been jailed twelve years earlier. Bennion also sent his ‘heartfelt 
congratulations on escaping assassination,’ a reference to the Brighton Bomb detonated by the IRA 
at Thatcher’s hotel before the Tory Party Conference.29 Another private-sector loyalist, Woodrow 
Homes millionaire Frank Taylor (a different Frank Taylor to the policeman involved in the setting up 
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of the Leicester Unit), wrote to Brittan in late October to echo Bennion’s sentiment and inquire 
about the possibility of a private-sector prosecution against Scargill. Brittan replied that ‘if…there is 
sufficient evidence..the government will in no way seek to prevent charges [being] brought.’30 
Behind the scenes, three agencies of the state were now attempting to collect and supply that 
evidence via the Leicester Unit.  
On 30th October, R Sillence, a Staff Officer with HMI Constabulary, visited the Leicester Unit 
at the Home Office’s behest, to assess the situation. Sillence reported that the CIU had, despite a 
relatively short period in operation, begun to acquire substantial lists in regard to specific unlawful 
activity at picket-lines nationwide. Martindale told Sillence that 3,000 crimes had now been logged 
from the 16 feeder forces.31 Sillence appeared not to have been given a brief about the exact remit 
of the Leicester Unit. After studying the evidence gathered, however, he correctly reported that ‘my 
understanding is that one of the principle objectives is to be able to access the information with a 
view to linking offences.’32 Sillence had been asked to consider a computer held by Leicestershire 
Constabulary, which might prove a cheaper option that the Met’s CPAP. The Staff Officer reported 
that the Leicestershire computer had been used to link five unsolved murders in the previous year. 
However, warned the policeman, that system had only been used specifically for serious crimes and 
‘not for anything which could be remotely considered political.’33 Sillence finished his report by 
warning the Home Office that without the expensive computer program from London, the Leicester 
Unit would undoubtably ‘fail to achieve its objectives.’34 Ignoring Sillence’s reference to ‘political’ 
objectives but taking on board his reluctance to sanction the use of a device against Scargill used 
previously to catch mass murderers, Partridge and the Home Office faced a stark choice. On the one 
hand, they would have to provide the funds for the installation and running costs of the CPAP – 
risking embarrassment and claims of political bias from within the state if the existence of the 
Leicester Unit ever became public. On the other hand, they risked failing to carry-out the Prime 
Minister’s will – when Thatcher had already voiced her disappointment. Operating within the culture 
of conformity, the Home Office Undersecretary went with the former. 
Partridge sanctioned the installation of the CPAP at the Leicester Unit’s Enderby 
headquarters in early November. Another HMCIC officer, S Vessey, informed the Home Office that 
landlines would also be needed from Leicester to London, which ‘would obviously involve a fair 
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31 R Sillence HMCIC to S Kippax Home Office, 31st October 1984, TNA Kew, HO504/34.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
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amount of expense.’35 Justifying the Home Office’s decision, Partridge circulated a report in which he 
revealed that he had recently visited Yorkshire picket-lines. Back in Whitehall, he told other civil 
servants that the Prime Minister was correct and that he was ‘more sure than ever that picketing 
was not organised locally.’36 Partridge agreed to pay £5,000, which was the running cost of the 
program, directly from the Home Office’s Directorate of Telecommunications budget.37 The Home 
Office was now financing the Leicester Unit directly. However, the computer program was to come 
with an unexpected cost. 
Since its inception, a chief concern for those involved with the Leicester Unit was that the 
existence of the Unit, the number of state agencies involved, and the nature of its intelligence-
gathering directive, might become known to the public. An operation which brought together the 
Home Office, the police (ACPO and Special Branch) and MI5 to produce a dossier of evidence against 
Scargill or anyone else might be difficult to legitimise. The involvement of the Security Service meant 
another reason for secrecy. Moreover, the Home Office was now using a large amount of taxpayers’ 
money to directly fund the CIU. However, the installation of the Met’s CPAP system in Enderby was 
uncovered by Guardian journalist Richard Norton-Taylor. Looking further into the nature of CPAP’s 
proposed installation in Leicester, Norton-Taylor had accidentally stumbled upon the existence of 
the Leicester Unit. The journalist wrote an article, published on the 25th October, which reported the 
existence of the Unit and its location.38 Norton-Taylor’s report had many inaccuracies. While the 
journalist correctly asserted that ACPO were involved in the Unit, there was no mention of either 
Special Branch or MI5.39 Also unaware of the direct involvement of the Home Office, the article 
assumed that the Leicestershire Chief Constable, Alan Goodwin, was coordinating the Unit. In truth, 
Goodwin had no involvement. Norton-Taylor seemed unaware of the significance of his discovery. 
The journalist did not know that the Unit was being coordinated nationally by three different 
agencies, nor was he aware of the Unit’s remit to link crimes in order to target Scargill. The existence 
of the Leicester Unit had been revealed, but its intelligence-gathering directive had not.  
Senior civil servants within the Home Office were concerned by the article and sought to 
limit its damage. Their main concern was to distance themselves from the Leicester Unit and, in line 
with the stealth approach, avoid any public knowledge of Home Office involvement. As President of 
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ACPO, Charles McLaughlin had a copy of the original Taylor Report which had outlined the setting-up 
of the Unit and its objectives. Not for the first time, the Home Office was wary of police carelessness 
when it came to the stealth approach. They wrote to McLaughlin to outline their ‘concerns’ and to 
remind him of the document’s confidentiality.40 Harrington reassured Partridge that those police 
officers aware of the CIU had been reminded of the ‘highly sensitive aspects of the Unit.’ Not least, 
reflected Harrington, ‘the fact that the Security Services are directly involved in the running of it.’41 If 
the Taylor Report became public, speculated Harrington, it ‘could be used to create embarrassment,’ 
given that the Home Office was financing it directly.42 Harrington might have been concerned that 
the Report’s stated remit for the Leicester Unit - the ‘obtaining of evidence to support the 
prosecution of persons’ involved with the strike who ‘transcend police boundaries’ - needed little 
interpretation.43 The Home Office man sent round a document entitled ‘public stance on the 
Leicester Unit’ which was sent to all senior officers who were aware of the Unit.44 Chief constables 
were told that they could admit the existence of the Unit (which was now impossible to deny, given 
The Guardian article), but there was to be no mention of Special Branch or MI5.45 Referring to the 
computer program, Harrington said that it could be admitted that a request had been made for the 
national computer program, the Police National Computer (PNC).46 In reality, the PNC had already 
been dismissed in favour of the plan to install the Met’s own, smaller CPAP. If the press were told 
that access to the national PNC program had been denied to the Leicester Unit, however, they might 
not even consider the possibility of CPAP – which was specific to the Met in London. Harrington’s 
memo advised fellow Home Office civil servants and police officers to essentially admit to what had 
already been revealed in the article. That is, the Leicester Unit existed, ACPO was involved, and a 
request for a computer program had been made. However, the involvement of the Home Office in 
the funding of the Unit, the involvement of Special Branch and MI5, the fact that the Met’s CPAP 
system was installed, and crucially, the real remit of the Leicester Unit – were all kept from the 
public.    
By the early months of 1985 the defeat of Scargill and the NUM seemed certain. Thatcher’s 
loyalists within the DSPU had used the Ridley Report to plan, instigate, and brutally supress the 
strike. While the overall strike was being won by Thatcher’s private-sector loyalists, her Whitehall 
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and other public-sector loyalists had not been as successful in satisfying the Prime Minister’s other 
wish – the jailing of Scargill. Partridge dispatched the Home Office’s David Brooker to Enderby on 7th 
February to check the progress of the Leicester Unit. He was accompanied by McLaughlan’s 
predecessor as ACPO Chairman, David Hall. The Home Office and ACPO men were debriefed by three 
members of the Leicester Unit - Martindale, Goslin and Chevasse. Given the money and resources 
that the Home Office had thus far spent on the Unit, they may well have been disappointed by 
Martindale’s overall conclusions. In regard to any charges of ‘national picketing coordinating,’ the 
Detective Superintendent said that after studying the amassed evidence, he very much ‘doubted 
that the top structure of the NUM was involved.’47 Martindale acknowledged that, despite six 
months of Home Office-funded counter-subversion, the Leicester Unit had no dossier of evidence 
and had not identified any ‘trends or patterns’ linking Scargill with picketing. When it came to finding 
Scargill’s ‘coordinating hand’ in regard to other criminal activity, Martindale felt that evidence could 
still be obtained to prove that a link existed – but only if undercover agents were deployed to 
infiltrate the NUM hierarchy. The Detective Superintendent reflected that during the British Leyland 
strike, ‘well-placed sources’ had been able to direct that strike to the government’s liking, and that 
the undercovers had a ‘major bearing on the conduct of disputes in that company.’48 The fact that 
the Leicester Unit had not been able to get the evidence to prosecute Scargill was not down to the 
NUM President’s innocence, inferred Martindale, but down to a lack of undercover spies within the 
upper echelons of the union. If undercover agents were in place, Scargill might one day slip-up and 
give the Leicester Unit something concrete to use against him. With the miners’ strike nearing its 
end and no dossier imminent, the Home Office’s patience with the Leicester Unit was coming to an 
end.  
The Leicester Unit would last only as long as the strike itself and was disbanded in March 
1985. Partridge explained his decision to cut funding and wrap-up the CIU. The Leicester Unit had 
failed in its only aim, having ‘no success in establishing evidence of organisation or planning by the 
[top level] of the NUM.’49 As such, the Deputy Undersecretary had concluded that there was ‘no firm 
information about the [continued] value of the Leicester Unit.’50 Partridge did not undertake an 
analysis of how much the Leicester Unit had cost during its six months in operation. However, the 
CPAP program alone had cost £5,000.51  
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A letter from the right-wing private-sector organisation, the Law and Order Society (LOS), to 
Leon Brittan in July 1985 bemoaned the fact that despite the failure of the strike, Scargill remained 
President of the NUM. LOS Secretary Richard Harrison complained that ‘Scargill…is not going to 
disappear as we had hoped.’52 Harrison assured Brittan that the LOS ‘will go ahead with our plans to 
launch a private prosecution for criminal conspiracy’ against Scargill, and confirmed that he intended 
to subpoena Charles McLaughlan, Jim Anderton, South Yorkshire Deputy Chief Constable Tony 
Clement (in charge of police forces at Orgreave), and Brittan himself to give evidence.53 Plans to 
prosecute Scargill had been left to Thatcher’s private sector loyalists. What Brittan could not tell the 
eager Harrison was that his efforts were not likely to succeed – given that the police, MI5 and the 
Home Office collectively had not been able to provide evidence for a successful prosecution. In any 
case, when the Leicester Unit was wound-up in March 1985, Thatcher’s public-sector loyalists, 
including Michael Partridge, Roy Harrington, and David Hilary, had begun to turn their attention 
toward other targets. Partridge forwarded a letter to another civil servant, Robert Hazell, from the 
Minister of State, Lord Elton, in which the aging old-Etonian asserted that ‘Lambeth council had been 
taken over by the Trotskyists.’54 Partridge told Hazell that, in the coming year, ‘there are likely to be 
well-publicised clashes on…public sector pay and possible violence over rate-capping, abolition of 
the GLC and Metropolitan counties.’55 Moreover, there were ‘indicators of mounting tension in 
places like Brixton, Hackney and Liverpool.’56 Thatcher’s Whitehall loyalists were not the only ones 
looking into different areas. Redwood sent a DSPU report to Thatcher that month to say that a new 
member of his team, Oliver Letwin, had ‘built up a good nexus of contacts in the local authority 
world, to enable him to monitor the activities of the Left [at local government level].’57 The strike 
was over, but Thatcher’s loyalists, and the culture of conformity, remained. Other areas of the public 
sector now became central targets. As for the Leicester Unit, Partridge could afford to be dismissive. 
Reflecting in 1986, he told fellow civil servants that failed prosecutions during the strike had been 
‘only a marginal setback,’ and that when it came to Scargill, it was important that ‘martyrs [had not 
been] created.’58 
The existence and practices of the Leicester Unit are an example of the weaponisation of 
sections of the state in the government’s responses to the miners’ strike. Several agencies of the 
state collaborated in an effort to ‘get Scargill.’ Those efforts were not in response to any existing 
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evidence. Indeed, the eventual failure of the Leicester Unit revealed a distinct lack of evidence. 
Rather, the Leicester Unit was set-up in response to the Prime Minister’s request that a ‘dossier of 
evidence’ be assembled to prosecute her political opponent. Operating within the culture of 
conformity, the Home Office, the Security Service and sections of the police had complied. In the 
run-up to the strike, senior civil servants had faced the pressure of the ‘Scrutineers’ and their 
private-sector superiors in the DSPU. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s own non-toleration of 
opposing views. Under that combined pressure from above, even those who remained politically 
unaffiliated might have felt forced to comply with directives which did not appear to make any 
distinction between the governing political party and several agencies of the permanent state. 
However, some within the upper-echelons of the civil service appeared to welcome directives which 
appeared politically partisan. Some had engaged in Tory-led counter-subversion since 1972. That 
was also the case with some senior policemen and MI5 officers, who abandoned adherence to 
written charters with little or no resistance. Margaret Thatcher essentially decided single-handed 
that Arthur Scargill was an enemy of the state, and then challenged the various security agencies to 
go out and prove it.  It is possible to imagine that some of those within the agencies of the state 
attempted to win favour with their leader by interpreting the will of a right-wing Prime Minister who 
was immensely popular with most of their peer group. It is only in the context of the culture of 
conformity that the Leicester Unit can be understood – the multi-state-agency targeting of a trade 
union leader and innocent man (Scargill) at great financial cost (the computer program alone was 
£5000-per-year) for a crime that did not exist (national picketing coordinator).  
The attempt to ‘get Scargill’ on the orders of the Prime Minister lacked political legitimacy. 
Like with the DSPU, those agencies involved in the Leicester Unit circumvented that by operating 
covertly and adhering to stealth. Without public scrutiny, legitimacy was not required. Adherence to 
stealth was central to the Unit’s operation. During the Norton-Taylor incident which exposed the 
existence of the Unit, Home Office officials were most concerned with publicly distancing themselves 
from it – despite the fact that they were involved at every stage and even financed it. If Home Office 
officials felt that their own involvement in the Leicester Unit was perfectly legitimate, then their 
attempts to feign non-involvement and to hide the knowledge of their involvement from the Labour 
Party become difficult to explain. The existence and practices of the Leicester Unit reveal a section of 
the state acting without moral authority. The Ridley Report had advised attack by stealth and the 
DSPU had followed that directive throughout the strike. Led by the Home Office, several sections of 
the state including senior police and MI5 had collaborated to follow the same directive, though 
much more specifically – in a failed attempt to ‘get’ Arthur Scargill.  
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Reflections on the Research Questions 
The existence and activities of the Leicester Unit indicate that some within the permanent state 
apparatus were strident Thatcherites and were committed to their leader. Public pronouncements 
by the nation’s chief constables and Special Branch’s targeting of left-wing groups identified sections 
of the British police force as deeply conservative. That the chief constables were more comfortable 
‘going public’ with these biases denotes the existence of new cultural norms, where activity 
previously deemed politically biased was now normalised. Despite all of that, the evidence in this 
section demonstrates the guiding hand of Thatcher herself. The Prime Minister pressurised people 
and agencies to comply – quickly replacing those who did not. The private-sector loyalists of the 
DSPU also affected those within the permanent state, with their role in setting-up the ‘scrutineers’ 
initiative revealing the unit’s higher place in the pecking order than their public-sector colleagues – 
and their ability to dismiss those who were not ‘one-of-us.’  Those developments gave another 
example of something new happening under Thatcher – despite those existing state biases. 
Thatcher’s direct involvement, the meddling of the DSPU, the public statements made by the chief 
constables and the setting-up of the Leicester Unit are all manifestations of authoritarianism and are 
incompatible with any anti-statist ideology. However, April 1985 saw the ending of the miners’ 
strike. If Hall’s assertion concerning authoritarian populism was correct, then surely the 
authoritarian initiatives deployed against the miners would also be in evidence elsewhere? The next 
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Part 4: Subversion in Public Life 
Introduction 
Convened in the early months of 1985 with the miners’ strike nearing an end, the Subversion in 
Public Life (SPL) group was a secret and collaborative effort between multiple state agencies which 
weaponised sections of the state against political opponents of the sitting Prime Minister in four 
areas of the public sector. Abandoning distinctions between party and state, senior civil servants, 
MI5 and the police targeted people working within the rank-and-file civil service, the education 
sector, local government, and the National Health Service (NHS). The SPL’s work was so secretive 
that its chair reported directly to, and took instruction directly from, Margaret Thatcher. The group 
bypassed departmental ministers – many of whom did not know of its existence. In 1985, the SPL 
created a civil service blacklist which was used to covertly keep rank-and-file civil servants away from 
certain jobs. With the personal backing of the Prime Minister, the group also pressurised managers 
to enact a purge procedure against civil servants already in sensitive roles. In the education sector, 
the SPL targeted specific locations, and then used HM Inspectorate to arrange surprise inspections in 
schools deemed to be under the influence of subversive schoolteachers – in the hope that those 
inspections might lead to the dismissal of the teachers targeted. In 1987, some of the SPL’s 
blacklisting procedures were rolled-out against local councillors in twelve Labour-controlled local 
authorities. Members of two NHS trade unions were also targeted.  
Many of those who had been involved in the Leicester Unit were involved again in the SPL. As with 
the Leicester Unit, strict adherence to stealth was a primary concern. Carrying out their operations 
in secret, the existence and activities of the SPL denote the continuation of the culture of 
conformity, inspired into existence by the government’s responses to the miners’ strike but not 
confined to that dispute. The weaponisation of sections of the state had been normalised by the 
state’s responses to the strike. With the strike defeated, political opponents of the governing party 
working within four other sectors were rebranded as enemies of the state. However, when Thatcher 
introduced the ‘community charge’ in 1989, the culture of conformity became a negative 
manifestation for the Prime Minister – an echo chamber incapable of preventing the Prime 
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Chapter 11: ‘Persistent Troublemakers’: The Civil Service Blacklist 
After Orgreave in June and the NACODS scare in early November (the proposed shotfirers strike 
which would have shut down the Nottinghamshire pits and made the strike fully national), 
Thatcher’s loyalists within the state began to concentrate on other political opponents. If they had 
looked to the Prime Minister’s own ‘enemy within’ speech for earlier indication – then Thatcher’s 
blunt style meant that her remarks, like that earlier speech, needed little interpretation. Despite the 
early rift with MI5, Thatcher never publicly attacked the Security Service, and also protected the 
police – elements of both had shown loyalty to the Prime Minister via the Leicester Unit and had 
also been instrumental in the wider strike. Pensions was an area that saw significant draining of the 
public purse during the 1980s, but the Prime Minister made no public protestations in that regard. 
Ministers had warned since 1980 that any cuts to the state pension would hurt the Tories 
electorally.1  There were three specific sectors that Thatcher had attacked publicly - local 
government, the education sector and to a lesser extent, the National Health Service. In all three 
cases, institutions were regional, provincial or municipal in responsibility. To Thatcher, they were the 
services most affected by socialism – in the grip of elected Labour councils and trade unions.2 The 
Ridley Report had called for a miners’ strike to be deliberately instigated. With the defeat of the 
NUM imminent, the bargaining position of the wider union movement would also be weakened – as 
predicted by Ridley in 1978.3 In the NHS, in 1983 Thatcher had appointed a private-sector loyalist, 
Sainsburys Chief Executive Roy Griffiths. Griffiths’ subsequent report found that the NHS’s main 
problem was that there was not enough senior management. In a move that seemed to go against 
the anti-statist credentials of the Thatcherites, he recruited 200 chief executives and centralised 
control of the NHS to the Thatcher-appointed public-sector loyalists in Whitehall.4  
Local government was another area which had attracted the Prime Minister’s criticism. The 
Tories had set-up Urban Development Corporations (UDC) for Liverpool and London in 1981, 
bypassing hostile Labour councils and awarding grants to the UDC’s which were unavailable for 
council use. Central government had also steadily reduced funding to local authorities since the mid-
seventies.5 Local authorities had depended on central government for 66% of their income in 1975. 
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By 1984, that percentage had fallen to just over 50%.6 Faced with a choice between large reductions 
in services or raising local property charges (known as the rates), most Labour authorities had 
chosen the latter. However, the Tories’ view of the rates was that they were deeply unfair because 
local businesses were hit the hardest, while some of the financially worse-off did not pay rates at 
all.7  
The Conservative government introduced the Rates Act in 1984, which enabled Whitehall to 
determine maximum budgets for local councils for the first time. 18 councils, 17 of them Labour, 
became the subject of ‘rate-capping.’ Rate-capping was met with strong defiance in all 17 areas. In 
July 1984, the 17 Labour rate-capped councils met in Sheffield to discuss plans to oppose central 
government. That show of unity meant that, if all 17 councils were defiant and refused to cut their 
rates, the government might have to surcharge hundreds of councillors. Ken Livingstone, the head of 
a large London contingent at the Sheffield meeting, had good reason to be fearful. During Thatcher’s 
first administration the leader of Greater London Council (GLC) had annoyed the Prime Minister by 
festooning the façade of County Hall, opposite Parliament, with monthly London unemployment 
figures. After the 1983 landslide, Thatcher had begun the process of disbanding the GLC and 
centralising its power, culminating in the Local Government Act of 1985.8 Although the abolishment 
of the GLC was evidence of the Prime Minister’s overt power, the Sheffield meeting was also 
attended by delegates from Liverpool City Council, which had openly defied the practice of rate-
capping. Council leader Tony Mulhearn and his deputy Derek Hatton, both members of the 
Trotskyist group Militant Tendency (MT), had refused to set a lower rate - a move that forced central 
government to back down and was seen as a defeat for the Tories.9 Thatcher’s enemy within speech 
given in the same month placed local authorities, and Liverpool in particular, alongside the miners as 
enemies of the state. Although the miners’ strike would have to take president, the Prime Minister 
and her loyalists within the state would return to local government in its aftermath.  
In 1985, Thatcher’s hand-picked Whitehall aides were far removed from Britain’s rank-and-
file civil servants, working in offices throughout the nation. A series of strikes over pay, conditions 
and service cuts ordered by the DSPU-controlled Scrutineers had put rank-and-file workers at odds 
with civil servants hand-picked by Thatcher, much higher up and resident in Whitehall. In late 1984, 
rank-and-file civil servants in Newcastle had begun a pay strike. In November, Permanent 
Undersecretary for Health and Social Security, Kenneth Stowe (hand-picked by Thatcher), wrote to 
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the Head of the Civil Service, and Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong (also hand-picked), to report 
on the Newcastle strike.10 Stowe’s report described the Newcastle strike as being secretly run by MT, 
behind the scenes. Stowe reported that the ringleaders of the strike were in alliance with fellow 
‘subversives’ within the NHS’s major trade union (NUPE), as well as MT members in local 
government in both Newcastle and Liverpool.11  By linking strike action within the civil service, local 
government and the NHS, it could be put forward that some sort of central organising committee 
was behind it. Just as the Leicester Unit had tried unsuccessfully to establish the existence of 
National Picketing Coordinators and Criminal Damage Organisers, and the DSPU had successfully 
enlisted the Foreign Office by eliciting the spectre of the Soviet Union, MT could be used as the folk 
devil behind civil service unrest and, tenuously (apart from Liverpool), local government and the 
NHS. Targeting the Civil Service first, Stowe told Armstrong that it would be ‘helpful if you could 
bring together the heads of a few of the major employing departments in the civil service, to take 
stock of the threat.’12  As well as health, local government and the civil service, Armstrong became 
aware of a fourth area of interest a fortnight later.  
The Prime Minister had never hidden her animosity towards schoolteachers and university 
lecturers. She had spoken against the influence of left-wing teachers who she accused of ‘teaching 
socialism.’13 When it came to higher education, Thatcher accused lecturers of brainwashing young 
people who then ‘have every decent value pounded out of them – and at public expense.’14 Huge 
cuts to the sector between 1981 and 1986 had a massive effect. Aberdeen University and some 
London Colleges nearly went bankrupt.15 A few months before Stowe’s correspondence, a DSPU 
report by Redwood criticised schoolteachers and lecturers who had spoken out against the cuts, 
labelling them as the ‘educational establishment.’16 In mid-December, Home Office Permanent 
Secretary Brian Cubbon copied Armstrong into a letter he had sent to MI5’s Cecil Shipp to voice his 
concerns that a ‘large-scale infiltration by Militant with a small and large M’ had taken place across 
London’s schools.17 Cubbon told the MI5 man that, for him, ‘Militant seems to have replaced the 
Communist Party as the established focus for subversion within the country.’18 Cubbon provided 
evidence for his accusations via an accompanying report, compiled by Permanent Undersecretaries 
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from the departments of Environment and Education and Science. According to the report, there 
were ‘worrying indications’ that ‘subversive teachers’ in the London area were ‘posing a threat to 
the quality of education.’19 The report did acknowledge that a recent pay settlement had been seen 
by many teachers as inadequate. As with the civil service strike action, that was dismissed as the 
primary cause of discontent. Instead, the report concluded that the reason for low morale in the 
education sector was the unseen hand of the subversives.  
Overtly hostile in tone, the report listed the ‘crimes’ committed by the observed teachers. 
Some had ‘[taken] the day off to support the miners’ strike.’ 20 Many teaching staff were said to be 
‘obsessed with egalitarianism and health and safety.’21  Female teachers were targeted for specific 
ire. Some had ‘defied head-[teachers] to go absent and support the Greenham women.’22  The 
writers of the report saved their harshest recrimination for several teachers who were reported to 
be holding ‘excessive discussions on anti-racist and equal opportunities issues.’23 The 
undersecretaries also resorted to personal attack in the criticism of their targets. Teachers were 
attacked for daring to complain about asbestos in school ceilings, were described as ‘insidious,’ and 
were charged with failing to maintain a reasonable amount of discipline in their classrooms. 24 The 
report by the undersecretaries would have been written with its intended audience – senior civil 
servants such as Armstrong and Cubbon, and perhaps the Prime Minister - in mind. The authors 
deployed overt partisanship, ideological zeal, and personal attack – in the full knowledge that this 
was what was expected of them in the continuing culture of conformity. 
With four ‘subversive’ sectors identified, Armstrong convened a meeting with Cubbon and 
two MI5 officers, Rimington and Shipp, on the 7th January to discuss the next step. All four targeted 
sectors were discussed. However, most of the meeting was dominated by discussions on the 
‘subversive threat’ within the civil service. One of the attendees brought up the civil service’s ‘purge 
procedure.’ That was an existing disciplinary procedure written into the employment contracts of all 
civil servants which stated that a purge could take place if the civil servant was accused of gross 
misconduct. Cubbon asked whether this could be initiated, in order to purge identified subversives 
out of the service in one fell swoop.25 However, Armstrong seemed less than enthusiastic. 
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Adherence to stealth, which required neither a full-on confrontation nor any attempt to gain 
legitimisation, had served Thatcher’s loyalists well during the miners’ strike. The DSPU’s adherence 
to the Ridley Report and the Leicester Unit’s targeting of Scargill had all been done covertly. 
Moreover, Armstrong’s own involvement with the prototype SHC as far back as 1972 may have 
convinced him that a more stealth-like approach was again the way forward. The Cabinet Secretary 
put forward his own idea. Rather than the blunt instrument of a purge, it might be possible to attack 
‘subversives’ without them ever being aware that they were being targeted. Once identified as 
subversives, Armstrong argued that it would be possible to ‘covertly..move individuals [to other jobs 
and tasks] where they have less potential for disruption.’26 That is, strike-leaders and others 
identified as ‘subversives’ could be covertly earmarked, kept away from certain ‘sensitive’ positions 
and secretly barred from promotion within the sector. Cubbon warned that it would be ‘difficult to 
convince [the identified target’s] manager about the reasons for the [covert earmarking].’27 
However, Armstrong, Cubbon and the MI5 officers all agreed that it could be achieved – if they could 
first identify who, exactly, the subversives were.  
A week later, on the 15th January, Armstrong met Cubbon and the MI5 officers again, though 
this time the list of attendees was increased. The Cabinet Secretary had invited Permanent 
Secretaries from most of the other government departments to attend. The Cabinet Secretary told 
his attendees that the government had indicated that it needed more precise information 
concerning the subversive threat. Specifically, the government had asked for details of the 
subversives’ exact policies, intentions and tactics.28 Those departments represented at Armstrong’s 
meeting would be expected to help in providing that information for the government. Armstrong 
announced that a new interdepartmental group, the Subversion in Public Life group (SPL), would be 
formed. The SPL would work in conjunction with MI5, which would also be represented within the 
SPL via officers Stella Rimington and Cecil Shipp – the former of whom was well-used to inter-agency 
collaboration of this sort because of her influential role in the setting-up of the Leicester Unit. Shipp 
was an MI5 stalwart who usually worked from Washington as the Security Service’s Liaison Officer to 
the CIA and FBI, where he had gained a fierce reputation as an interrogator and counter-espionage 
expert.29 Each of the permanent secretaries gathered was expected to second a reliable 
undersecretary to join the SPL. As for the permanent secretaries themselves, they would form a 
secondary overseeing group, the Subversion Home Committee (SHC), which would meet periodically 
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to discuss the activities and reports of the SPL. Rather than report to their own departmental 
ministers, the overseeing SHC group would report directly to the Prime Minister.30  
All present agreed to the reforming of both groups, with MI5’s Director General John Jones 
remarking that, alongside the seconding of Rimington and Shipp, his organisation was ‘very ready to 
agree to this and provide material.’31 Jones, like Armstrong, had been involved in the original group 
in 1972. The SPL and the overseeing SHC were much larger in size and scope when compared with 
1972. That year, The SPL had been chaired by Armstrong. However, that had been a small, four-man 
team. In 1985, the SPL would have fifteen members. As well as Shipp and Rimington, a Special 
Branch officer, CV Hewitt was included.32 The other twelve members of the SPL would be civil 
servants – undersecretaries and deputies from a host of different departments including the 
Ministry of Defence, Education and Science, Employment, the Cabinet Office, the Scottish Office, 
Health and Social Security, and the Home Office. The Home Office would provide two members of 
the SPL. Head of Counterterrorism Roy Harrington and Police Department Chairman David Hilary 
were both recruited. Both had worked alongside Rimington in the setting-up and running of the 
Leicester Unit. In 1972, the overseeing SHC had seven permanent members. In 1985, the overseers’ 
group was double the size – with fourteen. As well as Armstrong and permanent secretaries from all 
of the departments represented in the SPL, that included two further MI5 officers - Anthony Duff 
and Royd Barker.33 Other SHC members were the Thatcher-appointees Kenneth Stowe and Clive 
Whitmore, as well as the writers of the polemical report on schoolteachers discussed earlier, George 
Moseley and David Hancock. Given that Armstrong would now be chairing the overseeing SHC 
group, he needed someone to take on the role that he had had in 1972 – Chair of the SPL. Armstrong 
would need someone with experience collecting information against ‘subversive’ enemies of the 
state – someone who to use Thatcher’s oft-used phrase, was ‘one of us.’ The Cabinet Secretary had 
someone in mind. 
After his involvement in the formation and running of the Leicester Unit, Deputy 
Undersecretary of State Michael Partridge had returned to other duties within the Home Office. The 
Leicester Unit had not been able to provide the dossier of evidence to convict Scargill. However, 
Partridge’s attempts to do so earmarked him as a committed loyalist, a man who could be used to 
undertake activities which others might deem beyond the remit of a supposedly non-partisan senior 
civil servant.  As such, he, alongside Harrington and Hilary, fitted the bill for Armstrong’s revival of 
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the SPL. On the 18th January, Armstrong sent letters to all of the permanent secretaries to be 
included in both groups.34 As Armstrong reflected, ‘most of you were involved last time [in 1972], so 
you are all invited to be involved again.’35 Armstrong announced that he had chosen Partridge as the 
new Chair of the SPL. Partridge would also be a member of the overseeing SHC. During each 
intermittent SHC meeting, he would be able to give face-to-face reports to the permanent 
secretaries about the activities of the SPL – alongside the written reports. 
Over the course of the next week, every department sent their agreement to be part of the 
SPL, with each permanent secretary nominating an undersecretary to be involved.36 With that, 
Partridge was told to arrange the first SPL meeting as soon as possible. As for the overseeing SHC, 
with the SPL sub-group doing all of the legwork, there was no need for the overseers to meet again 
until the SPL had carried out its first raft of counter-subversion and compiled an appropriate report. 
It was agreed that SHC would reconvene in six months’ time – at which time Partridge should have 
plenty to say about the SPL’s activities in the meantime.37 Armstrong drew-up the SHC’s new terms 
of reference - ‘[t]o advise ministers, as necessary, on appropriate measures to counter subversive 
activities in the United Kingdom…and to oversee the work of Subversion in Public Life.’ 38 The SHC, 
then, acted as a bridge between the Prime Minister and the SPL. With ongoing strikes in several 
locations, it was agreed that the SPL’s first target should be the civil service. By the end of January, 
with the miners’ strike nearing defeat and the Leicester Unit soon to be disbanded, Thatcher’s 
public-sector loyalists had revived the SPL, substantially increased its membership, and set the 
organisation to target strike action within the civil service. If any of the SPL members were unsure 
about the nature of their remit, Armstrong issued guidance in the form of a memorandum in 
February. The SHC Chair reminded all civil servants that they were above-all servants of the Crown, 
that the Crown was represented by the government of the day, and that Whitehall ‘has no 
constitutional personality or responsibility separate from the duly constituted Government of the 
day.’39 
On the 14th August 1985, after six months in operation, the SPL issued its first full report. 
Written by SPL chair Michael Partridge, the report was issued to all members of the overseeing SHC, 
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before being passed directly to the Prime Minister.40 The main activity that the SPL had undertaken, 
during its first six months in operation, was the compiling of an extensive blacklist across all 
departments of the civil service. Unlike in 1972, when the Conservative state had had to turn to the 
Economic League, by 1985 the SPL and MI5 had no need for outside help. The new blacklist was 
remarkable for its attention to detail. The SPL was able to provide tables showing the exact numbers 
of identified ‘subversives’ in each department. Precise figures were given for specific groups, such as 
Militant and the Socialist Workers’ Party. Said to be accurate for the end of 1984, the blacklist 
contained details of 1,420 civil servants. Once on the list, the civil servant in question could be 
covertly banned from promotions and kept away from sensitive tasks, as Armstrong had suggested. 
However, the tables revealed that it was remarkably easy to get put onto one of the lists. The SPL 
report explained that those on the list were either a member of a subversive organisation (under the 
new manipulated definition), someone deemed to have ‘expressed sympathy’ with one of the 
groups in the past, or someone with a family member involved – even if they themselves were not.41  
Partridge outlined how the SPL had defined the term ‘subversion,’ before undertaking its 
activities. Although the definition from MI5’s Charter had been accepted by the original incarnation 
of the SPL in 1972, reflected Partridge, it had been decided that it would not suffice for 1985. The 
SPL Chair admitted that the new interpretation of ‘subversion’ was indeed a ‘wide definition.’42 
However, Partridge had gained justification right from the top. As he explained, ‘ministers have 
resisted all calls for [the definition] to be applied only to unlawful activity.’43 Those unnamed 
ministers had criticised the old definition, which had, according to them, ‘allow[ed] too much scope 
to subversive organisations who take care to keep within the law, and who profess their intention of 
achieving power by legal and constitutional means, but whose real aims are the destruction of the 
present system.’44 Under the SPL’s new definition, anybody said to subscribe to an ‘anti-democratic 
philosophy’ could be labelled as a subversive and therefore become a target - whether they were 
deemed to threaten the safety of the state or not. Just like the term ‘subversion,’ however, the exact 
definition of an ‘anti-democratic ideology’ seemed open to interpretation. Under the new definition, 
the broader left in general were identified as subversives. For instance, Partridge revealed that the 
SPL had targeted ‘the Eurocommunists.’45 The Undersecretary conceded that the Eurocommunists 
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were neither violent, nor anti-democratic. Under the new definition, stated Partridge, the SPL had 
decided that the Eurocommunists could be - and had been – blacklisted nevertheless, included in 
with the figures for the communists.46  
The tables produced by the SPL in August 1985 were evidence of some of the most extensive 
blacklisting carried out by the British state on its own people. The report was far more detailed than 
anything produced by the Economic League in the seventies. Further tables were produced breaking 
down each individual ‘subversive’ ideology, the organisations said to adhere to that ideology, and 
the exact number of civil servants said to be members or sympathisers with that organisation. 
Evidence of the scale of the blacklisting operation can be seen by the fact that the SPL was also able 
to provide a further list of suspected subversives nationwide – across all public and private sectors, 
though without the specifics of the civil service blacklist. Militant Tendency was given particular 
attention. The report was able to reveal that, overall, Trotskyist groups constituted the biggest 
number of subversives in wider society (16,170) with MT the biggest amongst those (6,300).47 
Despite the miners’ strike ending five months earlier, Thatcher’s public-sector loyalists had not 
forgotten their old enemies. The report attacked the NUM as being under the ‘significant influence’ 
of left-wing, subversive elements.48 Mick McGahey was correctly named as a member of the 
Communist Party. Communists were blamed by the report for nearly every industrial dispute in 
recent British history. According to the report, ‘Communists have played a significant role in every 
coal strike since 1970, the 1982 rail strike, Grunwick and the Warrington Messenger dispute.’49 
Moreover, organisations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the Campaign for 
Press and Broadcasting Freedom (CPBF) and the Anti-Apartheid Campaign against segregated South 
Africa were all said to be infiltrated by Communist Party members.50 The report conceded that, 
within those organisations, most people had no affiliation with the CPGB whatsoever. However, the 
fact that they ‘might support individual policies’ of the Communist Party meant that they had still 
been added to the blacklist.51 That ‘guilty by association’ justification had been used by SPL members 
Rimington, Harrington and Hilary in the past. MI5’s targeting of the Greenham women, the DSPU’s 
justification for Foreign Office involvement in the strike, and the Leicester Unit’s targeting of Scargill 
had all been justified in the same manner. Although such justification might not stand up to scrutiny, 
it did not have to. Like the DSPU and the Leicester Unit before it, the SPL’s activities were secret and 
therefore outright legitimisation was not sought or required. The section about communists ended 
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with an attack on the prominent British historian, Eric Hobsbawm. The historian was described as 
particularly dangerous, as he had ‘attracted a large student following.’52  The fact that Hobsbawm 
was a university lecturer, whose profession required interaction with students, was not commented 
upon.  
As well as the civil service blacklist and the section on wider society, the report also 
identified other areas which might, in the future, require the same level of scrutiny as the civil 
service had received in the SPL’s initial report. The report advised that the SPL was not worried 
about either the police or the armed forces, which were described as having pre-existing vetting 
procedures which had ‘virtually excluded subversives’ from either force.53 However, both Education 
and the NHS were highlighted as areas where ‘subversives [could] call strike action and cause other 
disruption.’54 The Labour Party was highlighted as being at risk from subversive entryists.55 
Summarising the SPL’s civil service blacklist, the Trotskyists were picked out for particular scrutiny. 
According to the report, Trotskyists ‘do currently pose a significant subversive threat on a national 
scale. The civil service, nationalised industries, NHS, education, local government and the Labour 
Party are most at risk from their activities.’56  
Aware of the embarrassment the report might raise if it were ever made public, Partridge 
told Armstrong that the SPL had done its best to keep MI5 free from any ‘political bias.’57 Partridge 
revealed that he was satisfied that impartiality had been achieved - once one allowed for the new 
definition of subversion, which had been widened to include, as the SPL Chair put it, those who 
engage in ‘activities which are hostile to the government and its policies, but not intended to 
overthrow democracy [my emphasis].’58 This was a telling turn-of-phrase by Partridge. For the first 
time, the SPL Chair admitted that those hostile to ‘the government’ had been deemed to be 
subversives. As with Scargill and the NUM, political opponents of the governing Conservative Party 
were recast as enemies of the state, with little or no distinction. Those political opponents’ personal 
details were placed on a blacklist which might be harmful to their future careers – though they 
would never know about it.  Many civil servants with links to the specified organisations may indeed 
have held revolutionary ideals. However, the compiling of the SPL report had been undertaken in the 
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full knowledge that many of those blacklisted were not revolutionaries, had no intention of 
operating outside of the law, and were often linked tenuously to one of the left-wing organisations.  
The SPL Chair was less than hostile towards right-wing targets on the blacklist. Partridge 
argued that the right-wing threat was small, only 4,000 out of an estimated 50,000 across all of the 
four industries.59 Even amongst those, Partridge was keen to point out that, unlike their left-wing 
counterparts, ‘not all members [of the National Front and British National Party] hold subversive 
views.’60  That attempt to play-down the significance of right-wing subversives was in stark contrast 
when juxtaposed against SPL activity and attitudes toward left-wing subversives. With regard to the 
Left, every effort was made to broaden the net. On the Right, the opposite occurred. When fascist 
groups were occasionally mentioned by the SPL, it was almost always to play down the threat. Many 
on the far-right admired Thatcher’s perceived hard-line stances on race and crime.61  They were not 
necessarily opponents of the Conservative Party and therefore, according to Partridge’s own stated 
interpretation, not necessarily subversive. Dismissing the far-right, Partridge concluded that ‘only 
the CPGB, MT, WRP and SWP pose a significant subversive threat on a national scale.’62 Submitting 
the SPL’s report to Armstrong and the permanent secretaries of the SHC for their consideration, 
Partridge offered the opinion that the SPL might move its blacklisting operations into some of the 
other identified sectors – specifically the NHS and local government.63 Always aware of the need for 
stealth, the Undersecretary did warn that it might not be possible to undertake blacklisting in those 
sectors as ‘covertly as ha[d] been possible for the civil service.’64  
When the SPL had been formed in January 1985, the miners’ strike was still under way. The 
strike’s end, after the NUM’s eventual defeat in March, can perhaps be used as explanation as to 
why the overseeing group – the SHC - did not meet to discuss the SPL report for five months. In the 
mean-time, in July 1985, senior civil servants including those working within the SPL had had their 
own round of pay negotiations. At the same time as rank-and-file were striking in Newcastle and 
being covertly blacklisted, the Top Salaries Review Body recommended large inflation-busting 
increases for the Thatcher-appointees in the top grades doing the blacklisting such as Partridge, 
Harrington and Hilary - of between 12 and 18 percent.65 Chancellor Nigel Lawson was alarmed with 
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the big increases and challenged the Prime Minister directly – singling out SHC Chair Armstrong who 
was in line for a 46 percent pay-rise. Lawson attempted to convince the Prime Minister that the 
senior civil servants’ pay negotiations should be part of the overall arrangements – including those 
of the rank-and-file. 66 Lawson’s argument might be taken as evidence that the Chancellor was 
completely unaware of the activities of the SPL. Lawson was dismayed when Thatcher personally 
overruled him and pushed the senior pay-rises through.67  
On the 27th November 1985, Armstrong convened the permanent secretaries of the SHC in 
Conference Room C of the Cabinet Office at Whitehall, to discuss the report and blacklisting 
activities of the SPL. Before considering the main thrust of the report, the permanent secretaries 
went off on a tangent, accusing the education sector of being riddled with subversive influence in 
the classrooms – particularly in London which was said to be heavily infiltrated by Militant 
Tendency.68 The Permanent Secretary of Education and Science, David Hancock, was present. 
Although he was quick to join the condemnation of the subversives, he did concede that ‘there was 
no evidence as yet of teachers indoctrinating children.’69 With regard to the civil service blacklist, 
SHC members offered high praise. Armstrong announced that for him, the report was further proof 
that the DHSS strike in Newcastle was being ‘masterminded by subversives,’ three of whom were on 
the blacklist.70 Armstrong then cast light onto the exact chain of command in relation to the SPL and 
SHC. In an unusual move, the SHC Chair told the other permanent secretaries that they should not 
discuss the SPL’s report with their own departmental ministers due to its high sensitivity. Instead, 
Armstrong had been instructed to deliver the report directly to Thatcher.71 Cabinet Office 
Undersecretary and SPL member Rex Davie was at the meeting as a note-taking secretary. He told 
the group that this was highly unusual and that, following the proper chain of command and 
constitutional propriety, the appropriate ministers would usually be informed. That was dismissed 
by several members of the SHC, who used the justification that ‘the Prime Minister might not wish to 
see it go any wider.’72 That disclosure explained Chancellor Nigel Lawson’s apparent obliviousness 
concerning the existence of the SPL.  In the minutes, none of the assembled permanent secretaries 
voiced any opposition to the move to exclude the ministers. Armstrong was as good as his word. In 
early December, the Cabinet Secretary sent the SPL report directly to the Prime Minister, with his 
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own, accompanying list of recommendations agreed by the SHC.73 Armstrong’s own 
recommendation was to echo Partridge - the SPL’s blacklisting technique should now be broadened 
into other sectors, with MI5 resources used again to complete the task.74 When communicating with 
the Prime Minister directly, Armstrong revealed that the SPL had widened the catchment net for 
prospective political opponents further - to include those who could not be labelled as subversive 
even under the new definition. The SHC Chair told Thatcher that the work of the SPL had been 
undertaken with the aim of ‘ensuring that subversives are not posted to [jobs] in key areas and that 
persistent troublemakers, whether subversives or not, are identified and removed.’75 Armstrong’s 
answer to the often tenuous linking of those targeted to ‘subversion’ was to use the even vaguer 
terminology of ‘troublemaker,’ without any further description of what might constitute that label. 
With his intended audience in mind, Armstrong might have felt that the term would be well received 
– taking its place alongside ‘the wreckers,’ ‘the enemy within,’ and ‘the subversives.' 
On the 9th December, Armstrong received a reply from the Head of the Prime Minister’s 
Office and Thatcher’s Principal Private Secretary, Nigel Wicks. Wicks was new to the role of Private 
Secretary, though he had worked in the Prime Minister’s Office under Thatcher’s two Labour 
predecessors. He also had links to Big Oil – having worked directly for BP as a young man before 
joining the civil service.76 Wicks told Armstrong that Thatcher had approved of the SPL report. 
Regarding Armstrong’s proposal of extending the blacklisting activity, the Private Secretary revealed 
that ‘the Prime Minister agrees that you should proceed with the…initiatives.’77 Wicks told 
Armstrong that Thatcher approved of the blacklisting, but that she felt that it did not go far enough. 
After studying the figures and tables in the SPL report, the Prime Minister had told Wicks that she 
was ‘somewhat disquieted to learn that there are some subversives above the rank of HEO.’78 The 
Prime Minister wanted Armstrong to be aware that ‘one further action to counter the subversive 
threat in the Civil Service would be for management to be very ready to sack subversive 
troublemakers’ with immediate effect.79 Thatcher gave the go-ahead for the SPL to broaden the 
group’s blacklisting exercise into the other areas already labelled as under suspicion. Wicks 
confirmed that ‘[s]he also thinks it would be worthwhile for [the SPL] to make a similar assessment 
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of the current threat of subversion in local government, education and the NHS.’80 The only criticism 
Thatcher had levelled was that the SPL did not go far enough and that outright sackings of identified 
subversives should be brought about in the civil service. 
Armstrong relayed Thatcher’s comments down the chain of command to Partridge and the 
SPL.81 The SPL Chair seemed to have anticipated such positive feedback. He informed Armstrong that 
he had already been in touch with MI5 about further ‘assessments’ which could be undertaken in 
the other specified sectors.82 The SPL Chair did remind the permanent secretaries of the ever-
present adherence to stealth, reflecting that ‘knowledge of the SPL and its activities needed to be 
kept within a restricted circle.’83 Anticipating and disregarding any charges of partisan activity, 
Partridge argued that the blacklisting procedure needed ‘to be seen to be no more than the good 
and sound management that it is.’84 Partridge also revealed that he himself had the ear of the Prime 
Minister, though some ministers remained oblivious to the work of the SPL. The Chair revealed that 
‘the Prime Minister has been informed. However, other ministers have not yet been brought into 
the picture.’85 The SPL reported, through the overseeing SHC, directly to Thatcher.  
Three months later, in April 1986, Partridge wrote to Armstrong to inform him that 
‘subversive’-led prospective strike action was being planned in the DHSS in London.86 In preparation, 
senior management within the London offices had been ‘made fully aware of the Prime Minister’s 
expressed approval for vigorous management action against subversive troublemakers.’87 That is, 
Thatcher herself had given the go-ahead for the dismissal of those identified as ‘troublemakers.’ A 
week later, Armstrong wrote to Thatcher to confirm that the Prime Minister’s own comment about 
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Chapter 12: ‘Obliged to Dismiss’: Targeting London’s Schoolteachers 
By 1987, economic decline and growing inequality had continued unabated for those on the other 
side of Thatcher’s polarised Britain. Although unemployment had fallen on official figures, it still 
stood at three million.1 Liverpool continued to be one of the hardest-hit areas. The city had become 
symbolic of the depressed north – ravaged by areas of extreme poverty and the epicentre of local 
government revolt in 1985-86. The Labour Party, led by centrist Neil Kinnock, offered little 
protection for the outsiders in Thatcher’s revolution. The party leadership seemed unable or 
unwilling to challenge the Tories in regard to increasing inequality, the running down of public 
services or the reduction in social housing. For the Thatcherites, each of those was proudly 
proclaimed as an achievement, rather than a failure.2  For Thatcher’s supporters – particularly in the 
City and within the private-sector, things had never been better. 1987 saw the high point of the 
ideologically-driven, eight-year wave of Thatcher’s privatisation of public services. British Aerospace 
and Cable and Wireless had been privatised in 1981, National Freight in 1982.3 Jaguar, Sealink and 
British Telecom went in 1984.4 British Gas and British Airways followed in 1986.5 Finally, Rolls-Royce 
and David Pascall’s British Petroleum in 1987.6 Overall, 28 publicly-owned assets were sold off 
between 1980 and 1987. In all cases, the biggest losers seemed to be their employees. The process 
of ‘rationalisation’ involved massively reducing the workforce in anticipation of selling off the 
company.7 By the time British Steel was sold off in 1988, 70% of jobs were already lost.8  
Accompanying the wave of privatisation was a widescale deregulation of the finance sector 
in the City of London. That had been confirmed in October 1986, with the so-called ‘Big Bang.’ Fixed 
commission was abolished and corporate membership of the Stock Exchange was permitted for the 
first time. Traditional ‘open-cry’ trading floors were replaced by computer screens.9 For those that 
worked within the City, it seemed as if they had suddenly been given what the Thatcherites had 
always said there was no such thing as – money for nothing. The average income for a director at 
city bank Morgan Grenfell had been £40,000-per-year in 1979. By the end of 1986, it was 
£225,000.10 For another large trader, Cazenove, Director Pay multiplied sevenfold over the same 
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period.11 The crossovers between the city traders and the Conservative Party were manifest. Both 
Cazenove and NM Rothschild executives were personally close to Thatcher, and both firms were 
large Tory donors.12 The revolving door went the other way, too. John Redwood, the former Leader 
of the DSPU, had never stopped claiming a salary from NM Rothschild during his miners’ strike 
secondment. With the strike long over, the bank created a department for both him and another 
former DSPU man, Oliver Letwin, who would tour the rest of the world selling privatisation abroad.13 
Within the City, a new atmosphere of the ‘Club for Rich Young Men’ prevailed.14 Mostly aged 
between 26 and 35, this new wave of stockbrokers were taking home £100,000-per-year, before 
bonuses.15   
Against this backdrop came the SPL’s second report, issued in February 1987. That report, 
and the responses to it, showed those who had weaponised sections of the state were less cautious 
about the secret nature of their work for the first time. In 1987, Nicholas Ridley’s attention had 
shifted onto education. The Environment Minister, who had remained one of Thatcher’s closest 
advisors, devised and implemented a policy to let schools ‘opt out’ of local authority control and be 
run by their governors.16 Here was a way to attack those deemed subversive in both the education 
sector and local government - simultaneously. Rubbishing claims that the education sector was 
struggling due to cuts made by the Conservative government, Ridley complained that teachers 
needed to ‘get back to the Three R’s and teach more British History.’17 That might have been well 
received by the Prime Minister – herself a former Education Minister under Heath. Ridley’s ‘opting 
out’ policy was, unusually for the Environment Minister, a move away from the stealth which he had 
proscribed since 1978. With regard to the covert targeting of political opponents, the SPL’s second 
report, issued in February 1987, revealed that the group had undertaken much more activity in the 
education sector and had attempted to bring about the dismissal of an unknown number of 
schoolteachers in London. Responding to Thatcher’s instruction to ‘sack,’ the SPL had also developed 
an existing purge procedure within the civil service to be used against political ‘subversives.’ 
Partridge highlighted a problem that the SPL had encountered when targeting education, 
local government and the NHS. Unlike with the civil service, the group ‘did not have access to the 
names and records of people in the other three areas.’18 Moreover, there was ‘no means of getting 
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[that information] without…a high risk of public exposure.’19 The SPL had overcome that issue, 
explained the report, by substituting the quantitative method of nationwide blacklisting with a more 
qualitative approach. The report revealed that in education, monitoring had constituted a ‘selective 
dipstick’ focused on ‘particular areas and individuals that [the SPL] thought might contain subversive 
activity.’20 With the help of MI5, certain locations or institutions thought to be either under the 
influence of subversives or vulnerable to subversion had been pre-selected. Back in December 1984, 
Armstrong had received a report which concluded that teachers in London were overwhelmingly 
politically-opposed to Thatcher.21 No methodology appears to have been used in choosing the area 
to be used for the ‘dipstick,’ other than the targeting of areas deemed left-wing by the SPL – in the 
first instance, London. The Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) was denounced for featuring a 
particular ‘hard-left approach.’22 The London branch of the teachers’ union, the NUT, had also been 
targeted. The union was said to be under ‘significant Trotskyist influence.’23 Partridge conceded the 
possibility that ‘a public body may adopt hard-left policies and take up a thoroughly uncooperative 
stance in its dealings with central government for non-subversive reasons.’24 The report admitted 
that schoolteachers named via the dipstick technique ‘appear[ed] to act responsibly in schools,’ 
despite their ‘subversive’ affiliations.25 Those admissions had not, however, prevented the SPL from 
targeting the ILEA. Once the targets had been identified, another, more specific technique had been 
deployed.  
Leon Brittan had privately enlisted another agency of the state into the search for 
subversion, HM Inspectorate of Schools, in February 1985. The then Home Secretary had told 
inspectors that ‘a worrying amount of NUM propaganda [had] found its way into school 
classrooms.’26 The school inspectors had continued to be useful. The SPL’s second report revealed 
that between August 1985 and February 1987, at the behest of the SPL, HM Inspectorate had been 
sent into specified schools in London, identified as under subversive influence during the dipstick 
phase.27 The point of these ‘surprise inspections,’ revealed the report, was to find evidence which 
would make the Local Education Authority ‘obliged to dismiss the subversive teachers.’28  It was not 
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recorded how many times the SPL ordered HM Inspectorate to carry out those surprise inspections, 
or how many people might have lost their jobs as a result. Though not commenting on education 
specifically, the Prime Minister had pushed the SPL towards achieving sackings in the civil service. It 
might be taken that she would also approve of the same outcome in education, a sector she had 
often accused of brainwashing children.29 Like the civil servants before them, the schoolteachers 
were oblivious that they were being targeted by the state. In February 1988 a year after the second 
report of the SPL, Thatcher announced that the ILEA would be dissolved – a move seen by enemies 
and allies alike as a strike against political opponents.30 What nobody knew at the time was that the 
organisation and its schoolteachers had been covertly targeted by the SPL for several months.  
The second report revealed that, with the help of MI5, the civil service blacklist had been 
expanded across the entire service - including those departments not listed in the first report. 
Despite that, in terms of overall numbers within the civil service, the ‘subversive threat’ was about 
the same as it had been at the time of the first report, 18 months earlier. That discrepancy would 
seem to indicate that while the blacklists had been successful in ‘moving [troublemakers] sideways,’ 
and covertly steering them clear of areas deemed ‘sensitive,’ it was much harder to actually sack 
someone for subversion – given the loose definition of the term and how easy it appeared to be to 
get onto the blacklist.31 However, the Prime Minister had made her feelings clear in the aftermath of 
the first report. The purge procedure, which was written into civil service contracts but was only 
supposed to be used in cases of gross misconduct, had been mentioned at a meeting chaired by 
Armstrong back in January 1985.32 The second report revealed that the SPL had worked with senior 
management and covertly changed the rule so that the purge could now be enacted in cases of 
subversion. Partridge justified the SPL’s interference by telling Armstrong that ‘civil servants owe 
their allegiance to the crown…[and] the authority of the crown is exercised by the government of the 
day.’33 The SPL Chair gave exact details of the procedure. Once a civil servant had been accused by a 
manager of subversion, s/he faced immediate suspension. Once accused and suspended, only two 
courses of action were available to her/him. In the first instance, they could accept all charges and 
face the disciplinary ramifications. Alternatively, if they denied the charge of subversion, then they 
would go in front of a panel known as ‘the Three Advisors.’34 That meant going before a court-like 
panel of three senior managers, who would act as judges. In her/his defence, the accused could call 
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witnesses to testify to the Three Advisors about their prior record, reliability and character.35 
However, the Advisors’ decision was final. If they upheld the accusation of subversion, the civil 
servant might be posted or retrained elsewhere – away from sensitive areas.36 Where that was not 
possible, the accused would be dismissed – unless they agreed to resign.37 Partridge included in the 
report an extract from a standard civil servant contract which gave details of the Three 
Advisors/Purge procedure as it already existed. As stated, however, the purge procedure was only 
meant to be used in cases of gross misconduct. The SPL report stated that the group had insisted 
that managers also enact the procedure in cases of subversion – though no figures were given in 
regard to how many times that had occurred.38 
 The Purge Procedure worked doubly well for the SPL. On the one hand it reinforced the 
culture of conformity. Many civil servants, worried about losing their jobs, might well have accepted 
a move sideways or downwards, suitably chastised about any political dissention. Those that did not 
could be sacked – allowing the loyalists within the SPL to report to Thatcher that her advice 
regarding ‘outright sackings’ had been implemented. As discussed, ending up on the blacklist was 
not difficult. Despite the specific nature of the purge procedure, it seemed just as easy to become a 
target. As Partridge explained, the purge could be triggered if ‘a doubt arises’ about someone 
engaged in ‘secret work.’39   
The SPL’s second report had also commented on local government – in Labour strongholds. 
Manchester, Liverpool and several East London boroughs were identified as subversive ‘hubs.’  It 
was admitted that ‘opposition to central government seemed to stem more from political than 
subversive motives,’ though, it was concluded, ‘the significant exception is Liverpool.’40 The logistics 
of the exercise meant that SPL had not been able to undertake more specific counter-subversion in 
the same way as it had done in education and the civil service. Central information for local 
councillors did not exist. The group had considered deploying MI5 to the regions specified to collate 
the information, but in the end felt it ‘too risky’ in regard to the stealth approach.41 Similarly, the 
NHS had been looked at by the SPL – but little more than that. Partridge stated that the ‘risk of 
obtaining information [about subversives within the NHS] would be unacceptably high.’42 Adherence 
to stealth was amplified in a sector as well loved by the British public as the Health Service. With the 
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Tories riding high in the polls and Thatcher expected to call an election, it did not make sense to risk 
counter-subversion in the NHS, nor undertake the logistically difficult task of compiling a full local 
government blacklist. As such, the SPL left it up to the overseeing SHC as to whether the procedures 
and activity in education and the civil service should be expanded into those other two sectors.  
Given the longstanding adherence to stealth, Partridge and the SPL might well have been 
dismayed to learn that, on the same day that the second report was released, 6th February 1987, a 
list of 269 ‘subversives within the civil service’ had been leaked to the press. SPL member and 
Cabinet Office Undersecretary Rex Davie wrote to Armstrong to warn that the disclosure was a 
‘difficult area open to misunderstanding and misinterpretation.’43 The leaked blacklist had been 
given to an unnamed newspaper man who had, in turn, given it to Tory MP for Hastings and Rye, 
Kenneth Warren. Sending the list directly to Thatcher, Warren used the polemic, partisan and even 
theatrical language evident in the prose of the Prime Minister’s loyalists. Warren thought the list of 
civil service subversives merely ‘the tip of the iceberg’ in regard to left-wing ‘infiltration’ of the 
British public sector.44 The Tory MP paid no mind whatsoever as to why and how such a list had been 
compiled. Instead, Warren argued that ‘we cannot tolerate militants being given sensitive 
positions.’45  Thatcher could not tell the backbencher about the activities of the SPL. She did write a 
reply to him in which she assured him that ‘departments are alert to the dangers represented by 
people who hold extreme views.’46   
Armstrong convened the Permanent Secretaries of the SHC on the 13th March to discuss the 
SPL’s second report - and the leak. The Cabinet Secretary defended the SPL and distanced the group 
from the leaked blacklist. He told the others categorically that the ‘list does not represent a leak of 
material prepared by the SPL.’47 Armstrong did not appear to consider the question that if the secret 
list did not come from the SPL, who else, or which other possible organisation, would have both the 
incentive and the capabilities (via MI5) to produce such a list? It did not seem likely that a secondary 
secret organisation was also working with MI5 to produce blacklists of civil servants. In any case the 
leak was made on the same day that the SPL report was issued – which seemed an unlikely 
coincidence. Unless, therefore, the leak had emanated directly from MI5, it seems probable that it 
must have come from either a member of SPL, or a member of the overseeing SHC, the latter of 
whom would have been sat round the table with Armstrong when he defended the SPL in the 
matter. The leak might have been made by a triumphalist member of either organisation, believing 
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that the list would, through the prism of the right-wing press, be regarded as a propaganda victory 
for the government, rather than an embarrassment. In either case, a deliberate leak to the press 
represented a move away from strict adherence to stealth. That less cautious approach was a 
definitive move away from SHC policy stretching back to 1972 under Heath. Moreover, adherence to 
stealth had been the cornerstone of both the DSPU and the Leicester Unit during the miners’ strike, 
as well as SPL activity up until that point. After the Leicester Unit’s existence was uncovered by a 
journalist in October 1984, the civil servants involved had scrambled to limit the damage and 
distance themselves from the Unit’s activities. The leak of a list of ‘subversive’ civil servants, which 
might have been seen as disastrous in 1984, had caused little alarm in 1987. 
The permanent secretaries of the SHC had been universally positive about the original SPL 
report in August 1985. However, their reactions to the second report were rather more mixed. 
Counter-subversion methods were praised, particularly in the civil service and education. However, 
the SPL faced criticism that it had not gone far enough – particularly in local government and the 
health service. The whole section on local government was disparaged as ‘superficial.’48 The 
permanent secretaries were particularly dismayed about the SPL’s assertion that local authorities 
hostile to central government were not necessarily subversive. The SHC admonished the SPL, 
reminding the attending Partridge that definitions had been changed for just those reasons. If ‘Loony 
Left local authorities’ were political opponents of the government, then that was more than enough 
justification to target them for specific action.49 In education, the SHC was unanimous that the 
surprise inspections should be continued and that, with the success of the civil service blacklist in 
mind, HM Inspectorate should be encouraged to produce lists of teachers thought to be under 
subversive influence.50 The SHC members showed more sympathy to the SPL’s difficulties with the 
health service. Nevertheless, they too appeared to favour a less cautious approach than what had 
previously been the norm. They instructed the SPL to put aside hesitation concerning risk and begin 
work on creating an NHS blacklist as soon as possible. If the SPL could not do it directly, then ‘local 
managers [should] be encouraged to report the names of subversives, so that they [can] be checked 
by MI5’ and a blacklist created in that way.51   
Armstrong demonstrated that the chain of command had not been altered since the first 
report in 1985. The SHC Chair told the other permanent secretaries that they should not inform their 
own departmental minister about the SPL’s report. Armstrong would send it directly to Thatcher and 
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Brittan’s replacement as Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, with explicit instruction that ‘no formal 
report [is to be] put to ministers.’52  It could be argued that the SHC, in their response to the second 
SPL report, were simply saying what they believed the Prime Minister wanted to hear. Operating in 
the culture of conformity, their criticisms echoed Thatcher’s own after the Prime Minister had read 
the first report. Direct action to sack civil servants and schoolteachers was praised, while criticism 
was aimed at sectors where that had not been implemented.  
Armstrong’s more critical response to the second report can perhaps be regarded as a way 
of highlighting what might be expected from a SHC Chair – for the benefit of his prospective 
replacement. The old Thatcher-appointee was retiring from his post as Cabinet Secretary and was 
preparing for a move to the House of Lords where he would sit as a crossbencher – rewarded with a 
knighthood and lifetime peerage. The outgoing SHC Chair had served under different administrations 
in his career, including as Principal Secretary to Harold Wilson. Despite that, Armstrong’s links to MI5 
and the original SHC were decades in the making. By 1987, the Cabinet Secretary had spent over two 
years at the head of the SHC, overseeing the SPL group’s work, instructing and directing them, and 
feeding their reports directly to Thatcher. Before his retirement, Armstrong would be deployed to 
Australia for one last, ill-fated attempt at keeping up the Thatcher loyalists’ adherence to stealth. 
Armstrong had appeared sporadically throughout the pages of Peter Wright’s Spycatcher, and in 
September 1987 was called as a witness by the British government in a failed attempt to supress the 
book’s publication in Australia. However, his evidence was ridiculed in the press for its obviously 
deceptive nature.53 Wright’s lawyer and future Prime Minister of Australia Malcolm Turnbull said of 
Armstrong ‘if he is an honest man, then he appears rather like a well-educated mushroom.’54 The 
Cabinet Secretary and SHC Chair seemed to put Tory concerns above all others. Several ministers 
had turned down requests to fly to Australia before Armstrong agreed to do so. 55 ‘Someone had to 
do the job,’ the Cabinet Secretary later reflected on his humiliating task.56  In March 2019, it was 
alleged by the Guardian that in 1986 Armstrong went as far as supressing evidence that Tory MP 
Peter Morrison was a child molester with, according to MI5, ‘a penchant for small boys.’57  Although 
that particular allegation was not proven, Armstrong’s Spycatcher humiliation might be seen as 
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further evidence, alongside his work with the SPL, of a man whose loyalty was to the sitting 
government and the Prime Minister who had appointed him ten years earlier. Armstrong had been 
an important figure in the development of the culture of conformity. After the outgoing Cabinet 
Secretary flew home from Australia the SDP Leader, David Owen, remarked that Armstrong had 
‘become a civil servant who’s very much seen as a supporter of the government.’58  The position of 
Cabinet Secretary had been meant to guard the distinction between party and state.59 Instead, 
Armstrong’s tenure was defined, as the journalist Peter Oborne put it, by the spectacle of a man 
‘pressured into carrying out political favours for the Prime Minister of the day.’60 
Armstrong was not the only one stepping down. Michael Partridge would also be replaced as 
Chair of the SPL. Another example of one of Thatcher’s public-sector loyalists, the outgoing SPL Chair 
had shown his commitment to the Prime Minister initially through his work with the Leicester Unit. 
His attempts to compile the ‘dossier of evidence’ had not been successful, but they had earmarked 
him as the perfect candidate for the SPL Chair. Between January 1985 and March 1987, Partridge 
had overseen a state-sponsored counter-subversion exercise which had targeted political opponents 
of the government in four different areas of the public sector. He was rewarded with his own 
knighthood, in 1990.61 Partridge’s replacement as Chair of the SPL was Armstrong’s former Principal 
Private Secretary, John Chilcot (Appendix D for full changes in personnel).  
Armstrong’s own replacement as Cabinet Secretary was Robin Butler, the former Private 
Secretary to the Prime Minister who had fed back Thatcher’s ‘disappointment’ regarding the 
Leicester Unit’s failure to jail Scargill, to the Home Office in October 1984.62 Butler had existing 
relationships with several senior Tories. He was known to be a regular attender at Jeffrey Archer’s 
‘champagne and Shepherd’s Pie parties.’63 Butler had worked under private-sector loyalist Victor 
Rothschild in the Centre Policy Review Staff since 1972.64 The senior civil servant was also an 
acquaintance of Tory MP Jonathan Aitken.65 Butler would later face his own ‘Spycatcher moment.’  
Toward the end of his stint as Cabinet Secretary in 1995, he was called on to carry out an 
investigation into Aitken after a media story asserted that the Tory MP had stayed at the London Ritz 
at a foreign businessman’s expense and then lied about it. When that was later proved to be true, 
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Butler’s prior investigation was revealed to be half-hearted at best. As Oborne put it, ‘there was not 
a great deal of evidence that he guarded the boundaries between party and state with the diligence 
that might have been expected.’66 Both Aitken and Archer were later jailed for perjury. In 1987, 
Butler might well have seemed like a good fit for both the role of Cabinet Secretary and also of SHC 
Chair – the living embodiment of the disintegration of state / party distinction during the period and 
someone who would easily pass the ‘one-of-us’ question.67 In a BBC documentary in 2019, Butler 
described the senior civil service in 1987 as being akin to Thatcher’s ‘family’ whose loyalty was to the 
Prime Minister above all else.68 Those outside of the ‘fully-Thatcherised Satrapy’ were to be 
regarded as rivals – even non-Thatcherite Tory ministers.69 The SPL group had outlived Armstrong 
and Partridge. Their replacements were tasked with carrying on with the group’s activities in 
education and the civil service, as well as spreading those activities into those two outstanding areas 
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Chapter 13: ‘The Position Becomes Less Clear Cut’: The NHS, Local Government and the end of the 
Culture of Conformity 
The SPL’s second report in February 1987 had indicated that some within the Thatcherite state had 
become less fearful of public exposure as the Tories consolidated power. Four months after the 
second report, in June, Margaret Thatcher and the Tories won a second landslide General Election 
and secured a third term in office. Of the 30 million people who voted, the vast majority (over 17 
million) did not vote for the Tories. However, the SDP/Liberal Alliance and the now Centrist-led 
Labour Party split the anti-Tory vote (7m and 10m respectively), meaning that the tried and tested 
Tory electoral alliance held firm, with 13 million votes and a loss of only 20 seats since the 1983 
landslide. The Tory coalition of affluent South East voters and big voting blocks in the Midlands and 
South West was enough for another large victory.1 The second landslide increased the consolidation 
of power by Thatcher’s loyalists yet further. Redwood’s successor as Policy Director of the DSPU was 
private-sector loyalist, ex-banker and Dean of the London School of Economics Business School, 
Brian Griffiths.  
With the upper-levels of the civil service ‘Thatcherised,’ Griffiths was able to recruit 
promising Whitehall loyalists directly into the DSPU to take their place alongside their private-sector 
counterparts. David Hobson, hand-picked by Thatcher for his Whitehall role, switched to the DSPU 
shortly after the election.2 A Cabinet reshuffle removed the last non-Thatcher ministers.3 The second 
landslide gave the Thatcherites the confidence to confront the education sector head on – 
abandoning all premise of stealth and overtly centralising power. The Education Reform Bill of 1988, 
brought in by Keith Joseph’s successor Kenneth Baker, placed the entire school curriculum within the 
ambit of central government. From now on, 90 percent of the school-day would be ordained by 
Thatcher’s loyalists in Whitehall.4 Cabinet members spent hours rewriting mathematics papers and 
wrangled over whether a History advisor was ideologically sound.5 Thatcher involved herself in the 
debate, specifically demanding a re-write of the history curriculum to reflect ‘the truth.’6 The 
Modern Law Review called the bill ‘the high point of elective dictatorship’.7 Universities, a pet-hate 
of the Prime Minister, were also punished. As well as further cuts, Thatcher would publicly lampoon 
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the sector. In early 1989 she famously quipped that ‘I went to Oxford University, but I’ve never let it 
hold me back.’8 With new faces at the helm of both the SPL and the overseeing SHC, the Thatcher 
loyalists’ increased confidence was manifested in the decision to overcome fears of publicity and to 
target sections of local government – and the National Health Service.  
If Nicholas Ridley was not aware of the existence of the SPL, he seemed to have the same 
targets in mind. The Environment Minister had railed against the education sector in 1987, at the 
same time that the SPL was focusing on that area. In early 1988, he denounced local government 
which, he said, had an ‘almost incestuous relationship with its council tenants.’9 Ridley told the 
Prime Minister that he was determined to weaken that bond.10 . The Environment Minister attacked 
Labour-controlled local authorities, which he accused of keeping council house rents ‘absurdly low’ 
in order to buy political allegiance from the inhabitants.11 Ridley also accused local councillors of 
giving ‘grants to lesbian and gay groups’ in return for voting loyalty.12 Ridley was not the only one of 
Thatcher’s loyalists pressing that same message. Thatcher’s friend and private-sector loyalist, 
Woodrow Wyatt, who had called for the prosecution of Scargill during the Leicester Unit affair, told 
the Prime Minister, shortly after the 1987 election triumph, that ‘local government…is undemocratic 
and should be run by Whitehall with a fixed budget.’13 Tory MP Cecil Franks had lost his seat on 
Manchester council. During a 1987 Commons debate on local government, Franks revealed what 
was, for him, the problem with Labour-leaning councils in the north. ‘Those who are the dross of our 
society, who contributed nothing but took everything out of society had a vote, whereas those 
putting something in did not.’14  Here again was the old Tory dissatisfaction with local government – 
and particularly the rates system.  
Ridley, still in the role of Environment Secretary, also pushed for NHS privatisation, though 
he later admitted to Thatcher critic Ian Gilmour that Thatcher thought it ‘too sensitive a topic to 
expose to the electorate.’15 However, the Prime Minister was on the record as saying that she 
herself used a private healthcare provider and was typically bombastic about the issue. ‘I exercise 
my right as a free citizen,’ thundered the Prime Minister, ‘to spend my own money my own way.’16 
During the eighties, the number of British people with private healthcare doubled – though that still 
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accounted for only 10% of the population.17 The figures for private education were roughly the 
same.18 Thatcher could point to her right-to-buy scheme as an example of a privatisation which was 
extremely popular with some sections of the working-class. However, publicly-owned healthcare 
and schools were different. For the vast majority of the British population, the state system in health 
and education was not a safety net, but a fundamental part of life. Despite that, the continuing wave 
of privatisation had not left healthcare untouched. Charges for eye tests and dental care were 
introduced in 1988 for the first time.19  
Ridley, the old orchestrator of the stealth approach, had more advice for the Prime Minister 
aside from local government and the health service. The Thatcher confidante also railed against dole 
payments, which he claimed were too high – leading to the emergence of a feckless dependency 
culture. Ridley gave an anecdote about his own window cleaner, who, the minister claimed, had told 
Ridley he was retiring onto the dole, as it was better pay. Perturbed, Ridley revealed that ‘for a long 
time, my windows went dirty.’20 The decade had seen a massive spike in homelessness in Britain.21 
Visiting London in mid-1988, Mother Teresa was said to be shocked at the seemingly-endless victims 
of nearly ten years of Thatcherism – a sight she had never seen before in a first-world country. ‘I 
didn’t know what to say,’ she remarked, ‘there were tears in my eyes.’22 Ridley had a different 
perspective to Mother Teresa. Dismissing homelessness out-of-hand, he claimed that evidence that 
many on the dole were near starvation was ‘false,’ ‘homelessness was a misnomer,’ and a report he 
had read by a fellow Tory minister had revealed that there was no such thing as poverty.23 The 
language used by senior Tories in 1988 seemed to denote a lack of guardedness as another electoral 
landslide led them to abandon caution in public pronouncements. MP George Young’s contribution 
to the homeless debate was to dismiss homeless people in a Radio interview as – ‘the sort of people 
you step on when you come out of the opera.’24 Chancellor Nigel Lawson’s budget in March 1988 
was an ideological sledgehammer. With the miners’ strike now a thing of the past and the trade 
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union movement critically injured, Lawson slashed the top rate of income tax from 60% to 40%. 
Britain’s wealthy elite would now pay less tax than at any time since before the First World War.25  
Local government was also a target for centralisation projects. In 1987 the Urban 
Development Corporations, which had been used to undermine local Labour councils in Liverpool 
and London, were expanded to several other Labour strongholds including Manchester, Cardiff, 
Newcastle and Leeds.26 Like with Liverpool and London, the UDC’s were given grants not available to 
the local authority – undermining local councils and leaving them unable to fund themselves. 
Newcastle Council leader Jeremy Beecham complained that his council did ‘not even have enough 
money to paint the bridges over the Tyne.’27 Thatcher gave personal orders that the London UDC 
would get preferential treatment over the northern regions.28 From now on local authorities would 
not even run their own police, fire and transport. Despite self-professed claims of libertarian anti-
statism, Thatcher and her loyalists had centralised local government power, thus undermining 
political opponents in the north and abandoning the stealth-approach favoured in many of 
Thatcher’s political battles before the 1987 landslide. With the confidence of winning three elections 
and two landslides, Thatcher even began to take Ridley seriously about the NHS. In December 1987, 
the Prime Minister complained to colleagues that the health service was a ‘bottomless financial 
pit.’29 Later that month, she told the BBC’s Panorama programme that the NHS should be ‘totally 
reformed.’30 In early 1988, Ridley began to publicly talk-up plans to bring in some mild forms of 
private provision.31  
Despite both the overt attacks of centralisation and the covert counter-subversion of the 
SPL, the areas targeted by Thatcher’s loyalists continued to be a thorn in the side of the Prime 
Minister. Given the 1,420 civil servants on the original blacklist and the unknown number of 
schoolteachers targeted for surprise inspection, the targeting procedures of the SPL might well have 
seemed painfully slow. The SPL had admitted that the overall ‘subversive scene’ was unchanged in 
the civil service, while schoolteachers had hardly converted to Thatcherism en-masse. This might be 
taken to show that both the civil service and the education sector appeared remarkably resilient to 
both overt and covert attack. Local authorities across the north had remained deeply hostile. In the 
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NHS, nurses had gone on strike on 3rd February 1988 for higher pay and more funding for the health 
service. An even larger nurses’ strike took place on the 16th February. Ridley’s plans for partial 
privatisation had met fierce resistance and had been met with, in his own words, ‘storms of protest’ 
from GPs and hospitals nationwide.32 Ridley dismissed the nurses and doctors, who he claimed used 
‘fashionable words such as underfunded and under-resourced.’33 However, the Environment 
Minister was finding out that the overt targeting of specific sectors required political legitimisation 
and the winning of arguments - none of which had been necessary in his stealth approach.   
Chilcot wrote to Butler in July 1988 to confirm that the SPL had continued its counter-
subversion activities in the interim, regardless of the change in personnel. Chilcot offered a reason 
for the long period in-between the second report and the forthcoming one – an 18-month gap. One 
of the civil service trade unions, the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) had run internal 
elections in May. According to Chilcot, the SPL had information that one of the groups vying for 
power within the union, the ‘Broad Left Group,’ was a front for Militant Tendency, and was widely 
predicted to lose. Chilcot has waited until Militant had taken the hit from that election defeat.34 The 
new SPL Chair reported the ‘total defeat’ of Militant in that election, and confirmed that no new 
subversive threats were evident within the civil service.35 Chilcot also announced that the threat in 
education was ‘stabilising.’36 With that being the case, Chilcot told Butler that the SPL had done as 
instructed and spent more time in the interim focusing on the other two areas – local government 
and the health service. NHS counter-subversion had taken place ‘despite its acute sensitivity and the 
high risk of embarrassment in the event of any leak.’37 Fear of exposure had not been totally 
overcome. By 1988, however, Thatcherism was entrenched in the mind-set of both the Thatcher-
appointees in Whitehall, and also the majority of the Cabinet.38  
The selective dipstick technique used in education had been applied in local government. 
With help from MI5 and Ridley’s Department of Environment, the SPL had identified twelve 
authorities likely to be under some sort of ‘subversive’ influence. The SPL had focused exclusively on 
safe Labour constituencies, under the premise that ‘subversion…would only be found in councils 
under Labour control.’39 Ten of the councils were in East London, including Camden and Lambeth.40 
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The other two were the northern Labour strongholds of Manchester and St Helens.41 Exact numbers 
of subversives and sympathisers were reported in each location. The report conceded that ‘there are 
no local councils which are under significant subversive influence.’42 Armstrong had circumnavigated 
that previously by substituting the word ‘subversive’ with ‘troublemaker.’ Chilcot adopted the same 
technique. Councillors known for being campaigners for legitimate causes, such as anti-racism, had 
been targeted by the SPL - particularly ones who were themselves from an ethnic minority. ‘On 
some councils,’ warned the report, ‘Asian or other ethnic councillors have been seen to seek, and 
indeed welcome, the support for their ethnic causes of subversives, especially Trotskyists.’43 Once 
the link was made, however tenuously, the ‘ethnic councillors’ had become targets for blacklisting. 
As Chilcot put it, ‘[n]on-subversive trouble-makers have been the prime instigators of [the] 
disruption in local councils, but subversives will always be ready exploit disruption, however 
caused.’44 Being a ‘non-subversive troublemaker’ made you susceptible to subversive influence – the 
same ‘guilty by association’ justification used by Stella Rimington and Roy Harrington previously. 
Both of those SPL members had survived the changes in personnel. A small local blacklist was 
compiled for each of the chosen areas. The names and affiliations of ‘troublemakers’ were passed to 
the overseeing SHC.  
Of the four areas targeted by the SPL since its reformation in 1985, the National Health 
Service had received the least coverage. Paradoxically in an ideological context of sweeping 
privatisation, Britain’s Health service, fully nationalised by the Labour government after the war, 
remained almost universally popular with the British public. Chancellor Nigel Lawson had warned 
against any attempt at privatisation, summing up the public’s relationship with the NHS thus; ‘The 
National Health Service is the closest thing the English have to a religion, with those who practice in 
it regarding themselves as a priesthood.’45 Nevertheless, the report revealed that ‘despite the risks, 
MI5 have looked at two health unions, the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) and 
Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE).’46 MI5 had concentrated their efforts on the 
governing national committees of each union. The SPL had been able to compile a blacklist of sorts – 
though restricted to the union leadership and therefore much smaller and less detailed than the civil 
service one. Names and affiliations of ‘subversives and sympathisers’ were recorded.47 Those on the 
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list were identified as being a member or sympathiser of organisations such as Militant Tendency or 
the Communist Party.48  The SPL had been monitoring the nurses’ strikes, which had taken place 
earlier in the year. The group had concentrated its efforts on linking the strikes with subversion. 
Instead, a familiar picture emerged as in the other sectors. It was conceded that ‘no evidence [exists] 
linking subversives to [the] current unrest in the Health Service.’49 Regardless, MI5 had continued to 
monitor and blacklist. The Security Service had reported to the SPL that ‘their coverage at national 
level [was adequate] to assess exploitation by subversive organisations.’50 The report continued to 
highlight the ‘unacceptably high risks’ involved in targeting sections of the NHS for secret state 
blacklisting.51 Therefore, the SPL did not take a direct course of action such as the civil service purge 
or unannounced inspections in education. As with the other sectors targeted, however, counter-
subversion activity had taken place – identification and blacklisting of targets, despite an admission 
that strike activity was not believed to be subversive.  
In education, the third report warned of a new group, the Socialist Teachers Alliance, which 
was said to have strong influence in London.52 The report also described some of the effects of the 
implementation of the ‘opting-out’ initiative Ridley had designed. That change in policy, reflected 
the report, shifted management responsibility away from the local authorities and onto the 
governing boards of schools and colleges. The report argued that ‘this will make it harder for 
subversives to influence things.’53 HM Inspectorate remained ready, and had been ordered to report 
any ‘significant disruption or abnormal activity’ within the new bodies directly to the SPL.54As with 
the health service, MI5 would ‘continue to monitor the situation.’55  The SPL had also kept up its 
blacklisting within the civil service and reported that amongst the Trotskyites, there remained a 
‘general awareness’ of the potential for exploitation by low morale and low pay.56 The overall 
picture in the civil service was described as one of a small but continuing decline of subversives and 
sympathisers since 1985.57  
By August 1988, blacklisting had taken place in at least some parts of all four of the sectors 
originally identified in 1985 toward the end of the miners’ strike. In September, the permanent 
secretaries of the SHC met to give their verdict on the third report. The SHC members seemed much 
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more pleased than at the last overseers meeting. Butler announced that in local government, 
counter-subversion meant that ‘fears [were now] reduced,’ particularly in Liverpool and East 
London.58 In education, fears remained, but MI5 had improved and were on top of things.59 In the 
civil service, changes to recruitment were already taking place, with incoming graduates now 
‘checked’ before any offer of employment was made.60 In light of the move toward more overt 
targeting, and buoyed on by the achievement of successful counter-subversion in all four sectors, 
one of the permanent secretaries questioned whether the SPL should continue its high-risk work at 
all, or be disbanded. Most agreed with Butler that the ‘inter-departmental arrangements for the 
close monitoring of particularly sensitive fields should continue.’61 It was agreed that the SPL would 
produce its next report in two years’ time. 
Before the SPL’s fourth report was issued, however, Margaret Thatcher was swept from 
power. That may have posed the SPL with a logistical problem of its own – given that the group 
bypassed ministers and reported directly to her via the SHC. What would have proved anathema to 
the SPL was that two of the areas targeted in the third report - local government and the National 
Health Service – were in part, responsible for bringing her down.  Thatcher’s dalliance with bringing 
in some privatisation to the NHS was met with strong resistance nationwide. A January 1989 White 
Paper had outlined Tory plans to ‘simulate privatisation without actually doing it.’62 Lawson’s adage 
about the British religion had been ignored. Ridley, who favoured privatisation, had cautioned for a 
return to the stealth approach – in light of his own tarnished reputation in the health service.  He 
warned that doctors were well-respected in communities, and that making enemies out of them 
was, as he had discovered, foolish.63 Ridley was correct. The paper was received with outrage by the 
nation’s general practitioners, and others within the health service. Doctors, hospital staff and the 
Labour Party combined to publicly denounce it.64 The NHS paper had also announced the formation 
of 500 ‘trust hospitals’ nationwide. That was an attempt at the centralisation carried out in the 
education sector and local government. However, direct centralisation of authority meant direct 
centralisation for the blame if anything went wrong – in a critically underfunded sector. As Jenkins 
argued, ‘the Prime Minister became the de facto chief executive of every hospital in the land.’65 
Public dissatisfaction and distrust in regard to the health service was a mill-stone that would haunt 
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Tory administrations into the 21st Century. Thatcher’s downfall can mostly be attributed, however, 
to her continuing obsession with, and hostility toward, local government. In both cases, 
overconfidence gained from the second landslide lead Thatcher and her loyalists to abandon 
adherence to stealth.  
Local government authorities, particularly Labour-controlled councils in the north, had 
continued to offer resistance to the Thatcher revolution. Those regional councils might well have 
seemed to Thatcher to contain by far the largest collection of ‘subversives’ out of all of the targeted 
areas. The rate-capping rebellion had been defeated in late 1985. However, Tory policies such as 
rate-capping, allowing schools to ‘opt-out’ and the Urban Development Corporations had acted to 
undermine local authorities and had exasperated already hostile local councillors. As with the 
miners, the Prime Minister appeared to want total victory. The SPL’s specific targeting, such as the 
civil service purge procedure or the surprise inspections in education, had not been applied in local 
government – though blacklisting had been carried-out in the 12 targeted areas. As with education 
and health, Thatcher wanted a plan to centralise and diminish the power of her perceived enemies – 
but also rally her supporters. Thatcher turned back to the argument surrounding ‘the rates.’ The 
system was hated by many middle-class Tory voters and seen as unfair. In Camden, one of the areas 
secretly targeted by the SPL, inhabitants of affluent areas such as Hampstead felt like they were 
obliged to subsidise inhabitants of the council estates which made up the poorer parts of the 
borough, all the while knowing that they would always be outvoted by those on the estates - many 
of whom were exempt from the rates.66 Thatcher had ordered reviews to be carried out shortly after 
her election victories in both 1979 and 1983.67 Patrick Jenkin, the Environment Minister in 1983, 
concluded that the rates were an adequate system that were ‘well understood, cheap to collect and 
very difficult to evade.’68 Operating in the same culture of conformity as everyone else, however, the 
minister was ‘desperate to appease his boss’s presumed radicalism.’69  He ordered a further review 
for the autumn. Thatcher insisted that one of her private-sector loyalists be included in the review 
group.  
The now-elderly Victor Rothschild had been an official Tory advisor since Heath had made 
him Chief of the Policy Review Staff in 1972. He had been one of the private-sector loyalists invited 
to the Chequers meeting in 1979, called to discuss subversion. Rothschild was still chief executive of 
NM Rothschild, the company which was a longstanding Economic League donator and had seconded 
 
66 Turner, Rejoice Rejoice, p350.  
67 Jenkins, Thatcher and Sons, p140.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid.  
P a g e  | 165 
 
Redwood into the DSPU during the miners’ strike. He was also an ex-vice-chairman of Shell, another 
League donator which had seconded Wybrew to the DSPU. With such an impressive itinerary, 
Rothschild was given the task of coming up with a new idea regarding the rates. Previously, the rates 
had set bills in accordance with household income. Rothschild came up with the idea of replacing 
that system with a ‘community charge.’70 Instead of sending bills of different size, one to each 
householder, the local authority would have to bill everyone on the register for a flat rate for local 
services – levied on rich and poor alike and regardless of income.71  The 1987 Tory Party Conference 
had seen a passionate defence of this idea by Gerry Malone, who had lost his Aberdeen seat – an 
outcome which he blamed on the oil-rich town’s high rates for wealthy constituents.72 According to 
Ridley, Thatcher whispered in his ear that ‘we shall have to look at this again, Nick.’73 The Local 
Government Finance Act of 1988 brought the Community Charge into operation. First to be trialled 
in Scotland, the Charge would be rolled out across Britain by 1990. However, surveys carried out by 
the government indicated that only the top-earning 20% would be better off under the new system 
– while the remaining 80% would be significantly worse off.74 Crucially, this meant that so-called 
‘Essex Man,’ the lower middle-classes and better-off working-class people - who had benefitted from 
right-to-buy and who formed a vital part of the Tories voting bloc - would lose out. 75  
Senior Tory ministers claimed in hindsight to have known that the Community Charge was a 
political disaster waiting to happen.76 However, even senior ministers were operating in the culture 
of conformity. Political opponents within the Tory Party such as Michael Heseltine were dismissed as 
‘socialists’ for questioning Thatcher.77 When, later, Thatcher heard that Heseltine had announced a 
leadership bid, she privately told colleagues that he was ‘on the side of Saddam,’ a reference to the 
ongoing Gulf War and an example of the Prime Minister’s black and white perceptions concerning 
most issues.78 On the eve of the Community Charge’s implementation, Chancellor Nigel Lawson, 
seen as one of the few ministers willing to stand up to Thatcher, resigned. Lawson had demanded 
the removal of Thatcher’s long-time ally and private-sector loyalist, Alan Walters, a demand which 
had been refused by the Prime Minister.79 Once at a safe distance himself, Lawson lambasted other 
ministers such as Chris Patten, who Lawson accused of allowing a terrible bill to go through, so 
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fearful was Patten of appearing to question Thatcher’s will.80 A series of examinations and debates 
about the bill took place before implementation. In one of the most telling examples of how 
completely the culture of conformity had closed down debate and dissent within the Tory Party and 
Whitehall, those involved in the examinations failed in what should have been their only purpose – 
to abandon the scheme.81 By 1989, the Fully-Thatcherised Satrapy in Whitehall had abandoned the 
last vestige of political neutrality and was now completely out of control, according to the Prime 
Minister’s own Private Secretary, Caroline Slocock.82 Lawson reflected that by 1989, any discussion 
or questioning of Thatcher’s will was forbidden by her and her echo chamber within the culture of 
conformity.83 
Among the general public, the name ‘Community Charge’ never caught on. Instead, the 
universally reviled scheme was known as the ‘Poll Tax.’ In Scotland, where the Poll Tax was first 
introduced, 26,000 people ceased to exist in Glasgow – their names disappearing off voting registers 
because people had no way of paying the high amounts.84 In poorer areas, most people could not 
pay it – regardless of whether they wanted to or not. Militant Tendency, repeatedly the target of SPL 
counter-subversion, was responsible for setting up the Anti-Poll Tax Federation in Scotland, where 
the ‘subversives’ persuaded over one million Scots not to register – from a population of just 3.8 
million.85 Implementation across England brought street protests across the north and a full-blown 
riot in London in March 1990.86 In the polls, Labour’s lead shot up to 20%.87 The Mid-Staffordshire 
By-Election, ten days before the Poll Tax’s introduction in England and Wales, saw a huge Tory 
majority overturned by Labour – a 20% swing and the biggest swing from Tory to Labour since the 
war.88  
For Thatcher personally, the Poll Tax had seen the Prime Minister’s aura of seeming 
invincibility, and the surrounding culture of conformity, destroyed. Just months earlier, at the 1989 
Tory Conference, the chant had been for ‘ten more years.’89 Seemingly adopting the uncharacteristic 
lack of guardedness shared by her loyalists after the 1987 election, the Prime Minister had told her 
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friend Woodrow Wyatt that she fully intended to seek a fourth and even a fifth term in office.90 
Instead Tory ministers, tired of her bullying behaviour, turned on her one-by-one. Even her most 
staunch loyalists seemed to sense that the ship was sinking. Nicholas Ridley distanced himself from 
the Poll Tax, though some have argued that he was one of the chief architects of it.91 Though he 
accused dissenting Tories of an ‘ambush,’ Ridley admitted that ‘the blame lay at the Prime Minister’s 
door.’92 In his memoirs, Ridley put his own bad press over the Poll Tax down to jealousy ‘because I 
went to Eton and Balliol.’93 Again from his safe distance, Nigel Lawson referred to the Poll Tax as ‘the 
greatest single political blunder of the Thatcher years.’94 The centrist Labour leadership was less than 
effective, despite the Tories’ massive mistake. Neil Kinnock labelled those who had vowed not to pay 
the Poll Tax as ‘toytown revolutionaries who pretend that the tax can be stopped and the 
government toppled by non-payment.’95 However, figures on the Labour left joined in the protests 
with Tony Benn, George Galloway and Jeremy Corbyn all signing-up for the non-payment 
campaign.96 Beleaguered by opponents from across the political spectrum, (other than the centrist 
Labour leadership), facing another leadership challenge from Heseltine that she was predicted to 
lose, and enduring further high-profile resignations, Thatcher announced her own resignation in 
November 1990. Referring to the overconfidence and lack of stealth displayed by Thatcher and her 
loyalists from 1988 onwards, the journalist and commentator Mark Steel reflected that ‘Thatcher, 
her [civil servants], her press and her police were like a boxer who’d become so used to winning that 
he doesn’t notice the hunger and speed of his next opponent, or the flab accumulating on his own 
stomach.’97 
Among the last pieces of evidence known to exist in regard to the SPL, is a correspondence 
concerning dockers’ and transport workers’ strikes which were both taking place in June 1989. MI5 
had supplied Butler with names and other details of supposed subversives and sympathisers at 
National Executive Committee level within each union. The SPL conceded that both disputes 
appeared to be about pay and conditions. In a letter to the Prime Minister’s Office, however, Butler 
argued that, although subversive organisations did not appear to be organising the dockers’ strikes, 
‘this could mean that certain militant individuals [were] coordinating them,’ therefore making the 
strikes subversive by association.98 MI5, again drafted in to supply the required information, had 
 
90 Ibid.  
91 Bloom, Thatcher’s Secret War, p284.  
92 Ridley, My Style, p227 & 221.  
93 Ibid, p222.  
94 Lawson, The View From Number 11, p1001.  
95 Turner, Rejoice Rejoice, p355.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Butler to Thatcher’s Private Secretary Malcolm Turnbull, 12th June 1989, TNA Kew, CAN301/486. 
P a g e  | 168 
 
shown concern that ‘if it appears that [transport workers] support the strike as Trade Union 
members, they would not be an appropriate target for the Security Service.’99 As ever, the usual 
justification was used; ‘on the other hand, if they are still meeting to ensure the continuation of the 
strike at all costs in order to further subversive aims, then the position becomes less clear cut.’100 
Despite Thatcher’s own move away from stealth, her public-sector loyalists inside the SPL were still 
actively, and covertly, pursuing ‘subversives’ as late as July 1989. Shortly after, Thatcher would take 
down with her the culture of conformity which had led to the abandonment of distinctions between 
party and state and the weaponisation of elements of the state against political opponents of the 
Prime Minister. Whether the SPL ever produced its fourth report for Prime Minister John Major, or 
even continued its activities beyond that, remains unknown. When the evidence detailing the 
existence and activities of the SPL was released in July 2018, those working within Britain’s state 
apparatus again did so under the Conservative Party. The Guardian journalist Ian Cobain wrote to 
the Home Office to ask whether it was still involved in the blacklisting of civil servants. Despite 
originally refusing to acknowledge that the SPL had existed at all, the Home Office later changed the 
official line, hence: ‘the inter-departmental group on Subversion in Public Life (SPL) is no longer in 
operation and there is no other unit conducting similar work.’101 Whether the Home Office was 
telling the truth, or had merely returned to stealth adherence, will only become apparent at a later 
date. 
Between 1985 and 1988 the SPL methodically weaponised sections of the state against civil servants, 
schoolteachers, local councillors and health workers. Blacklisting, a purge procedure, and surprise 
inspections were all deployed against political opponents of the Prime Minister and others who had 
been labelled as subversive. The methodology used to brand workers as subversives was crude and 
deeply unfair. As with both the DSPU and the Leicester Unit, the SPL eschewed political legitimacy by 
adhering to stealth, as originally set-out in the Ridley Report. Operating in the same culture of 
conformity in which the Leicester Unit had come into existence, Partridge, Rimington, Harrington, 
Hilary and the others carried-out partisan activities and secretly altered the lives of an unknown 
number of public sector workers. Along with the DSPU and the Leicester Unit, the SPL was another 
example of the lack of distinction between the governing Conservative Party and elements of the 
permanent state. The SPL operated with a direct line, through the SHC, to the Prime Minister who 
 
99 Patrick Walker MI5 and SPL, to Butler, 7th July 1989, TNA Kew, CAB301/486. 
100 Ibid.  
101 Ian Cobain, 'Subversive civil servants secretly blacklisted under Thatcher,’ the Guardian 24th July 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/24/subversive-civil-servants-secretly-blacklisted-under-
thatcher (Accessed 16th January 2019).  
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gave them unambiguous orders to develop techniques to get people sacked and to spread their 
activities into other sectors.  
Though it might be argued that senior civil servants such as Armstrong and Partridge were 
never likely to be politically neutral and could be expected to side against labour interests, that 
cannot account for the activities of the SPL.102 Unlike with the other two groups highlighted in this 
research, many of those targeted between 1985 and 1989 were not on strike. Existing biases already 
present amongst those working within the state apparatus had been heightened by the prevailing 
atmosphere in which loyalty was not primarily to the British voters or the British state - but to 
Margaret Thatcher. In the case of the SPL, that partisanship and lack of neutrality was exacerbated 
because the group reported directly to the Prime Minister. The existence and activities of the SPL 
denote the continuing weaponisation of sections of the state – originally evident in the 
government’s responses to the miners’ strike and then continued within the culture of conformity 
well after the strike had ended. The miners’ strike had allowed the ‘gloves to come off,’ and the 
normalisation of the disintegration between party and state. When the strike was finished, 
Thatcher’s loyalists rolled-out the same weaponisation against workers in four other areas – in line 
with the Prime Minister’s wishes.   
Reflections on the Research Questions 
 If the existence and activities of the Leicester Unit demonstrated how far Thatcherism had 
permeated the permanent state, then the existence and activities of the SPL show the continuation 
of that politicisation after the miners’ strike had ended. Cultural norms, including the weaponisation 
of sections of the state, not only continued but were broadened and rolled-out across four other 
areas of the public sector. However, Thatcher was again directly involved. That influence allowed SPL 
members to carry out their blacklisting and other activities secure in the knowledge that the Prime 
Minister had personally sanctioned the weaponisation of sections of the state against political 
opponents. Under the auspices of Thatcher and her DSPU loyalists, such activity had been 
normalised during the strike and manifested most obviously through the Leicester Unit. Once that 
normalisation had taken place, it was easy enough for those same agencies and same people to ‘go 
after’ other political opponents of the Prime Minister. The SPL served as another example of 
something different occurring under Thatcher – despite existing state biases. Direct interference by 
the Prime Minister, widespread blacklisting of state employees and even direct action intended to 
 
102 Ralph Miliband. The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (Aylesbury: 
Quartet Books 1974), p76 
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bring about dismissal are all extreme examples of the authoritarianism which defined the Thatcher 
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Chapter 14: Culture of Conformity Revisited 
The recruitment of private-sector loyalists into the DSPU, the enlistment of ideologically-aligned 
civil-servants into Whitehall, direct pressure from the Prime Minister aimed at several state agencies 
to conform, and already-existing conservative biases within those agencies, all contributed to the 
development of a culture of conformity during Margaret Thatcher’s tenure. That culture of 
conformity led to the partial disintegration of distinctions between the governing Conservative Party 
and elements of the permanent state. With those distinctions removed, some parts of the state 
apparatus were weaponised against political opponents of the sitting Prime Minister. The attempt to 
lean on the judiciary so that arrested miners were handed down exemplary sentences, efforts to 
compile a dossier of evidence against Arthur Scargill, and the blacklisting of public-sector employees 
in four other sectors were all examples of that weaponisation. In each case, a secretive and covert 
section of the state was responsible for the targeting of specified political opponents. Fearing the 
strength of the trade unions and lacking the political legitimacy to carry-out those activities in the 
open, Thatcher’s loyalists did so in line with the Ridley Report’s instruction to avoid a full-on 
confrontation and adhere to stealth.   
The culture of conformity was established within sections of the state associated with 
longstanding conservative biases. The police had undergone a period of militarisation and 
politicisation during the 1970s and early 1980s. Some chief constables were politically aligned to 
Margaret Thatcher and made public announcements confirming that. MI5 had its own long history 
of conservatism, classism and hostility toward the NUM and the trade union movement in general. 
The civil service had taken part in the SHC and SPL in the 1970s. Private-sector loyalists had worked 
with Conservative governments for at least as long – via the Economic League. That existing state 
bias was an essential foundation on which the culture of conformity was built. However, the advent 
of Thatcher as Prime Minister was required to bring about the disintegration of party/state 
distinction on the levels described in these pages.  
In an era of polarisation, the private-sector loyalists of the DSPU had been recruited 
precisely because they were partisan. Such men were never likely to be politically neutral – owing 
both their political allegiance and their recruitment to the Prime Minister herself. Even so, the 
DSPU’s systematic attacks on the National Union of Mineworkers – starting with and including the 
accumulation of coal stocks in preparation for the strike – are an extreme example of the 
disintegration of distinctions between party and state and the weaponisation of the state by those 
partisans. The DSPU remained committed to the stealth approach as laid out in the Ridley Report. 
Policies such as avoiding the arrest of Scargill after Orgreave, the behind-the-scenes last-minute 
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NACODS agreement, attempts to influence the judiciary in order to bring about exemplary 
sentences, and enlisting the Foreign Office to go after the NUM’s overseas assets, were all key 
examples of weaponising the state without the government having to admit publicly that it was 
involved in any of those covert activities. If the lack of political neutrality displayed by the private-
sector loyalists of the DSPU was to be expected, proof of the ubiquitous nature of the culture of 
conformity is evident in how little resistance DSPU policy encountered and how ready senior 
officials, such as the Lord Chancellor and the Foreign Office Undersecretaries, were to go along.  
Thatcher’s recruitment of loyalists into Whitehall led to the politicisation of sections of the 
home civil service – the ‘fully-Thatcherised satrapy.’1 Moreover, the DSPU-aligned Scrutineers 
threatened job losses for any remaining non-conformists who might resist the culture of conformity. 
Thatcher directly instructed some of those within the state to pursue Scargill by supplying a ‘dossier 
of evidence.’ Rather than reacting to pre-existing evidence that any crime had been committed, the 
Home Office, MI5 and senior police all collaborated in an attempt to ‘get Scargill,’ because the sitting 
Prime Minister had told them to do so. Of those three agencies, only MI5 offered any resistance to 
the weaponisation of the state against the trade union leader. In the culture of conformity, however, 
that resistance was quickly overcome. During the multi-agency meetings that eventually led to the 
formation of the Leicester Unit, Michael Partridge voiced concerns that the Labour Party might find 
out about the multi-agency attempts to provide Thatcher’s dossier of evidence and use that 
information ‘against us.’2 Partridge’s language revealed a senior civil servant dedicated to carrying 
out Thatcher’s will and operating in a climate where, to a large degree, party and state distinctions 
were absent.  
Although Thatcher’s culture of conformity was born out of the state’s responses to the 
miners’ strike, the defeat of the NUM allowed those working within it to switch the focus of their 
attention onto other political targets. Both the SPL and the overseeing SHC were originally set-up by 
Heath in 1972. However, their resurrection by Thatcher’s loyalists in the wake of the miners’ strike 
allowed for a plethora of new initiatives which revealed the continuing lack of distinction between 
party and state after the coal dispute had ended. Civil servants were covertly blacklisted, secretly 
barred from promotions, moved sideways away from sensitive positions and even sacked via a purge 
procedure under the direct instruction of the Prime Minister. Schoolteachers in the London area 
 
1 Hugo Young. ‘The convictions which will not serve the full term,’ The Guardian Archive, 21st July 1987, 
https://search-proquest-
com.edgehill.idm.oclc.org/publicationissue/1D43B03C72CA4A2BPQ/$B/1/The+Guardian+$281959-
2003$29$3b+London+$28UK$29/01987Y07Y21$23Jul+21,+1987/$N?accountid=10671 (Accessed 13th July 
2019) 
2 Michael Partridge to Nigel Pantling, Private Secretary to Brittan, 1st August 1984, TNA Kew, HO325/624.   
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were singled out, blacklisted and then subjected to ‘surprise’ inspections in the hope that the SPL’s 
intervention would lead to their dismissal. The involvement of HM Inspectorate revealed another 
agency of the state in which party and state distinctions appeared absent and which was 
weaponised against the unsuspecting teachers. Blacklisting had later taken place against local 
councillors in Manchester, St Helens and 10 London boroughs – all 12 areas chosen because they 
were safe Labour constituencies and thought to contain political opponents of the Prime Minister. 
Ethnic minority councillors had been targeted because of their tenuous links with those described as 
‘subversive’ under the changed definition of that term. Finally, members of two NHS trade unions 
had been blacklisted despite deep concerns that the SPL’s lack of political legitimacy might become 
all too apparent in the event of the public finding out.  
The DSPU’s partisanship behind the scenes was always accompanied by a public 
commitment to pretend that the upper-levels of the state were not involved. The Home Office 
loyalists such as Harrington and Hilary hid their own involvement in the creation of the Leicester Unit 
and distanced themselves publicly when its existence was revealed. The SPL’s original reluctance to 
blacklist NHS employees was not based upon any moral or constitutional objection, but instead on 
the fear of public exposure. Thatcher critic Ian Gilmour’s appraisal of some Tory ministers during the 
strike was to say that Thatcher’s ‘cleverest tactic was to make out that the government was scarcely 
involved in it.’3 Covertly weaponising elements of the state against political opponents was a 
pursued policy of the Thatcher tenure, with the DSPU, the Leicester Unit and the SPL all serving as 
examples of that. It was overconfidence and the abandonment of stealth which eventually led to the 
end of the culture of conformity and Thatcher’s downfall. The three groups all adhered to stealth as 
a deliberate policy of avoiding any form of public scrutiny. Covertly, all three used oppressive and 
arbitrary force – in doing so forsaking the legitimacy conferred to state institutions under the rule of 
law. 4 Lacking legitimacy, all three were exemplars of the Thatcherite state as an amoral state – 
having ‘effective authority’ but acting without moral authority. 5 Ralph Miliband argued that ‘the 
state’ in a Western democracy was never likely to be neutral – an unconscious bastion of ruling-class 
authoritarianism. What this research reveals, however, is a conscious politicisation of the state in 
order to weaponise agencies against political opponents. Existing conservative biases were not 
enough. Recruitment of both private-sector and Whitehall loyalists were purposeful moves to 
enhance the culture of conformity and aid the disintegration between the governing party and 
elements of the permanent state. The culture of conformity is different to what went before – a 
 
3 Ian Gilmour. Dancing With Dogma: Britain Under Thatcherism (London: Simon & Schuster 1992), p91. 
4 Bob Fine & Robert Millar (&eds.) ‘Law of Market and Rule of Law,’ in Policing the Miners’ Strike (London: 
Laurence and Wishart 1985), p20. 
5 Immanuel Kant. ‘Perpetual Peace,’ in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1999). 
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conscious addition to an unconscious set of pre-existing biases and a deliberate and successful 
attempt to disintegrate party/state distinctions.  
Arthur Scargill’s claim in 1984 that the Tories meant to deploy a raft of pit closures ‘by 
stealth’ was correct. John Saville’s 1985 paper highlighting the central importance of the Ridley 
Report is also proved to be accurate by the findings of this research.6 Accusations that the 
government’s responses to the strike were based more on political rather than economic factors are 
also enhanced. Both Redwood and Pascall of the DSPU said as much while the Prime Minister also 
talked about closing economically-sound pits to preserve the principal. The theatrical and polemical 
language of the private-sector loyalists of the DSPU is not in line with the calm and calculated 
language of indifferent state employees making a dispassionate appraisal of the mining industry. 
Rather, their language and activities reveal them for what they were – private-sector loyalists intent 
on fighting the miners on behalf of their leader. Moreover, the remit and the covert activities of the 
Leicester Unit would be difficult to link to any economic justification. The research adds to the 
literature on the miners’ strike by casting serious doubt on longstanding Conservative claims that the 
government’s objectives were entirely economic.  
Reflecting on the Research Questions 
1. To what extent were the ideological mores of Thatcherism adopted by those working 
within the permanent state such as senior civil servants, MI5 officers and senior police? 
2. What cultural norms were established within the state in response to Thatcher and 
Thatcherism?  
Civil servants used the theatrical language of the Thatcherites. MI5 officers and senior policemen 
also espoused Thatcherite rhetoric – often (in regard to the latter) to such a degree that they had to 
be warned to step back. Some of those within the state were quick to acquiesce to Thatcher’s direct 
interference. Some of the language used, such as that in the SPL’s report on London’s 
schoolteachers, was in line with the ideological language of the government. Despite that, 
Thatcher’s authoritarianism made it extremely difficult to defer due to the established culture of 
conformity. This research shows that ideological and political allegiance was one factor, but that it 
cannot alone account for the weaponisation of the state. Within the culture of conformity, activity 
which might previously have been seen as coercive was normalised. The striking miners were the 
catalyst for that change. Once the miners and their leaders had been recast as enemies of the state, 
then multi-agency initiatives to ‘get Scargill’ or interference in the law courts in regard to both 
 
6 John Saville. ‘An Open Conspiracy: Conservative Politics and the Miners’ Strike 1984-5,’ Socialist Register 22 
(August 1985), pp.295-329. 
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sentencing and finance, were justified. Once that initial justification had taken place, it was easier to 
recast rank-and-file civil servants, London schoolteachers, local Labour councillors and NHS trade-
union members as enemies of the state – where previously they would have been political 
opponents of the governing party. Although occasional whistleblowers came forward, the 
weaponisation of the state was normalised within the culture of conformity. However, those 
operating within the culture of conformity knew that their activities lacked the legitimacy of public 
support. Adherence to stealth was also adopted as a cultural norm – allowing groups such as the 
Leicester Unit and the SPL to go after Thatcher’s political opponents without any scrutiny as to 
whether their own activity could ever be legitimised.  
3. Margaret Thatcher has been described by Simon Jenkins as an aggressive and angry 
leader. In what way did Thatcher’s leadership and personality influence members of the 
permanent state during her tenure?  
4. Thatcher recruited private-sector loyalists directly into the state apparatus. What impact 
did they have on members of the permanent state? 
The most important factor in the establishment of the culture of conformity was Thatcher 
herself. Her authoritarian interference, her confrontational personality and the loyalty and fear she 
inspired were essential in bringing about the weaponisation of sections of the state.  Thatcher 
replaced civil servants who could not pass the ‘one-of-us’ criteria with more ideologically-acceptable 
mandarins. The snubbing of the MI5 Director-General, and his eventual replacement with a SHC 
member, was another example of direct action taken to remake the state in her own image. Public 
pronouncements aimed at rank-and-file policemen and private instructions given to senior officers 
furthered Thatcher’s influence throughout the permanent state. Margaret Thatcher inspired two 
distinct things – loyalty and fear. Each was a key factor in the establishment of the culture of 
conformity.  
 The private-sector loyalists were an essential part of the culture of conformity. Recruited 
precisely because they were loyal to the Prime Minister and her ideology, they were given higher 
status than existing civil servants. The DSPU was also behind the ‘Scrutineers’ initiative, meaning 
dissenters could be removed. The recruitment of private-sector loyalists could be viewed as an 
ideological move – reflecting neoliberal beliefs about the superiority of the private-sector. However, 
the DSPU and its activities were put in place mainly to aid Thatcher’s deliberate disintegration of 
distinctions between party and state. By appointing her loyalists into the DSPU, Thatcher had 
created and empowered a group of men who had a higher status than most civil servants, had the 
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power to replace dissenters within the state, and who played a key role in establishing the culture of 
conformity. 
5. Clive Bloom and Seamus Milne have argued that the advent of Thatcher led to the 
politicisation of sections of the state. How far was this a new manifestation, given existing 
claims that the permanent state had always been politically biased in favour of 
conservatism?  
6. Although neoliberal theory champions the rolling-back of the state, Thatcherism has been 
described by Stuart Hall as ‘Authoritarian Populism.’ To what extent is Hall’s theory 
proven or disproven by the new evidence? 
Miliband’s assertion, about the conservative biases evident within any state in Western 
society, is discussed elsewhere in this thesis. The research findings do back that claim up – to an 
extent. Existing and inherent biases were an important contributing factor to the manifestation of 
the culture of conformity. Political policing undertaken by Special Branch and far-right dogma 
publicly espoused by some chief constables confirm Cockcroft’s analysis that elements of the British 
police had always been conservative. For senior civil servants, shared cultural and social-class ties 
made those within those organisations more likely to carry conservative biases. Christopher 
Andrew’s history of MI5 reveals a deeply-conservative and class-conscious organisation with 
structural biases against organised labour. Despite all of that, the advent of Thatcher revealed a 
decisive move away from the norm. Exiting conservative biases were simply not enough. Pressure 
from above enhanced what, to some degree, was already there. Already-existing conservatism and 
state-bias were super-charged by the advent of an ideologically aligned Prime Minister. Moreover, 
Thatcher’s direct interference behind the scenes.  
 ‘Thatcherism’ might be said, on the evidence here, to be the most interventionist ideology 
ever implemented in modern British times – if not outright totalitarian then certainly a fine example 
of Hogg’s ‘elective dictatorship’ – the term he used 10 years before the Lord Chancellor’s own ‘word 
to the wise’ with his judiciary.7 This was not just what Bloom called ‘Thatcherism sans Thatcher,’ 
although that also occurred during the strike – including the attitudes and behaviours of some 
elements of the police.8 Rather, this was direct authoritarianism - deliberate and personal 
interference by Thatcher in order to bring about the weaponisation required to attack and defeat 
the miners and other elements of the organised working-class. Bagehot had warned of a British 
 
7 Quintin Hogg to Margaret Thatcher, 18th December 1984, TNA Kew, PREM19/1578. 
8 Clive Bloom. Thatcher’s Secret War: Subversion, Coercion, Secrecy and Government 1974-90 (Stroud: The 
History Press 2015), p95.  
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constitutional susceptibility to a ‘zealot-like Premier.’9 Thatcher and her loyalists within the three 
groups had proved him correct. This research reveals the acute levels of authoritarianism involved in 
implementing Thatcherism by showing that the ideology required the weaponisation of the state 
against political opponents to succeed – hardly the work of the (neo)liberal invisible hand. The 
findings compliment Phil Scraton’s 1985 work which highlighted Thatcherism’s ability to bring about 
a ‘united mobilisation’ of state forces, including the police and judiciary, against flying pickets and 
other alien groups.10  
Barriers to the Research 
As discussed in the introduction, in order to complete this research it was necessary to 
overcome several barriers which occurred when trying to obtain ‘politically sensitive’ material. It 
could be argued that the current system allows state agencies to ‘pick and choose’ which material to 
release and therefore requires a clarification of regulatory procedure. As discussed, the papers 
concerning the Leicester Unit were only released under pressure from the Orgreave Truth and 
Justice Campaign. Official methods – such as Freedom of Information Requests (FOI) – are easy to 
bypass for a government department inclined to keep a particular file hidden. Some state agencies 
can look with suspicion toward the historian who is requesting to look at files. For instance, South 
Yorkshire Police’s (SYP) claim that my request to see that agency’s files might be ‘vexatious’ in 
nature. There are two points to address here. Firstly, the best methods of finding out what is 
available. Secondly, finding out how to access that material.  In the first instance, FOI requests can 
be very useful.  State agencies are legally-bound to inform a requestor of what material they hold 
concerning a specific subject. In this author’s reply from SYP, the force’s Compliance Officer 
informed me that the agency had over 30 boxes of material relating to Orgreave. This can prove 
tantalising if a historian is then told that he cannot access that material (as indeed happened in this 
case), but FOI was essential in finding out exactly who had what. The National Archives website and 
search engine is another useful tool – in locating exactly what has been handed over. Though again, 
this does not necessarily mean that one will be allowed to view it.  
Once a requestor has identified exactly what material is available, the second (and more 
difficult) problem is gaining access. It is necessary here to reflect on the barriers faced in gaining 
access to significant information. Although state agencies must reply to FOI requests and inform the 
requestor of the documentation held, a different criteria exists when deciding whether to let the 
 
9 Walter Bagehot. The English Constitution (London: Chapman and Hall 1949), p206.  
10  Phil Scraton & Phil Thomas. The State v the People: Lessons from the Coal Dispute (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
1985), p264.  
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historian actually view the files. A plethora of opaque ‘exceptions’ can be applied. The current state 
of affairs allows the British state to manufacture versions of the past which ‘cut out’ the worst 
excesses of state coercion. The continuing electoral successes of the Conservative Party mean that 
senior Tories act as gatekeepers to knowledge about the party’s previous administrations.  
Reflections on the Contribution to Knowledge 
It might be argued that the evidence, analysis and conclusions of this research do not 
portray the actions of those within the culture of conformity in a flattering light. However, any 
attempt to revise the findings in order to avoid controversial conclusions would represent lazy 
conformism. With findings such as these, accurate portrayals of those involved, and true 
representations of the evidence, might be said to constitute risk-taking. If so, then being unafraid to 
take those risks adds further to an innovative thesis which highlights an original topic (the three 
groups), is evidenced by new data (the archives) and makes a significant contribution toward filling 
the knowledge gap concerning the government’s responses to the strike.   
This research makes a contribution to knowledge by building on the work of academics such 
as Stuart Hall and Ralph Miliband– particularly Hall’s concept of authoritarian populism and 
Miliband’s work on the function of the state. Hall and Scraton both defined Thatcherism and the 
Thatcherite state as definitively authoritarian, in a different way to what had gone before. However, 
those authors were less successful in integrating their findings with Miliband’s theories. Miliband 
argued convincingly that the state in Western democracies had always been partisan, likely to be 
biased in favour of more conservative regimes and authoritarian by its own nature. If the British 
state was already authoritarian, then what was different about Thatcherism?  The originality of this 
research, alongside the new primary sources, is in uniting these two theories. The existence and 
activities of the DSPU, the Leicester Unit and the SPL are in themselves a bridge linking Miliband to 
Hall and Scraton. On the one hand, the research reveals clear evidence of a politically-aligned state 
intent on attacking political opponents of the governing Conservative Party. However, those existing 
biases were not enough for Margaret Thatcher. The recruitment of private-sector loyalists into the 
DSPU, the enlistment of ideologically-aligned civil-servants into Whitehall, and direct pressure from 
the Prime Minister aimed at the police, MI5 and Home Office employees were all new 
developments. That deliberate ‘super-charging’ of the existing state biases described by Miliband 
was the physical manifestation of authoritarian populism.  
Britain remains susceptible to the possibility of a zealot-like Premier inspiring, and directly 
introducing, a culture of conformity within some elements of the state. Should another Thatcher 
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come along – a Prime Minister who commanded loyalty not to a programme of policies but instead 
to a personality - then no check is in place to prevent such a leader weaponising sections of the state 
apparatus against their political opponents. With that in mind, the findings of this research can be 
viewed as a critical warning from history by revealing the lengths to which the apparatus of the 
British state can be purposefully turned against political opponents of the sitting Prime Minister. The 
existing conservative framework on which Thatcher’s culture of conformity was established has not 
diminished. At the time of writing, as a new, Thatcher-aligned Conservative Prime Minister comes to 
power, Britain’s susceptibility to a ‘zealot-like Premier’ remains an unresolved issue. Further 
research into these issues might look into SPL activity during the John Major government, the Tony 
Blair Labour administrations or more recent developments. During the Blair tenure, the DSPU was 
doubled in size – as had happened under Thatcher. Finally, the return to the news of ‘special 
advisors’ such as Dominic Cummings might be taken to suggest that the issues discussed in this 
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Appendix A: Ministerial Group, Subversion Home Committee and Sub-Groups 1972. 
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Appendix B: Procedural Flow of the Leicester Unit 
Special Branches from 16 Strike-Bound Local Forces.  
• Collated information from front line occurrences and sent that information directly to the 
CIU (Leicester Unit). 
• Information required in relation to picketing and criminal behaviour.  
• To ‘provide intelligence leading to the obtaining of evidence to support the prosecution of 




The CIU (Leicester Unit). 
• Seven-man team – 6 Special Branch and 1 MI5 officer. 
• Headed by Deputy CC Goslin and DS Martindale. 
• Analyses data sent from front line forces. Looking for patterns or trends which can link 
picketing and criminal behaviour back to Scargill and other miners’ leaders. 




ACPO Chief Charles McLaughlin AND Michael Partridge Deputy Undersecretary of the Home Office. 
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Appendix C: Subversion Home Committee and Subversion in Public Life Group 1985.
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